

AN
ESSAY
ON THE
NATURE *and* CONDUCT
OF THE
Passions and Affections.
WITH
ILLUSTRATIONS
On the MORAL SENSE.

*By the Author of the Inquiry into the Original
of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue.*

*Hoc opus, hoc studium, parvi properemus, & ampli,
Si Patria volumus, si Nobis vivere chari.* Hor.

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E S S A Y

OF THE
NATURE AND
EXTENT

OF THE
PASSION AND AFFECTION

WITH
ILLUSTRATIONS

OF THE MIND

OF THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE PASSION AND AFFECTION

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THE PREFACE.

ALTHO' the main *practical Principles*, which are inculcated in this Treatise, have this Prejudice in their Favour, that they have been taught and propagated by the best of Men in all Ages, yet there is reason to fear that renewed Treatises upon Subjects so often well manag'd, may be look'd upon as *superfluous*; especially since little is offer'd upon them which has not often been well said before. But beside that general Consideration, that old Arguments may sometimes be set in such a Light by one, as will convince those who were not

moved by them, even when better express'd by another ; since, for every Class of *Writers*, there are Classes of *Readers* adapted, who cannot relish any thing higher : Besides this, I say, the very *Novelty* of a Book may procure a little Attention, from those who over-look the Writings which the World has long enjoy'd. And if by *Curiosity*, or any other means, some few can be engag'd to turn their Thoughts to these important Subjects, about which a little *Reflection* will discover the Truth, and a thorow *Consideration* of it may occasion a great Increase of real Happiness ; no Person need be asham'd of his Labours as useless, which do such Service to any of his Fellow-Creatures.

If any should look upon some Things in this *Inquiry into the Passions*, as too suitable for common Apprehension, and consequently not necessary for the Instruction of Men in *Morals*, which are the common business of Mankind : Let them consider, that the Difficulty on these Subjects arises chiefly from some *previous Notions*, equally difficult at least, which have been already receiv'd, to the great Detriment of many a *Natural Temper* ; since many have been discourag'd from all Attempts of cultivating kind generous *Affections* in themselves, by a previous Notion that there are no such Affections in Nature, and that all Pretence to them was only *Dissimulation*, *Affectation*, or at best some *unnatural Enthusiasm*. And farther, that

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The PREFACE.

to discover Truth on these Subjects, nothing more is necessary than a little *Attention to what passes in our own Hearts*, and consequently every Man may come to Certainty in these Points, without much Art or Knowledge of other Matters.

WHATEVER Confusion the *Schoolmen* introduced into Philosophy, some of their keenest *Adversaries* seem to threaten it with a worse kind of Confusion, by attempting to take away some of the most *immediate simple Perceptions*, and to explain all *Approbation, Condemnation, Pleasure and Pain*, by some intricate Relations to the Perceptions of the *External Senses*. In like manner they have treated our *Desires or Affections*, making the most generous, kind and disinterested of them, to proceed from *Self-Love*, by some subtle Trains of Reasoning, to which honest Hearts are often wholly Strangers.

LET this also still be remembered that the *natural Dispositions* of Mankind will operate regularly in those who never reflected upon them, nor form'd just Notions about them. Many are really *virtuous* who cannot explain what *Virtue* is. Some act a most generous disinterested Part in Life, who have been taught to account for all their Actions by *Self-Love*, as their sole Spring. There have been very different and opposite Opinions in *Opicks*, con-

trary Accounts have been given of *Hearing*, *voluntary Motion*, *Digestion*, and other *natural Actions*. But the Powers themselves in reality perform their several Operations with sufficient Constancy and Uniformity, in Persons of good Health, whatever their Opinions be about them. In the same manner our *moral Actions* and *Affections* may be in good order, when our Opinions are quite wrong about them. *True Opinions* however, about both, may enable us to *improve* our natural Powers, and to *rectify* accidental Disorders incident unto them. And true Speculations on these Subjects must certainly be attended with as much *Pleasure* as any other Parts of human Knowledge.

IT may perhaps seem strange, that when in this *Treatise* Virtue is suppos'd *disinterested*; yet so much Pains is taken, by a *Comparison* of our several *Pleasures*, to prove the *Pleasures* of *Virtue* to be the greatest we are capable of, and that consequently it is our truest *Interest* to be *virtuous*. But let it be remember'd here, that tho' there can be no *Motives* or *Arguments* suggested which can directly raise any *ultimate Desire*, such as that of our *own Happiness*, or *publick Affections* (as we attempt to prove in *Treatise IV*;) yet if both are *natural Dispositions* of our Minds, and nothing can stop the Operation of *publick Affections* but some *selfish Interest*, the only way to give publick Affections their full Force, and to make them pre-

valent

valent in our Lives, must be to remove these *Opinions of opposite Interests*, and to shew a superior Interest on their side. If these Considerations be just and sufficiently attended to, a *natural Disposition* can scarce fail to exert it self to the full.

IN this *Essay on the Passions*, the Proofs and Illustrations of a *moral Sense*, and *Sense of Honour* are not mention'd; because they are in the *Inquiry into moral Good and Evil*, in the first and fifth *Sections*. Would Men reflect upon what they feel in themselves, all *Proofs* in such *Matters* would be needless.

SOME strange Love of *Simplicity* in the Structure of human Nature, or Attachment to some favourite *Hypothesis*, has engag'd many *Writers* to pass over a great many *simple Perceptions*, which we may find in our selves. We have got the Number *Five* fixed for our *external Senses*, tho' *Seven* or *Ten* might as easily be defended. We have *Multitudes* of *Perceptions* which have no relation to any *external Sensation*; if by it we mean *Perceptions, occasion'd by Motions or Impressions made on our Bodies*; such as the *Ideas of Number, Duration, Proportion, Virtue, Vice, Pleasures of Honour, of Congratulation; the Pains of Remorse, Shame, Sympathy*, and many others. It were to be wish'd, that those who are at such Pains to prove a beloved Maxim, that "all Ideas arise from Sensation and Reflection,"

had

had so explain'd themselves, that none should take their Meaning to be, that all our Ideas are either *external Sensations*, or *reflex Acts* upon *external Sensations*: Or if by *Reflection* they mean an *inward Power of Perception*, as I fancy they do, they had as carefully examin'd into the several kinds of *internal Perceptions*, as they have done into the *external Sensations*: That we might have seen whether the former be not as *natural* and *necessary* as the latter. Had they in like manner consider'd our *Affections* without a previous Notion, that they were all from *Self-Love*, they might have felt an *ultimate Desire* of the Happiness of others as easily conceivable, and as certainly implanted in the human Breast, tho' perhaps not so strong as *Self-Love*.

THE Author hopes this imperfect *Essay* will be favourably receiv'd, till some Person of greater Abilities and Leisure apply himself to a more strict Philosophical Inquiry into the various *natural Principles* or *natural Dispositions* of Mankind; from which perhaps a more exact Theory of Morals may be form'd, than any which has yet appear'd: And hopes that this Attempt, to shew the fair side of the human Temper, may be of some little use towards this great End.

THE principal Objections offer'd by Mr. Clarke of Hull, against the second Section of the

the second *Treatise*, occur'd to the Author in Conversation, and had appriz'd him of the necessity of a farther illustration of *disinterested Affections*, in answer to his Scheme of deducing them from *Self-Love*, which seem'd more ingenious than any which the Author of the *Inquiry* ever yet saw in Print. He takes better from Mr. *Clarke*, all other Parts of his Treatment, than the raising such an Outcry against him as *injurious to Christianity*, for Principles which some of the most zealous *Christians* have publicly maintain'd: He hopes Mr. *Clarke* will be satisfy'd upon this Point, as well as about the Scheme of *disinterested Affections*, by what is offer'd in the *Treatise* on the *Passions*, Sect. I. and designedly placed here, rather than in any distinct *Reply*, both to avoid the disagreeable Work of *Answering* or *Remarking* upon Books, wherein it is hard to keep off too keen and offensive Expressions; and also, that those who have had any of the former Editions of the *Inquiry*, might not be at a loss about any *Illustrations* or additional *Proofs* necessary to complete the Scheme.

THE last *Treatise* had never seen the Light; had not some worthy *Gentlemen* mistaken some things about the moral Sense alledg'd to be in Mankind: Their Objections gave Opportunity of farther Inquiry into the several *Schemes* of accounting for our *moral Ideas*, which some
appre-

apprehend to be wholly different from, and independent on that *Sense* which the Author attempts to establish. The following Papers attempt to shew, that all these *Schemes* must necessarily presuppose this *moral Sense*, and be resolv'd into it : Nor does the Author endeavour to over-turn them, or represent them as unnecessary Superstructures upon the Foundation of a moral Sense ; tho' what he has suggested will probably shew a considerable Confusion in some of the *Terms* much used on these Subjects. One may easily see from the great *Variety of Terms*, and diversity of *Schemes* invented, that all Men *feel* something in their own Hearts recommending Virtue, which yet it is difficult to explain. This Difficulty probably arises from our previous Notions of a small Number of *Senses*, so that we are unwilling to have Recourse in our Theories to any more ; and rather strain out some Explication of moral Ideas, with relation to some other natural Powers of Perception universally acknowledg'd. The like difficulty attends several other *Perceptions*, to the Reception of which Philosophers have not generally assigned their *distinct Senses* ; such as *natural Beauty, Harmony*, the Perfection of *Poetry, Architecture, Designing*, and such like Affairs of Genius, Taste, or Fancy : The Explications or Theories on these Subjects are in like manner full of Confusion and Metaphor.

To define *Virtue* by *agreeableness to this moral Sense*, or describing it to be *kind Affection*, may appear perhaps too uncertain; considering that the Sense of particular Persons is often depraved by *Custom*, *Habits*, false Opinions, Company: and that some *particular kind Passions* toward some Persons are really pernicious, and attended with very unkind Affections toward others, or at least with a Neglect of their Interests. We must therefore only assert in general, that “every one calls that Temper, or those Actions *virtuous*, which are approv’d by his *own Sense*,” and withal, that “abstracting from particular Habits or Prejudices, every one is so constituted as to approve every *particular kind Affection* toward any one, which argues no want of *Affection* toward others. And constantly to approve that Temper which desires, and those Actions which tend to procure the greatest Moment of Good in the Power of the Agent toward the most extensive System to which it can reach;” and consequently, that the Perfection of *Virtue* consists in “having the *universal calm Benevolence*, the prevalent Affection of the Mind, so as to limit and counteract not only the *selfish Passions*, but even the *particular kind Affections*.”

OUR *moral Sense* shews this to be the highest Perfection of our Nature; what we may see to be

be the *End* or *Design* of such a Structure, and consequently what is requir'd of us by the Author of our Nature : and therefore if any one like these Descriptions better, he may call Virtue, with many of the Antients, "*Vita secundum naturam*;" or "acting according to what we may see from the Constitution of our Nature, we were intended for by our Creator.

If this *Moral Sense* were once set in a convincing Light, those vain Shadows of Objections against a virtuous Life, in which some are wonderfully delighted, would soon vanish : alledging, that whatever we admire or honour in a *moral Species*, is the Effect of *Art, Education, Custom, Policy*, or subtle Views of Interest ; we should then acknowledge

Quid sumus, & quidnam victuri gignimur. Persl.

'T IS true, a *Power of Reasoning* is natural to us ; and we must own, that all Arts and Sciences which are well founded, and tend to direct our Actions, are, if not to be called *Natural*, an *Improvement upon our Nature* : yet if Virtue be look'd upon as wholly Artificial, there are I know not what Suspicions against it ; as if indeed it might tend to the greater Interest of *large Bodies* or *Societies* of Men, or to that of their *Governors* ; whereas a private Person may better find his *Interest*, or enjoy greater Pleasures in the Practices

Practices counted *vicious*, especially if he has any Probability of *Secrecy* in them. These Suspicions must be entirely remov'd, if we have a *moral Sense* and *publick Affections*, whose Grati-
fications are constituted by Nature, our most in-
tense and durable *Pleasures*.

I HOPE it is a good Omen of something still better on this Subject to be expected in the learn-
ed World, that Mr. *Butler*, in his Sermons at the *Rolls Chappel*, has done so much Justice to the
wise and good Order of our Nature; that the
Gentlemen, who have oppos'd some other Sen-
timents of the Author of the *Inquiry*, seem
convinc'd of a *moral Sense*. Some of them have
by a Mistake made a Compliment to the Author,
which does not belong to him; as if the World
werè any way indebted to him for this Discove-
ry. He has too often met with the *Sensus De-
cori & Honesti*, and with the *Δύναμις ἀγαθῆς*, to
assume any such thing to himself.

SOME Letters in the *London Journals*, sub-
scribed *Philaretus*, gave the first Occasion to the
Fourth Treatise; the Answers given to them
bore too visible Marks of the Hurry in which
they were wrote, and therefore the *Author* de-
clined to continue the Debate that way; chusing
to send a private Letter to *Philaretus*, to desire a
more private Correspondence on the Subject of
our Debate. I have been since informed, that

his Death disappointed my great Expectations from so ingenious a Correspondent. The *Objections* propos'd in the first *Section* of *Treatise* IV, are not always those of *Philaretus*, tho' I have endeavour'd to leave no *Objections* of his unanswer'd; but I also interspersed whatever *Objections* occur'd to me in Conversation on these Subjects. I hope I have not used any Expressions inconsistent with the high Regard I have for the Memory of so ingenious a Gentleman, and of such Distinction in the World.

THE last *Section* of the *Fourth Treatise*, was occasion'd by a private Letter from a Person of the most real Merit, in *Glasgow*; representing to me some Sentiments not uncommon among good Men, which might prejudice them against any Scheme of *Morals*, not wholly founded upon *Piety*. This Point is, I hope, so treated, as to remove the Difficulty.

THE Difference due to a Person, who has appear'd so much in the learned World, as M. *Le Clerc*, would seem to require, that I should make some Defence against, or Submission to, the Remarks he makes in his *Bibliothèque Ancienne & Moderne*. But I cannot conclude from his Abstract, especially from that of the last *Section* of the *Inquiry*, either that I don't understand his *French*, or he my *English*, or that he has never read more than the Titles of some
of

of the *Sections* : and if any one of the three be the Case, we are not fit for a Controversy.

IN the References, at bottom of Pages, the Inquiry into *Beauty* is called *Treatise I.* That into the Ideas of moral Good and Evil, is *Treatise II.* The Essay on the Passions *Treatise III.* And the Illustrations on the moral Sense, *Treatise IV.*



THE PRINCIPLES
OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE HISTORY OF THE
CITY, WE NEED NOT BE LONGER CONSIDERED

CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
AND THE INFLUENCE OF THE MORAL SCIENCE
ON THE HISTORY OF THE CITY

THE PRINCIPLES
OF THE CONSTITUTION

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AN
ESSAY
ON THE
NATURE *and* CONDUCT
OF THE
PASSIONS.

SECT. I.

*A general Account of our several SENSES and DESIRES,
Selfish or Publick.*



THE Nature of human Actions cannot be sufficiently understood without considering the *Affections* and *Passions*; or those *Modifications*, or *Actions of the Mind* consequent upon the *Apprehension* of certain *Objects* or *Events*, in which the *Mind* generally conceives *Good* or *Evil*. In this inquiry we need little *Reasoning*, or *Argument*, since *Certainty* is only attainable by distinct *Attention* to what we are conscious happens in our *Minds*.

Art. I. "Objects, Actions, or Events obtain the Name of *Good* or *Evil*, according as they are the Causes, or Occasions, mediately, or immediately, of a grateful, or ungrateful *Perception* to some sensitive Nature." To understand therefore the several Kinds of *Good*, or *Evil*, we must apprehend the several *Senses* natural to us.

There seems to be some *Sense* or other suited to every sort of Objects which occurs to us, by which we receive either *Pleasure*, or *Pain* from a great part of them, as well as some *Image*, or *Apprehension* of them: Nay sometimes our only *Idea* is a *Perception of Pleasure or Pain*. The Pleasures or Pains perceiv'd, are sometimes *simple*, without any other previous *Idea*, or any *Image*, or other concomitant *Ideas*, save those of *Extension*, or of *Duration*; one of which accompanies every *Perception*, whether of *Sense*, or inward *Consciousness*. Other Pleasures arise only upon some previous *Idea*, or *Assemblage*, or *Comparison of Ideas*. These Pleasures, presupposing previous *Ideas*, were called *Perceptions of an internal Sense*, in a former Treatise*. Thus *Regularity* and *Uniformity* in Figures, are no less grateful than *Tastes*, or *Smells*; the *Harmony* of Notes, is more grateful than simple Sounds†. In like manner,

Affections,

* INQUIRY into BEAUTY.

† It is not easy to divide distinctly our several Sensations into *Classes*. The Division of our External Senses into the five common *Classes*, is ridiculously imperfect. Some Sensations, received without any previous *Idea*, can either be reduced to none of them, such as the Sensations of Hunger, Thirst, Weariness, Sickness; or if we reduce them to the Sense of Feeling, they are Perceptions as different from the other *Ideas of Touch*, such as Cold, Heat, Hardness, Softness, as the *Ideas of Taste or Smell*. Others have hinted at an External Sense different from all of these. The following general Account may possibly be useful. (1.) That certain Motions raised in our Bodies are by a general Law constituted the

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of the PASSIONS.

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Affections, Tempers, Sentiments, or Actions, reflected upon in our selves, or observed in others, are the constant Occasions of agreeable or disagreeable Perceptions, which we call Approbation, or Dislike. These Moral Perceptions arise in us as necessarily as any other Sensations; nor can

the Occasion of Perceptions in the Mind. (2.) These Perceptions never come entirely alone, but have some other Perception joined with them. Thus every Sensation is accompanied with the Idea of Duration, and yet Duration is not a sensible Idea, since it also accompanies Ideas of Internal Consciousness or Reflection: So the Idea of Number may accompany any sensible Ideas, and yet may also accompany any other Ideas, as well as external Sensations. (3.) Some Ideas are found accompanying the most different Sensations, which yet are not to be perceived separately from some sensible Quality; such are Extension, Figure, Motion, and Rest, which accompany the Ideas of Sight, or Colours, and yet may be perceived without them, as in the Ideas of Touch, at least if we move our Organs along the Parts of the Body touched. Extension, Figure, Motion, or Rest, seem therefore to be more properly called Ideas accompanying the Sensations of Sight and Touch, than the Sensations of either of these Senses. The Perceptions which are purely sensible, received each by its proper Sense, are Tastes, Smells, Colours, Sound, Cold, Heat, &c. The universal concomitant Ideas which may attend any Idea whatsoever, are Duration, and Number. The Ideas which accompany the most different Sensations are Extension, Figure, Motion, Rest. These all arise without any previous Ideas assembled, or compared: the concomitant Ideas are reputed Images of something External.

From all these we may justly distinguish "the Pleasures perceived upon the previous Reception and Comparison of various sensible Perceptions, with their concomitant Ideas, or intellectual Ideas, when we find Uniformity, or Resemblance among them." These are meant by the Perceptions of the internal Sense.

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4 The Nature and Conduct

we alter, or stop them, while our *previous Opinion or Apprehension* of the *Affection, Temper, or Intention* of the Agent continues the same; any more than we can make the Taste of Wormwood sweet, or that of Honey bitter.

IF we may call every Determination of our Minds to receive Ideas independently on our Will, and to have Perceptions of Pleasure and Pain, A SENSE, we shall find many other Senses beside those commonly explained. Tho' it is not easy to assign accurate Divisions on such Subjects, yet we may reduce them to the following Classes, leaving it to others to arrange them as they think convenient. A little Reflection will shew that there are such *Natural Powers* in the human Mind, in whatever Order we place them. In the 1st Class are the *External Senses*, universally known. In the 2d, the *Pleasant Perceptions* arising from regular, harmonious, uniform Objects; as also from *Grandeur and Novelty*. These we may call, after Mr. ADDISON, the Pleasures of the *Imagination*; or we may call the Power of receiving them, an *Internal Sense*. Whoever dislikes this Name may substitute another. 3. The next Class of Perceptions we may call a *Publick Sense*, viz. "our Determination to be pleased with the *Happiness* of others, "and to be uneasy at their *Misery*." This is found in some degree in all Men, and was sometimes called *Καλονομιαν*, or *Sensus Communis* by some of the Antients. 4. The fourth Class we may call the *Moral Sense*, by which "we perceive *Virtue*, or *Vice* in our selves, or others." This is plainly distinct from the former Class of Perceptions, since many are strongly affected with the Fortunes of others, who seldom reflect upon *Virtue*, or *Vice* in themselves, or others, as an Object: As we may find in *Natural Affection, Compassion, Friendship*, or even general *Benevolence* to Mankind, which connect our Happiness or Pleasure with that of others, even when we are not reflecting upon our own Temper, nor delighted with the Perception of our own Virtue. 5. The fifth Class is a *Sense of Honour*, "which makes the *Approbation*, or *Gratitude* of others, for any good Actions we have done, "the necessary occasion of Pleasure; and their *Dislike*, "Con-

of the PASSIONS.

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" *Condemnation, or Resentment of Injuries done by us,*
 " the occasion of that uneasy Sensation called *Shame*, even
 " when we fear no further evil from them."

There are perhaps other *Perceptions* distinct from all these Classes, such as some Ideas " of *Decency, Dignity, Suitableness to human Nature* in certain Actions and Circumstances; and of an *Indecency, Meanness, and Unworthiness*, in the contrary Actions or Circumstances, " even without any conception of *Moral Good, or Evil*." Thus the Pleasures of *Sight, and Hearing*, are more esteemed than those of *Taste or Touch*: The Pursuits of the Pleasures of the *Imagination*, are more approved than those of simple external Sensations. *Plato* * accounts for this difference from a constant Opinion of *Innocence* in this sort of Pleasures, which would reduce this Perception to the Moral Sense. Others may imagine that the difference is not owing to any such Reflection upon their *Innocence*, but that there is a different sort of Perceptions in these cases, to be reckoned another *Class of Sensations*.

II. Desires arise in our Mind, from the Frame of our Nature, upon Apprehension of Good or Evil in Objects, Actions, or Events, to obtain for our selves or others the agreeable Sensation, when the Object or Event is good; or to prevent the uneasy Sensation, when it is evil. Our original Desires and Aversions may therefore be divided into five Classes, answering to the Classes of our Senses.

1. The Desire of *sensual Pleasure*, (by which we mean that of the external Senses); and Aversion to the opposite Pains. 2. The Desires of the *Pleasures of Imagination* or Internal Sense †, and Aversion to what is disagreeable to it. 3. Desires of the *Pleasures arising from Publick Happiness*, and Aversion to the Pains arising from the *Mis-*

A like Division of our Desires.

* *Hippias Major.* See also *Treat. 2. Sect. 5. Art. 7.*

† See *Treat. 1.*

ry of others. 4. Desires of Virtue, and Aversion to Vice, according to the Notions we have of the Tendency of Actions to the Publick Advantage or Detriment. 5. Desires of Honour, and Aversion to Shame *.

The third Class of *Publick Desires* contains many very different sorts of Affections, all those which tend toward the *Happiness of others*, or the removal of Misery; such as those of *Gratitude, Compassion, Natural Affection, Friendship*, or the more extensive calm *Desire of the universal Good* of all sensitive Natures, which our moral Sense approves as the Perfection of Virtue, even when it limits, and counteracts the narrower Attachments of Love.

Now since we are capable of *Reflection, Memory, Observation, and Reasoning* about the *Desires of distant Tendencies of Objects and Actions*, and not confined to things present, there must arise, in consequence of our *original Desires*, "*secondary Desires* of every thing imagined useful to gratify any of the primary Desires, with strength proportioned to the several original Desires, and the imagined Usefulness, or Necessity, of the advantageous Object." Hence it is that as soon as we come to apprehend the Use of *Wealth or Power* to gratify any of our original Desires, we must also desire them. Hence arises the *Universality* of these Desires of *Wealth and Power*, since they are the Means of gratifying all other Desires. "How foolish then is the Inference, some would make, from the universal Prevalence of these Desires, that human Nature is wholly selfish, or that each one is only studious of his own Advantage; since Wealth or Power are as naturally fit to gratify our *Publick Desires*, or to serve *virtuous Purposes*, as the selfish ones?"

* See Treat. 2. Sect. 5. Art. 3—8.

"How weak also are the Reasonings of some recluse Moralists, who condemn in general all Pursuits of Wealth or Power, as below a perfectly virtuous Character: since Wealth and Power are the most effectual Means, and the most powerful Instruments, even of the greatest Virtues, and most generous Actions?" The Pursuit of them is laudable, when the *Intention* is virtuous; and the neglect of them, when honourable Opportunities offer, is really a Weakness. This justifies the Poet's Sentiments:

Hic onus horret,

Ut parvis Animis & parvo Corpore majus:

Hic subit & perfert: aut virtus nomen inane est,

Aut Decus & Pretium recte petit experiens Vir.

HO R. Epist. 17.

"Further, the *Laws or Customs* of a Country, the *Honour* of our Company may have made strange *Associations of Ideas*, so that some Objects, which of themselves are indifferent to any Sense, by reason of some *additional grateful Idea*, may become very desirable; or by like *Addition* of an *ungrateful Idea* may raise the strongest *Aversion*." Thus many a Trifle, when once it is made a *Badge of Honour*, an Evidence of some *generous Disposition*, a Monument of some *great Action*, may be impatiently pursued, from our Desire of Honour. When any *Circumstance, Dress, State, Posture* is constituted as a Mark of *Infamy*, it may become in like manner the Object of *Aversion*, tho' in it self most inoffensive to our Senses. If a certain way of *Living*, of *receiving Company*, of *shewing Courtesy*, is once received among those who are honoured; they who cannot bear the Expence of this may be made uneasy at their Condition, tho' much freer from Trouble than that of higher Stations. Thus *Dress, Retinue, Equipage, Furniture, Behaviour, and Diversions* are made Matters of considerable Importance by additional

"How

nal Ideas*. Nor is it in vain that the wisest and greatest Men regard these things; for however it may concern them to break such Associations in their own Minds, yet, since the bulk of Mankind will retain them, they must comply with their Sentiments and Humours in things innocent, as they expect the *publick Esteem*, which is generally necessary to enable Men to serve the Publick.

Should any one be surprized at this *Disposition* in our Nature to associate any Ideas together for the future, which once presented themselves jointly, considering what great Evils, and how much *Corruption* of Affections is owing to it, it may help to account for this Part of our Constitution, to consider “that all our *Language*” and much of our *Memory* depends upon it:” So that were there no such *Associations* made, we must lose the use of *Words*, and a great part of our Power of *recollecting past Events*; beside many other valuable *Powers* and *Arts* which depend upon them. Let it also be considered that it is much in our power by a vigorous *Attention* either to prevent *those Associations*, or by *Abstraction* to separate Ideas when it may be useful for us to do so.

Concerning our pursuit of *Honour*, 'tis to be observ'd, that “since our Minds are incapable of retaining a great Diversity of Objects, the *Novelty*, or *Singularity* of any Object is enough to raise a particular Attention to it among many of equal Merit:” And therefore were *Virtue universal* among Men, yet, 'tis probable, the *Attention* of Observers would be turned chiefly toward those who distinguished themselves by some *singular Ability*, or by some Circumstance, which, however trifling in its own Nature, yet had some honourable ideas commonly joined to it, such as *Magnificence*, *Generosity*, or the like. We should perhaps, when we considered se-

See 1 Treat. Sect. 1. Art. 7. and 2 Treat. Sect. 6. Art. 2. lately

dately the common Virtues of others, equally love and esteem them * : And yet probably our *Attention* would be generally fixed to those who thus were distinguished from the Multitude. Hence our natural Love of Honour, raises in us a Desire of *Distinction*, either by higher Degrees of Virtue; or, if we cannot easily or probably obtain it this way, we attempt it in an easier manner, by any Circumstance, which, thro' a *Confusion of Ideas*, is reputed honourable.

This Desire of *Distinction* has great Influence on the Pleasures and Pains of Mankind, and makes them chuse things for their very *Rarity*, *Difficulty*, or *Expence*; by a confused Imagination that they evidence *Generosity*, *Ability*, or a *finer Taste* than ordinary; nay, often the merest Trifles are by these means ardently pursued. A *Form of Dress*, a *foreign Dish*, a *Title*, a *Place*, a *Jewel*; an *useless Problem*, a *Criticism on an obsolete Word*, the *Origin of a Poetic Fable*, the *Situation of a razed Town*, may employ many an Hour in tedious Labour:

*sic love, sic parvum est, animum quod laudis avarum
Subruit aut reficit.* —————

HOR.

Art. III. There is another Division of our *Desires*, Desires taken from the Persons for whose *selfish and* Advantage we pursue or shun any Object. *publick.*
“ The Desires in which one intends or pursues what he apprehends advantageous to himself, we may call *SELFISH*; and those in which we pursue what we apprehend advantageous to others, and do not apprehend advantageous to *our selves*, or do not pursue with this view, we may call *Publick* or *BENEVOLENT* Desires.” If there be a just Foundation for this Division, it is more extensive than the former Division, since each of the former Classes may come under either

Member of this Division, according as we are desiring any of the five sorts of Pleasures *for our selves*, or desiring them *for others*. The former Division may therefore be conceived as a Subdivision of the latter.

This Division has been disputed since *Epicurus*; who with his old Followers, and some of late, who detest other parts of his Scheme, maintain, "that all our Desires are *selfish*: or, that what every one intends or designs ultimately, in each Action, is the obtaining Pleasure to *himself*, or the avoiding his own *private Pain*."*

It requires a good deal of Subtily to defend this Scheme, so seemingly opposite to *Natural Affection*, *Friendship*, *Love of a Country*, or *Community*, which many find very strong in their Breasts. The Defenses and Schemes commonly offered, can scarce free the Sustainers of this Cause from manifest Absurdity and *Affectation*. But some do acknowledge a *publick Sense* in many Instances; especially in *natural Affection*, and *Compassion*; by which "the Observation of the Happiness of others is made the necessary Occasion of Pleasure, and their Misery the Occasion of Pain to the Observer". That this *Sympathy* with others is the Effect of the Constitution of our Nature, and not brought upon our selves by any Choice, with view to any *selfish Advantage*, they must own: whatever Advantage there may be in Sympathy with the *Fortunate*, none can be alledged in Sympathy with the *Distressed*: And every one feels that this *publick Sense* will not leave his Heart, upon a change of the Fortunes of his Child or Friend; nor does it depend upon a Man's *Choice*, whether he will be affected with their Fortunes or not. But supposing this publick Sense, they insist, "That by means of it there is a *Conjunction of Interest*: the Happiness of others becomes the Means of *private Pleasure* to the Observer; and for this Reason,

* See Cicero de finib. lib. 1.

† See Mr. Clark of Hull, his Remarks on Treat. 2.

"or with a View to this private Pleasure, he desires the Happiness of another." Others deduce our Desire of the Happiness of others from Self-love, in a less specious manner.

If a *publick Sense* be acknowledged in Men, by which the Happiness of one is made to depend upon that of others, independently of his Choice, this is indeed a strong Evidence of the Goodness of the AUTHOR of our Nature. But whether this Scheme does truly account for our *Love of others*, or for *generous Offices*, may be determined from the following Considerations; which being matters of *internal Consciousness*, every one can best satisfy himself by Attention, concerning their Truth and Certainty.

Let it be premised, that *Desire is generally uneasy, or attended with an uneasy Sensation*, which is something distinct from that uneasy Sensation arising from some *Event or Object*, the Prevention or Removal of which Sensation we are intending when the Object is apprehended as Evil; as this *uneasy Sensation of Desire* is obviously different from the *pleasant Sensation*, expected from the Object or Event which we apprehend as Good. Then it is plain,

1. "That no Desire of any Event is excited by any view of removing the *uneasy Sensation, attending this Desire it self*". Sensations which are *previous* to a *Desire*, or not connected with it, may excite Desire of any Event, apprehended necessary to procure or continue the Sensation if it be pleasant, or to remove it if it be uneasy: But the *uneasy Sensation, accompanying and connected with the Desire it self*, cannot be a Motive to that *Desire* which it presupposes. The *Sensation* accompanying Desire is generally *uneasy*, and consequently our Desire is never raised with a view to obtain or continue it; nor is the Desire raised with a view to *remove this uneasy Sensation*, for the Desire is raised *previously* to it. This holds concerning all *Desire* publick or private.

There is also a *pleasant Sensation of Joy*, attending the *Gratification* of any *Desire*, beside the *Sensation* received from the *Object* it *self*, which we directly intended. "But *Desire* does never arise from a view of obtaining that *Sensation of Joy*, connected with the *Success* or *Gratification* of *Desire*; otherwise the strongest *Desires* might arise toward any *Trifle*, or an *Event* in all respects different: Since, if *Desire* arose from *this View*, the stronger the *Desire* were, the higher would be the *Pleasure of Gratification*; and therefore we might desire the turning of a *Straw* as violent as we do *Wealth* or *Power*." This *Expectation* of the *Pleasure of gratified Desire*, would equally excite us to desire the *Misery* of others as their *Happiness*, since the *Pleasure* or *Gratification* might be obtained from both *Events* alike.

2. It is certain that, "that *Desire* of the *Happiness* of others which we account virtuous, is not directly excited by prospects of any *secular Advantage*, *Wealth*, *Power*, *Pleasure of the external Senses*, *Reward from the Deity*, or *future Pleasures of Self-Approbation*." To prove this let us consider, That no *Desire* of any *Event* can arise immediately or directly from an *Opinion* in the *Agent*, that his *having such a Desire* will be the *Means* of private *Good*." This *Opinion* would make us *wish* or *desire* to have that *advantageous Desire* or *Affection*; and would incline us to *use any Means* in our *Power* to raise that *Affection*: but no *Affection* or *Desire* is raised in us, directly by our *volition* or *desiring* it. That alone which raises in us from *Self-Love* the *Desire* of any *Event*, is an *Opinion* that that *Event* is the *Means* of private *Good*. As soon as we form this *Opinion*, a *Desire* of the *Event* immediately arises: But if *having the Desire* or *Affection* be imagined the *Means* of private *Good*, and not the *Existence of the Event desired*, then from *Self-Love* we should only desire or wish to have the *Desire* of that *Event*, and should not desire the *Event* itself, since the *Event* is not conceived as the *Means* of *Good*.

For instance, suppose God revealed to us that he would confer Happiness on us, if our Country were happy: then from Self-Love we should have immediately *the subordinate Desire* of our Country's Happiness, as the Means of our own. But were we assured that, whether our Country were happy or not, it should not affect our future Happiness; but that we should be rewarded, provided we *desire the Happiness of our Country*; our Self-Love could never make us now desire the *Happiness of our Country*, since it is not now conceived as the *Means* of our Happiness, but is perfectly indifferent to it. The Means of our Happiness is *the having a Desire of our Country's Happiness*; we should therefore from Self-Love only *wish to have this Desire*.

'Tis true indeed in fact, that, because *Benevolence* is natural to us, a little Attention to other Natures will raise in us good-will towards them, whenever by any Opinions we are persuaded that there is no real *Opposition of Interest*. But had we no Affection distinct from *Self-Love*, nothing could raise our *Desire of the Happiness of others*, but conceiving their Happiness as the Means of ours. An Opinion that our having *kind Affections* would be the Means of our private Happiness, would only make us desire to have those Affections. Now that Affections do not arise upon our *wishing* to have them, or our volition of raising them; as conceiving the *Affections themselves* to be the Means of private Good; is plain from this, that if they did thus arise, then a *Bribe* might raise any Desire toward any Event, or any *Affection* toward the most improper Object. We might be hired to love or hate any sort of Persons, to be angry, jealous, or compassionate, as we can be engaged into external Actions; which we all see to be absurd. Now those who alledge, that our Benevolence may arise from prospect of *secular Advantage, Honour, Self-Approbation, or future Rewards*, must own, that these are either *Motives only to external Actions, or Considerations*, shewing, that *having the Desire of the Happiness of others*, would be the Means of private Good; while the *Event* supposed to

be desired, viz. the Happiness of others, is not supposed the Means of any private Good. But the best Defenders of this part of the Scheme of Epicurus, acknowledge that "Desires are not raised by Volition."

This Distinction defended.

3. "There are in Men *Desires of the Happiness of others*, when they do not conceive this *Happiness* as the Means of obtaining any sort of Happiness to themselves." *Self-Approbation*, or Rewards from the Deity, might be the Ends, for obtaining which we might possibly desire or will from Self-Love; to raise in our selves kind Affections; but we could not from Self-Love desire the *Happiness of others*, but as conceiving it the Means of our own. Now 'tis certain that sometimes we may have this *subordinate Desire* of the Happiness of others, conceived as the Means of our own; as suppose one had laid a Wager upon the Happiness of a Person of such Veracity, that he would own sincerely whether he were happy or not; when Men are Partners in Stock, and share in Profit or Loss; when one hopes to succeed to, or some way to share in the Prosperity of another; or if the Deity had given such Threatnings, as they tell us Telamon gave his Sons when they went to War, that he would reward or punish one according as others were happy or miserable: In such cases one might have this *subordinate Desire* of another's Happiness from Self-Love. But as we are sure the Deity has not given such Comminations, so we often are conscious of the *Desire of the Happiness of others*, without any such Conception of it as the Means of our own; and are sensible that this *subordinate Desire* is not that virtuous Affection which we approve. The virtuous Benevolence must be an *ultimate Desire*, which would subsist without view to private Good. Such *ultimate publick Desires* we often feel, without any *subordinate Desire* of the same Event, as the Means of private Good. The *subordinate* may sometimes, nay often does concur with the *ultimate*; and then indeed the whole Moment of these conspiring Desires may be greater than that of either alone: but the *subordinate alone* is not that Affection which we approve as virtuous.

Art. IV. This will clear our Way to answer the chief Difficulty: "May not our Benevolence be at least a *Desire of the Happiness of others, as the Means of obtaining the Pleasures of the publick Sense, from the Contemplation of their Happiness?*" If it were so, it is very unaccountable that we should approve this *subordinate Desire* as virtuous, and yet not approve the like Desire upon a *Wager*, or other Considerations of Interest. Both Desires proceed from *Self-Love* in the same manner: In the latter case the Desires might be extended to multitudes, if any one would wager so capriciously; and, by increasing the Sum wagered, the *Motive of Interest* might, with many Tempers, be made stronger than that from the Pleasures of the publick Sense.

Don't we find that we often desire the Happiness of others without any such selfish Intention? How few have thought upon this part of our Constitution which we call a *Publick Sense*? Were it not our only View, in *Compassion* to free our selves from the *Pain of the publick Sense*; should the DEITY propose it to our Choice, either to obliterate all Ideas of the Person in Distress, but to continue him in Misery, or on the other hand to relieve him from it; should we not upon this Scheme be perfectly indifferent, and chuse the former as soon as the latter? Should the DEITY assure us that we should be immediately annihilated, so that we should be incapable of either Pleasure or Pain, but that it should depend upon our Choice at our very Exit, whether our Children, our Friends, or our Country should be happy or miserab'e; should we not upon this Scheme be entirely indifferent? Or, if we should even desire the *pleasant Thought* of their Happiness, in our last Moment, would not this Desire be the faintest imaginable?

'Tis true, our *Publick Sense* might be as acute at our Exit as ever; as a Man's Taste of Meat or Drink might be as lively

lively the instant before his Dissolution as in any part of his Life. But would any Man have as strong *Desires* of the Means of obtaining these Pleasures, only with a View to himself, when he was to perish the next Moment? Is it supposable that any *Desire* of the Means of *private Pleasure* can be as strong when we only expect to enjoy it a Minute, as when we expect the Continuance of it for many Years? And yet, 'tis certain, any good Man would as strongly desire at his Exit the *Happiness of others*, as in any part of his Life. We do not therefore desire it as the *Means of private Pleasure*.

Should any alledge, that this *Desire* of the *Happiness of others*, after our Exit, is from some *confused Association of Ideas*; as a Miser, who loves no Body, might desire an Increase of Wealth at his Death; or as any one may have an Aversion to have his Body dissected, or made a prey to Dogs after Death: Let any honest Heart try if the deepest Reflection will break this *Association* (if there be any) which is supposed to raise the *Desire*. The closest Reflection would be found rather to strengthen it. How would any *Spectator* like the Temper of one thus rendered indifferent to all others at his own Exit, so that he would not even open his Mouth to procure *Happiness* to Posterity? Would we esteem it *refined Wisdom*, or a *Perfection* of Mind, and not rather the vilest Perverseness? 'Tis plain then we feel this *ultimate Desire* of the *Happiness of others* to be a most *natural Instinct*, which we also expect in others, and not the Effect of any *confused Ideas*.

The Occasion of the imagined Difficulty in conceiving *disinterested Desires*, has probably been from the attempting to define this simple Idea, *Desire*. It is called an *uneasy Sensation in the Absence of Good*. Whereas *Desire* is as distinct from any *Sensation*, as the *Will* is from the *Understanding* or *Senses*. This every one must acknowledge, who speaks of *desiring to remove Uneasiness or Pain*.

We may perhaps find, that our *Desires* are so far from tending always toward *private Good*, that they are oftner

em-

employ'd about *the State of others*. Nay further, we may have a Propensity toward an Event, which we neither apprehend as the *Means of private Good, or publick*. Thus an *Epicurean* who denies a future State; or, one to whom God revealed that he should be annihilated, might at his very Exit desire a *future Fame*, from which he expected no Pleasure to himself, nor intended any to others. Such Desires indeed no *selfish Being*, who had the modelling of his own Nature, would chuse to implant in itself. But since we have not this Power, we must be content to be thus "befooled into a publick Interest against our Will;" as an ingenious Author expresses it.

The Prospect of any *Interest* may be a Motive to us, to desire whatever we apprehend as the *Means* of obtaining it. Particularly, "if *Rewards* of any kind are proposed to those who have virtuous Affections, this would raise in us the Desire of having these *Affections*, and would incline us to use all means to raise them in our selves; particularly to *turn our Attention* to all those Qualities in the *DEITY*, or our Fellows, which are naturally apt to raise the virtuous Affections." Thus it is, that Interest of any kind may influence us indirectly to Virtue, and Rewards particularly may over-balance all Motives to Vice.

This may let us see, that, "the Sanctions of *Rewards* and *Punishments*, as proposed in the *Gospel*, are not rendered useless or unnecessary, by supposing the virtuous Affection to be *disinterested*;" since such *Motives of Interest*, proposed and attended to, must incline every Person to desire to have virtuous Affections, and to *turn his Attention* to every thing which is naturally apt to raise them; and must over-balance every other *Motive of Interest*, opposite to these Affections, which could incline Men to suppress or counteract them.

SECT.

S E C T. II.

Of the Affections and Passions: The natural Laws of pure Affection: The confused Sensations of the Passions, with their final Causes.

I. **A**FTER the general account of *Sensations*, we may consider other *Modifications* of our Minds, consequent upon these Perceptions, whether grateful, or uneasy. The first which occur to any *Proper Affections* are one are *Desire* of the grateful Perceptions, and *Aversion* to the uneasy, either for our selves or others. If we would confine the word *Affection* to these two, which are entirely distinct from all *Sensation*, and directly incline the Mind to *Action*, or *Volition of Motion*, we should have no Debate about the Number or Division of *Affections*. But since, by universal Custom, this Name is applied to other Modifications of the Mind, such as *Joy*, *Sorrow*, *Despair*, we may consider what universal *Distinction* can be assigned between these *Modifications*, and the several *Sensations* above-mentioned; and we shall scarce find any other than this, that we call "the *direct immediate Perception* of Pleasure or Pain from the present Object or Event, the *Sensation*:" But we denote by the *Affection* or *Passion* some other "*Perceptions* of Pleasure or Pain, not directly raised by the *Presence* or *Operation* of the Event or Object, but by our *Reflection* upon, or *Apprehension* of their present or certainly future Existence; so that we are sure that the Object or Event will raise the "*direct Sensations* in us." In beholding a regular Building

we have the *Sensation* of Beauty; but upon our apprehending our selves possessed of it, or that we can procure this pleasant *Sensation* when we please, we feel the *Affection* of Joy. When a Man has a Fit of the Gout, he has the painful *Sensation*; when he is not at present pained, yet apprehends a sudden return of it, he has the *Affection* of Sorrow, which might in some sense also be called a *Sensation*:

When the word *Passion* is imagined to denote any thing different from the *Affections*, it includes, beside the *Desire* or *Aversion*, beside the calm Joy upon apprehended Possession of Good, or Sorrow from the Loss of it, or from impending Evil, "a * *confused Sensation* on either of Pleasure or Pain, occasioned or attended by some violent bodily Motions, which keeps the Mind much employed upon the present Affair, to the exclusion of every thing else, and prolongs or strengthens the *Affection* sometimes to such a degree, as to prevent all deliberate Reasoning about our Conduct."

Affection
distinct
from Pas-
sion.

II. We have little reason to imagine, that all other Agents have such *confused Sensations* accompanying their Desires as we often have. Let us abstract from them, and consider in what manner we should act upon the several Occasions which now excite our Passions, if we had none of these *Sensations*: whence our Desires become *passionate*.

General
Desires,
and parti-
cular Af-
fections or
Passions.

There is a Distinction to be observed on this Subject, between " the calm *Desire* of Good, and Aversion to Evil, " either selfish or publick, as it appears to our Reason or

* Whoever would see *subtile Divisions* of those *Sensations*, let him read Malebranche's Recherche de la Verite, B. v. c. 3. Together with these *Sensations* there are also some strong Propensities distinct from any rational Desires: About which see Sect. 3. Art. 2. of this Treatise.

"*Reflection*; and the *particular Passions* towards Objects immediately presented to some Sense." Thus nothing can be more distinct than the *general calm Desire* of private Good of any kind, which alone would incline us to pursue whatever Objects were apprehended as the Means of Good, and the *particular selfish Passions*, such as *Ambition*, *Covetousness*, *Hunger*, *Lust*, *Revenge*, *Anger*, as they arise upon particular Occasions. In like manner, our publick Desires may be distinguished into the *general calm Desire of the Happiness of others*, or *Aversion to their Misery* upon Reflection; and the *particular Affections or Passions* of *Love*, *Congratulation*, *Compassion*, *natural Affection*. These *particular Affections* are found in many Tempers, where, thro' want of Reflection, the *general calm Desires* are not found: Nay the former may be opposite to the latter, where they are found in the same Temper. We obtain *Command* over the *particular Passions*, principally by strengthening the *general Desires* thro' frequent Reflection, and making them *habitual*, so as to obtain Strength superior to the *particular Passions*.

Again, the *calm publick Desires* may be considered as "they either regard the Good of *particular Persons* or *Societies* presented to our Senses; or that of some more abstracted or general Community, such as a *Species* or "System." This latter sort we may call *universal calm Benevolence*. Now 'tis plain, that not only *particular kind Passions*, but even *calm particular Benevolence* do not always raise from, or necessarily presuppose, the *universal Benevolence*; both the former may be found in Persons of little Reflection, where the latter is wanting: And the former two may be opposite to the other, where they meet together in one Temper. So the *universal Benevolence* might be where there was neither of the former, as in any superior Nature or Angel, who had no particular Intercourse with any part of Mankind.

Our *moral Sense*, tho' it approves all *particular kind Affection* or *Passion*, as well as *calm particular Benevolence* abstractly considered; yet it also approves the *Restraint* or

Limit

Limitation of all particular Affections or Passions, by the *calm universal Benevolence*. To make this Desire prevalent above all *particular Affections*, is the only sure way to obtain constant *Self-Approbation*.

The *calm selfish Desires* would determine any Agent to pursue every Object or Event, known either by Reason or prior Experience to be good to itself. We need not imagine any innate Idea of *Good in general*, of *infinite Good*, or of the *greatest Aggregate*: Much less need we suppose any *actual Inclination* toward any of these, as the *Cause* or *Spring* of all particular Desires. 'Tis enough to allow, "that we are capable by *enlarging*, or by *Abstraction*, of coming to these Ideas: That we must, by the Constitution of our Nature, desire any apprehended Good which occurs a-part from any Evil: That of two Objects inconsistent with each other, we shall desire that which seems to contain the *greatest Moment of Good*." So that it cannot be pronounced concerning any *finite Good*, that it shall necessarily engage our Pursuit; since the Agent may possibly have the Idea of a *Greater*, or see this to be inconsistent with some *more valuable Object*, or that it may bring upon him some *prepollent Evil*. The certain Knowledge of any of these Things, or probable *Presumption* of them, may stop the Pursuit of any finite Good. If this be any sort of *Liberty*, it must be allowed to be in Men, even by those who maintain "the *Desire or Will* to be necessarily determined by the *prepollent Motive*;" since this very *Presumption* may be a *prepollent Motive*, especially to those, who by frequent *Attention* make the Idea of the *greatest Good* always present to themselves on all important Occasions.

The same may easily be applied to our Aversion to finite Evils.

There seems to be this Degree of Liberty about the Understanding, that tho' the *highest Certainty* or *Demonstration* does necessarily engage our Assent, yet we can suspend any *absolute Conclusion* from *probable Arguments*, until

we examine whether this apparent *Probability* be not opposite to *Demonstration*, or *superior Probability* on the other side.

This may let us see, that tho' it were acknowledged that "Men are necessarily determined to pursue their own Happiness, and to be influenced by whatever Motive appears to be *prepollent*;" yet they might be proper *Subjects of a Law*; since the very *Sanctions* of the Law, if they attend to them, may suggest a Motive *prepollent* to all others. In like manner, "Errors may be criminal, * where there are sufficient *Data* or *Objective Evidence* for the Truth;" since no *Demonstration* can lead to Error, and we can suspend our Assent to probable Arguments, till we have examined both Sides. Yet *human Penalties* concerning Opinions must be of little consequence, since no Penalty can supply the place of *Argument*, or *Probability* to engage our Assent, however they may as *Motives* determine our *Election*.

In the *calm publick Desires*, in like manner, where there are no opposite Desires, the greater Good of another is always preferred to the less: And in the calm universal Benevolence, the Choice is determined by the *Moment of the Good*, and the *Number* of those who shall enjoy it.

When the *publick Desires* are opposite to the *private*, or seem to be so, that kind prevails which is *stronger* or more intense.

Definitions. III. The following *Definitions* of certain Words used on this Subject, may shorten our Expressions; and the *Axioms* subjoined may shew the manner of acting from *calm Desire*, with Analogy to the *Laws of Motion*.

* See Treat. 4. Sect. 6. Art. 6. last Paragraph.

1. Natural Good is Pleasure: *Natural Good*
Evil is Pain. *Natural Good and Evil.*

2. Natural good Objects are those which are apt, either mediately or immediately to give Pleasure; the former are called *Advantageous*. Natural Evil Objects are such as, in like manner, give Pain.

3. Absolute Good is that which, considered *Absolute*, with all its Concomitants and Consequences, contains more Good than what compensates all its Evils.

4. Absolute Evil, on the contrary, contains Evil which outweighs all its Good.

5. Relative Good or Evil, is any particular *Relative*. Good or Evil, which does not thus compensate its contrary Concomitants or Consequences. This Distinction would have been more exactly expressed by the *Bonum simpliciter*, and *secundum quid* of the Schoolmen.

Cor. Relative Good may be *Absolute Evil*; thus often sensual Pleasures are in the whole pernicious: And *Absolute Good* may be *Relative Evil*; thus an unpleasant Potion may recover Health.

Good and Evil, according to the Persons whom they affect, may be divided into *Universal*, *Particular* and *Private*.

6. Universal Good, is what tends to the *Universal*. Happiness of the whole System of sensitive Beings; and *Universal Evil* is the contrary.

7. Particular Good is what tends to the *Particular*. Happiness of a Part of this System: *Particular Evil* is the contrary.

Private. 8. *Private Good or Evil* is that of the Person acting. Each of these three Members may be either *Absolute* or *Relative*.

Cor. 1. Particular or private Good may possibly be universal Evil: And universal Good may be particular or private Evil. The Punishment of a Criminal is an Instance of the latter. Of the former, perhaps, there are no real Instances in the whole Administration of Nature: but there are some apparent Instances; such as the Success of an unjust War; or the Escape of an unrelenting Criminal.

Cor. 2. When particular or private Goods are entirely innocent toward others, they are universal Good.

Compound. 9. Compound good Objects or Events, are such as contain the Powers of several Goods at once. Thus, Meat may be both pleasant and healthful; an Action may give its Author at once the Pleasures of the Moral Sense and of Honour. The same is easily applicable to compound Evil.

Mixed. 10. A mixed Object is what contains at once the Powers of Good and Evil: Thus a virtuous Action may give the Agent the Pleasures of the Moral Sense, and Pains of the external Senses. Execution of Justice may give the Pleasures of the publick Sense, and the Pains of Compassion toward the Sufferer.

Greatest Good. 11. The greatest or most perfect Good is that whole Series, or Scheme of Events, which contains a greater Aggregate of Happiness in the whole, or more absolute universal Good, than any other possible Scheme, after subtracting all the Evils connected with each of them.

12. An Action is *good, in a moral Sense, Moral Good*, when it flows from benevolent Affection, or Intention of absolute Good to others. Men of much Reflection may actually intend *universal absolute Good*; but with the common rate of Men their Virtue consists in intending and pursuing *particular absolute Good*, not inconsistent with universal Good.

13. An Action is *morally evil*, either from Intention of *absolute Evil*, universal, or particular, *Evil*. (* which is seldom the case with Men, except in sudden Passions;) or from pursuit of *private or particular relative Good*, which they might have known did tend to *universal absolute Evil*. For even the want of a † just Degree of Benevolence renders an Action evil.

14. Compound *moral Goodness* is that to *Compound*, which different *moral Species* concur: Thus the same Action may evidence Love to our Fellows, and Gratitude to God. We may in like manner understand *compound moral Evil*. We cannot suppose *mixed moral Actions* ‡.

15. Agents are denominated *morally good or evil*, from their Affections and Actions, or Attempts of Action.

IV. Axioms, or natural Laws of *calm Desire*. *Axioms, or general Laws.*

I. Selfish *Desires* pursue ultimately only the private Good of the Agent.

* See 2 Treatise, Sect. 2. Art. 4. p. 80.

† Treatise 4. Sect. 6. Art. 4.

‡ See 2 Treatise, Sect. 7. Art. 9. *last Parag.*

2. Benevolent or *publick Desires* pursue the Good of others, according to the several *Systems* to which we extend our Attention, but with different Degrees of Strength.

3. The *Strength* either of the *private* or *publick Desire* of any Event, is proportioned to the imagined *Quantity of Good*, which will arise from it to the Agent, or the Person beloved.

4. Mixed *Objects* are pursued or shunned with Desire or Aversion, proportioned to the apprehended *Excess* of Good or Evil.

5. Equal *Mixtures* of Good and Evil stop all Desire or Aversion.

6. A Compound *good or evil Object*, is prosecuted or shunned with a *Degree* of Desire or Aversion, proportioned to the *Sum* of Good, or of Evil.

7. In computing the *Quantities* of Good or Evil, which we pursue or shun, either for our selves or others, when the *Durations* are equal, the *Moment* is as the *Intenseness*; and when the *Intenseness* of Pleasure is the same, or equal, the *Moment* is as the *Duration*.

8. Hence the *Moment* of Good in any Object, is in a compound Proportion of the *Duration* and *Intenseness*.

9. The *Trouble, Pain, or Danger*, incurred by the Agent, in acquiring or retaining any Good, is to be subtracted from the *Sum* of the Good. So the *Pleasures* which attend or flow from the means of *prepollent Evil*, are to be subtracted, to find the *absolute Quantity*.

10. The *Ratio* of the *Hazard* of acquiring or retaining any Good must be multiplied into the *Moment* of the Good; so also the *Hazard* of avoiding any Evil is to be mul-

multiplied into the Moment of it, to find its comparative value.

Cor. Hence it is, that the smallest certain Good may raise stronger Desire than the greatest Good, if the *Uncertainty* of the latter surpass *that* of the former, in a greater Ratio than that of the greater to the less. Thus Men content themselves in all Affairs with *smaller*, but more *probably successful* Pursuits, quitting those of greater Moment but *less Probability*.

11. To an *immortal* Nature it is indifferent in what part of its Duration it enjoys a Good limited in Duration, if its Sense be equally *acute* in all parts of its Existence; and the Enjoyment of this Good excludes not the Enjoyment of other Goods, at one time more than another. The same may be applied to the Suffering of Evil, limited in Duration.

12. But if the Duration of the Good be *infinite*, the Earliness of Commencement increases the Moment, as *finite* added to *infinite*, surpasses *infinite* alone.

13. To Beings of *limited certain Duration*, Axiom 12. may be applied, when the *Duration* of the Good would not surpass the Existence of the Possessor, after the Time of its Commencement.

14. To Beings of *limited uncertain Duration*, the Earliness of Commencement increases the Moment of any Good, according to the Hazard of the *Possessor's Duration*. This may, perhaps, account for what some alledge to be a *natural Disposition* of our Minds, even previous to any Reflection on the Uncertainty of Life, *viz.* that we are so constituted, as to desire more ardently the *nearer* Enjoyments, than the more distant, tho' of equal Moment in themselves, and as certainly to be obtained by us.

15. The Removal of Pain has always the Notion of Good, and solicits us more importunately: Its Moment

is the same way computed by *Intenseness* and *Duration*, and affected by the *Hazard* and by the *Uncertainty* of our Existence.

These are the general Ways of computing the Quantities of Good in any Object or Event, whether we are pursuing our own private Good from selfish Desires, or the Good of others from publick Affections. Concerning these latter we may observe,

16. That our Desires towards *publick Good* are, when other Circumstances are equal, proportioned to the Moment of the Goods themselves.

17. Our publick Desires of any Events, are proportioned to the Number of Persons to whom the good Event shall extend, when the Moments and other Circumstances are equal.

18. When the Moments themselves, and Numbers of Enjoyers are equal, our Desire is proportioned to the Strength or Nearness of the Ties or Attachments to the Persons.

19. When all other Circumstances are equal, our Desires are proportional to the apprehended *Moral Excellence* of the Persons.

20. In general, the Strength of publick Desire is in a Compound Ratio of the Quantity of the Good it self, and the Number, Attachment, and Dignity of the Persons.

These seem to be the general Laws, according to which our Desires arise. Our Senses constitute Objects, Events or Actions good; and "we have Power to reason, reflect and compare the several Goods, and to find out the proper and effectual Means of obtaining the greatest for our selves or others, so as not to be led aside by every Appearance of relative or particular Good."

V. If it be granted, that we have implanted in our Nature the several *Desires* above-mentioned, let us next enquire "into what *State* we would incline to bring our selves, upon the several Accidents which now raise our *Passions*; supposing that we had the Choice of our own State entirely, and were not, by the Frame of our Nature, subjected to certain *Sensations*, independently of our Volition."

Action
from pure
Desire or
Affection.

If it seems too rash to assert a Distinction between *Affections* and *Passions*, or that *Desire* may subsist without any *uneasiness*, since perhaps we are never conscious of any Desire absolutely free from all *uneasiness*; "let it be considered, that the simple Idea of *Desire* is different from that of Pain of any kind, or from any *Sensation* whatsoever: Nor is there any other Argument for their Identity than this, that they occur to us at once: But this Argument is inclusive, otherwise it would prove *Colour* and *Figure* to be the same, or *Inisition* and *Pain*."

There is a *middle State* of our Minds, when we are not in the pursuit of any important Good, nor know any great Indigence of those we love. In this State, when any smaller positive Good to our selves or our Friend is apprehended to be in our power, we may resolutely desire and pursue it, without any considerable *Sensation* of Pain or Uneasiness. Some Tempers seem to have as strong Desires as any, by the Constancy and Vigour of their Pursuits, either of publick or private Good; and yet give small Evidence of any *uneasy Sensation*. This is observable in some sedate Men, who seem no way inferior in Strength of Desire to others: Nay if we consult our selves, and not the common Systems, we shall perhaps find, that "the noblest Desire in our Nature, that of *universal Happiness*, is generally calm, and wholly free from any confused uneasy Sensation:" except in some warm Tempers, who, by a lively *Imagination*, and frequent Attention to general Ideas, raise something of Passion even toward

universal.

universal Nature *. Yea, further, Desire may be as strong as possible towards a certainly future Event, the fixed Time of its Existence being also known, and yet we are not conscious of any *Pain* attending such Desires. But tho' this should not be granted to be Fact with Men, yet the Difference of the Ideas of Desire and Pain, may give sufficient ground for abstracting them; and for our making the Supposition of their being separated.

Upon this Supposition then, when any Object was desired, if we found it *difficult or uncertain* to be obtained, but worthy of all the Labour it would cost, we would set about it with Diligence, but should never chuse to bring upon our selves any *painful Sensation* accompanying our Desire, nor to increase our Toil by *Anxiety*. Whatever Satisfaction we had in our State before the Prospect of this additional Good we should continue to enjoy it while this Good was in suspense; and if we found it unattainable, we should be just as we were before: And we should never chuse to bring upon our selves those *Frettings* which now commonly arise from Disappointments. Upon Opinion of any impending Evil, we should *desire and use all means* to prevent it, but should never voluntarily bring upon our selves the uneasy Sensation of *Fear*, which now naturally anticipates our Misery, and gives us a Foretaste of it, more ungrateful sometimes than the Suffering itself. If the Evil did befall us, we should never chuse to increase it, by the Sensations of *Sorrow or Despair*; we should consider what was the Sum of Good remaining in our State, after subtracting this Evil, and should enjoy our selves as well as a Being, who had never known greater Good, nor enjoyed greater Pleasure, than the *absolute Good* yet remaining with us; or perhaps we should pursue some other attainable Good. In the like manner, did our *State* and the *Modifications* of our Mind depend upon our Choice, should we be affected upon the apprehend-

* See Marcus Aurelius, in many places.

ed Approach of Good or Evil, to those whom we love; we should have *desires* of obtaining the one for them, and of defending them from the other, accompanied with *no uneasy Sensations*. We do indeed find in fact, that our stronger Desires, whether private or publick, are accompanied with *uneasy Sensations*. We do indeed find in fact, that our stronger Desires, whether private or publick, are accompanied with *uneasy Sensations*; but these Sensations do not seem the necessary *Result* of the Desire itself: They depend upon the present *Constitution of our Nature*, which might possibly have been otherwise ordered. And in fact we find a considerable Diversity of Tempers in this matter; some *sedate Tempers* equally desiring either publick or private Good with the more passionate Tempers; but without that Degree of *Ferment, Confusion, and Pain*, which attend the same Desires in the *Passionate*.

According to the present Constitution of our Nature, we find that the *Modifications, or Passions* of our Mind, are very different from those which we would chuse to bring upon ourselves, upon their several Occasions. The Prospect of any considerable Good for our selves, or those we love, raises Desire; and this Desire is accompanied with *uneasy confused Sensations*, which often occasion *Fretfulness, Anxiety, and Impatience*. We find violent *Motions* in our Bodies; and are often made unfit for serious Deliberation about the Means of obtaining the Good desired. When it was first obtained, we find violent *confused Sensations of Joy*, beyond the Proportion of the Good itself, or its Moment to our Happiness. If we are disappointed, we feel a Sensation of *Sorrow and Dejection*, which is often entirely useless to our present State. Foreseen evils are antedated by painful Sensations of *Fear*; and Reflection, attended with Sensations of *Sorrow*, gives a tedious Existence to transitory Misfortunes. Our *publick Desires* are in the same manner accompanied with painful Sensations. The Presence or Suspence of Good or Evil to others, is made the Occasion of the like confused Sensations. A little Reflection will shew, that none of these Sensations depend upon our Choice, but arise from the very

very *Frame of our Nature*, however we may regulate or moderate them.

The Necessity for these Sensations.

VI. Let us then examine "for what Purpose our Nature was so constituted, that Sensations do thus necessarily arise in us."

Would not those *first sorts of Sensations*, by which we apprehend Good and Evil in the Objects themselves, have been sufficient, along with our *Reason* and *pure Desires*, without those Sensations attending the very Desires themselves, for which they are called *Passions*, or those *Sensations* which attend our Reflection upon the Presence, Absence, or Approach of Good or Evil?

The common Answer, that "they are given to us as useful *Incitements* or *Spurs* to Action, by which we are roused more effectually to promote our private Good, or that of the Publick," is too general and undetermined. What need is there for rousing us to Action, more than a *calm pure Desire* of Good, and Aversion to Evil would do, without these confused Sensations? Say they, "we are averse to *Labour*; we are apt to be hurried away by *Avocations of Curiosity or Mirth*; we are often so *indolent* and averse to the vigorous Use of our Powers, that we should neglect our true Interest without these *soliciting Sensations*." But may it not be answered, that if Labour and vigorous Use of our Powers be attended with *Uneasiness* or *Pain*, why should not this be brought into the Account? The Pursuit of a small Good by great Toil is really foolish; violent *Labour*, may be as pernicious as any thing else: why should we be excited to any *uneasy Labour*, except for prepollent Good? And, when the Good is *prepollent*, what need of any further *Incitement* than the calm Desire of it? The same may be said of the *Avocations of Curiosity or Mirth*; if their *absolute Pleasures* be greater than that of the good from which they divert us, why should we not be diverted from it? If not, then the *real Moment* of the Good proposed is sufficient to engage our Pursuit of it, in Opposition to our Curiosity or Mirth.

If indeed our Aversion to Labour, or our Propensity to Mirth be accompanied with these Sensations, then it was necessary that other *Desires* should be attended with like Sensations, that so a Balance might be preserved. So if we have confused Sensation strengthening and fixing our *private Desires* the like Sensation joined to *publick Affections* is necessary, lest the former Desires should wholly engross our Minds: If weight be cast into one Scale, as much must be put into the other to preserve an *Equilibrium*. But the first Question is, "whence arose the Necessity of such additional Incitements on either side?"

It must be very difficult for Beings of such imperfect Knowledge as we are, to answer such Questions: we know very little of the Constitution of *Nature*, or what may be necessary for the Perfection of the *whole*. The Author of Nature has probably formed many active Beings, whose Desires are not attended with confused Sensations, raising them into Passions like to ours. There is probable an infinite *Variety* of Beings, of all possible Degrees, in which the Sum of Happiness exceeds that of Misery. We know that our State is *absolutely Good*, notwithstanding a considerable Mixture of Evil. The Goodness of the great Author of Nature appears even in producing the *inferior Natures*, provided their State in the whole be absolutely Good: Since we may probably conclude*, that there are in the Universe as many Species of *superior Natures*, as was consistent with the most perfect State of the whole. This is the Thought so much insisted upon by *Simplicius*, that the universal Cause must produce *ταυέσα*, as well as *τα τοῦτα*, & *τα ἑσθιατά*. We know not if this Globe be a fit Place for the Habitation of

* See *Simplicius on Epictetus, Cap. 34.* And the Archbishop of Dublin, de Origine Mali, above all others on this Subject.

Natures superior to ours : If not, it must certainly be in the whole better that it should have its *imperfect Inhabitants*, whose State is absolutely Good, than that it should be desolate.

All then which we can expect to do in this Matter, is “ only to shew, that “ these confused Sensations are necessary to such Natures as we are in other respects : Particularly that Beings, of such Degrees of *Understanding*, and such *Avenues* to Knowledge as we have, must need “ these *additional Forces*, which we call Passions, beside “ the first *Sensations* by which Objects are constituted “ Good or Evil, and the *pure Desire* or *Aversion* arising “ from Opinion or Apprehension of Good or Evil.”

From the Imperfection of our Understanding, which required Sensations of Appetite.

Now our *Reason*, or *Knowledge of the Relations* of external Things to our Bodies, is so inconsiderable, that it is generally some *pleasant Sensation* which teaches us what tends to their Preservation; and some *painful Sensation* which shews what is pernicious. Nor is this Instruction sufficient; we need also to be directed *when* our Bodies want supplies of Nourishment; to this our Reason could not extend : Here then appears the first Necessity of *uneasy Sensation*, preceding Desire, and continuing to accompany it when it is raised.

Again, our Bodies could not be preserved without a Sense of Pain, connected with *Incisions*, *Bruises*, or violent *Labour*, or whatever else tends to destroy any part of their Mechanism; since our Knowledge does not extend so far, as to judge in time what would be pernicious to it. And yet, without a great deal of human Labour, and many Dangers, this Earth could not support the tenth Part of its Inhabitants. Our Nature therefore required Sensation, accompanying its Desires of the *Means of Preservation*, capable to surmount the Uneasiness of Labour, and this we have in the Pains or Uneasiness accompanying the Desires of Food.

In like manner, the *Propagation of Animals* is a Mystery to their *Reason*, but easy to their *Instinct*. An Offspring of such Creatures as Men are, could not be preserved without perpetual Labour and Care ; which we find could not be expected from the more general Ties of *Benevolence*. Here then again appears the Necessity of strengthening the *Society*, or *natural Affection*, with strong Sensations, or Pains of Desire, sufficient to counter-balance the Pains of *Labour*, and the Sensations of the *selfish Appetites* ; since Parents must often check and disappoint their own Appetites, to gratify those of their Children.

“ When a Necessity of joining strong Sensations to one Class of Desires appears, there must appear a like Necessity of strengthening the rest by like Sensations, “ to keep a just Balance.” We know, for instance, that the Pleasures of the *Imagination* tend much to the Happiness of Mankind : the Desires of them therefore must have the like *Sensations* assisting them to prevent our indulging a nasty solitary Luxury. The Happiness of human Life cannot be promoted without *Society* and *mutual Aid*, even beyond a Family ; our *publick Affections* must therefore be strengthened as well as the private, to keep a Balance ; so must also our Desires of *Virtue* and *Honour*. *Anger*, which some have thought an useless Passion, is really as necessary as the rest ; since Mens Interests often seem to interfere with each other ; and they are thereby seduced from Self-Love to do the worst *Injuries* to their Fellows. There could not therefore be a wiser Contrivance to restrain *Injuries*, than to make every mortal some way formidable to an unjust Invader, by such a violent Passion. We need not have recourse to a *Prometheus* in this matter, with the old Poets : they might have ascribed it to their *Optimus Maximus*.

Infani Leonis,
Vim Stomacho apposuisse nostro.

*A Ballance
may be still
preserved.*

VII. With this *Ballance* of publick Passions against the private, with our *Passions* toward Honour and Virtue, we find that human Nature may be as really amiable in its low Sphere, as superior Natures endowed with higher Reason, and influenced only by *pure Desires*; provided we vigorously exercise the Powers we have in keeping this Ballance of Affections, and checking any Passion which grows so violent, as to be inconsistent with the publick Good. If we have selfish Passions for our own Preservation, we have also *publick Passions*, which may engage us into vigorous and laborious Services to *Offspring, Friends, Communities, Countries*. *Compassion* will engage us to succour the distressed, even with our private Loss or Danger. An Abhorrence of the injurious, and Love toward the injured, with a Sense of Virtue, and Honour, can make us despise Labour, Expence, Wounds and Death.

The Sensations of *Joy* or *Sorrow*, upon the Success or Disappointment of any Pursuit, either publick or private, have directly the Effect of *Rewards* or *Punishments*, to excite us to act with the utmost Vigour, either for our own Advantage, or that of others, for the future, and to punish past Negligence. The Moment of every Event is thereby increased: as much as the Sensations of *Sorrow* add to our *Misery*, so much those of *Joy* add to our *Happiness*. Nay, since we have some considerable *Power* over our Desires, as shall be explained hereafter, we may probably, by good Conduct, obtain more frequent *Pleasures* of *Joy* upon our Success, than *Pains* of *Sorrow* upon Disappointment.

*A just Bal-
lance very
rare.*

'Tis true indeed, that there are few *Temperaments* to be found, wherein these Sensations of the several Passions are in such a *Ballance*, as in all cases to leave the Mind in a proper State, for considering the Importance of every Action or Event. The Sensations of *Anger* in some *Temperaments* are violent above their Proportion; those of *Ambition, Avarice,*

rice, desire of sensual Pleasure, and even of natural Affection, in several Dispositions, possess the Mind too much, and make it incapable of attending to any thing else. Scarce any one Temper is always constant and uniform in its Passions. The best State of human Nature possible might require a Diversity of Passions and Inclinations, for the different Occupations necessary for the whole: But the Disorder seems to be much greater than is requisite for this End. Custom, Education, Habits, and Company, may often contribute much to this Disorder, however its Original may be ascribed to some more universal Cause. But it is not so great, but that human Life is still a desirable State, having a superiority of Goodness and Happiness. Nor, if we apply our selves to it, does it hinder us from discerning that just Ballance and Oeconomy, which would constitute the most happy State of each Person, and promote the greatest Good in the whole.

Let Physicians or Anatomists explain the Dispositions several Motions in the Fluids or Solids of the to some particular Passions. Body, which accompany any Passion; or the Temperaments of Body which either make Men prone to any Passion, or are brought upon us by the long Continuance, or frequent Returns of it. 'Tis only to our Purpose in general to observe, "that probably certain Motions in the Body do accompany every Passion by a fixed Law of Nature; and alternately, that Temperament which is apt to receive or prolong these Motions in the Body, does influence our Passions to heighten or prolong them." Thus a certain Temperament may be brought upon the Body, by its being frequently put into Motion by the Passions of Anger, Joy, Love, or Sorrow; and the Continuance of this Temperament shall make Men prone to the several Passions for the future. We find our selves after a long Fit of Anger or Sorrow, in an uneasy State, even when we are not reflecting on the particular Occasion of our Passion. During this State, every Trifle shall be apt to provoke or deject us. On the contrary, after good Success, after strong friendly Passions, or a State of Mirth, some considerable Injuries or

Losses, which at other times would have affected us very much, shall be overlooked, or meekly received, or at most but slightly resenting; perhaps because our Bodies are not fit easily to receive these *Motions* which are constituted the Occasion of the uneasy Sensations of Anger. This *Diversity* of Temper every one has felt, who reflects on himself at different Times. In some Tempers it will appear like *Madness*. Whether the only *Seat* of these Habits, or the Occasion rather of these *Dispositions*, be in the Body; or whether the *Soul* itself does not, by frequent Returns of any Passion, acquire some greater Disposition to receive and retain it again, let those determine, who sufficiently understand the Nature of either the one or the other.



S E C T. III.

Particular Divisions of the Affections and Passions.

I. THE Nature of any *Language* has considerable Influence upon Mens Reasonings on all Subjects, making them often take all those Ideas which are denoted by the same Word to be the same; and on the other hand, to look upon different Words as denoting different Ideas. We shall find that this Identity of Names has occasioned much confusion in Treatises of the Passions; while some have made larger, and some smaller Collections of Names, and have given the Explications of them as an Account of the Passions.

Cicero, in the Fourth Book of *Tusculan Questions*, gives from the Stoicks, this general Division of the *Passions*: First, into *Love and Hatred*, according as the Object is good or evil; and then subdivides each, according as the Object is *present* or *expected*. About Good we have these two, *Libido & Lætitia*, *Desire* and *Joy*: About Evil we have likewise two, *Metus & Aegritudo*, *Fear* and *Sorrow*. To this general Division he subjoins many *Subdivisions* of each of these four Passions; according as in the *Latin* Tongue they had different Names for the several *Degrees* of these Passions, or for the same Passion employed upon different Objects. A Writer of *Lexicons* would probably get the most precise Meanings of the *Latin* Names in that Book; nor would it be useless in considering the Nature of them.

The *Schoolmen*, as their Fund of Language was much smaller, have not so full Enumerations of them, going no further than their admired *Aristotle*.

II. 'Tis strange that the thoughtful *MALEBRANCHE* did not consider, that " *Desire* and *Aversion* are obviously " different from the other Modifications called *Passions*; " that these two directly lead to Action, or the Volition of " Motion, and are wholly distinct from all sort of Sensa- " tion." Whereas Joy and Sorrow are only a sort of Sensations; and other Affections differ from Sensations only, by including Desire or Aversion, or their correspondent Propensities: So that *Desire* and *Aversion* are the only pure Affections in the strictest Sense.

Sensation If, indeed, we confine the Word *Sensation* and *Affection* to the " immediate Perceptions of Pleasure and *Affection* distinct. " and Pain, upon the very Presence or Operation of any Object or Event, which are " occasioned by some Impression on our Bodies; " then we may denote by the Word *Affection*, those Pleasures or Pains not thus excited, but " resulting from some Reflection upon, or Opinion of our Possession of any Advantage, or from a certain Prospect of future pleasant Sensations on the one Hand, or from a like Reflection or Prospect of evil or painful Sensations on the other, either to " ourselves or others."

Passion. When more violent confused Sensations arise with the *Affection*, and are attended with, or prolonged by bodily Motions, we call the whole by the Name of *Passion*, especially when accompanied with some natural Propensities, to be hereafter explained.

Division by If this use of these Words be allowed, the *Malebranche* Division of *MALEBRANCHE* is very natural. Good Objects excite Love; evil Objects Hatred: each of these is subdivided, as the Object is present and certain, or doubtfully expected, or

certainly removed. To these three Circumstances correspond three Modifications of the original Affections; viz. Joy, Desire and Sorrow. Good present, raises Joy of Love, or Love of Joy: Good in suspense, the Love of Desire; Good lost, Love of Sorrow. Evil present, raises Aversion of Sorrow; Evil expected, Aversion or Hatred of Desire; and Evil removed, Aversion of Joy. The Joy of Love, and the Joy of Hatred, will possibly be found nearly the same sort of Sensations, tho' upon different Occasions; the same may be said of the Sorrow of Love, and the Sorrow of Aversion: and thus this Division will amount to the same with that of the Stoicks.

Perhaps it may be more easy to conceive *Desire and our Affections* and Passions in this manner. *Aversion.* The Apprehension of Good, either to our selves or others, as attainable, raises *Desire*: The like Apprehension of Evil, or of the Loss of Good, raises *Aversion*, or Desire of removing or preventing it. These two are the proper *Affections*, distinct from all *Sensation*: We may call both *Desires* if we please. The Reflection upon the Presence or certain Futurity of any Good, raises the Sensation of Joy, *Joy and Sorrow.* which is distinct from those immediate Sensations which arise from the Object itself. A like Sensation is raised, when we reflect upon the Removal or Prevention of Evil which once threatned our selves or others. The Reflection upon the Presence of Evil, or the certain Prospect of it, or of the Loss of Good, is the Occasion of the Sensation of *Sorrow*, distinct from those immediate Sensations arising from the Objects or Events themselves.

These Affections, viz. *Desire, Aversion, Affections.* *Joy and Sorrow*, we may, after MALEBRANCHE, call *spiritual or pure Affections*; because the purest Spirit, were it subject to any Evil, might be capable of them. *may be distinguished from Passions.* But beside these Affections, which seem to arise necessarily from a rational Apprehension of Good or Evil,

Evil, there are in our Nature violent *confused Sensations*, connected with *bodily Motions*, from which our *Affections* are denominated *Passions*.

Affections attended with undesigning Propensities. We may further observe something in our Nature, determining us very frequently to Action, distinct both from *Sensation* and *Desire*; if by *Desire* we mean a distinct Inclination to something apprehended as Good either publick or private, or as the Means of avoiding Evil: viz. a certain *Propensity of Instinct* to Objects and Actions, without any Conception of them as Good, or as the Means of preventing Evil. These Objects or Actions are generally, tho' not always, in effect the Means of some Good; but we are determined to them even without this Conception of them. Thus, as we observed above*, the *Propensity to Fame* may continue after one has lost all notion of Good, either publick or private, which could be the Object of a distinct Desire. Our particular *Affections* have generally some of these *Propensities* accompanying them; but these *Propensities* are sometimes without the *Affections* or distinct Desires, and have a stronger Influence upon the Generality of Men, than the *Affections* could have alone. Thus in Anger, beside the Intention of removing the uneasy Sensation from the Injury received; beside the Desire of obtaining a Reparation of it, and Security for the future, which are some sort of Goods intended by Men when they are calm, as well as during the Passion, there is in the passionate Person a Propensity to occasion *Misery* to the Offender; a Determination to *Violence*; even where there is no Intention of any Good to be obtained, or Evil avoided by this Violence. And 'tis principally this Propensity which we denote by the Name *Anger*, tho' other Desires often accompany it.

* Sect. 1. near the End.

So also our *Presence* with the distressed is generally necessary to their Relief; and yet when we have no Hopes nor Intention of relieving them, we shall find a *Propensity* to run to such Spectacles of Piety: Thus also, beside the calm *Desire* of the Happiness of a Person beloved, we have a strong propensity to their *Company*, to the very *Sight* of them, without any Consideration of it as a Happiness either to our selves or to the Person beloved. The sudden Appearance of great Danger, determines us to shriek out or fly, before we can have any distinct Desires, or any Consideration that a Shriek or Flight are proper means of Relief. These *Propensities*, along with the Sensations above-mentioned, when they occur without rational Desire, we may call *Passions*, and when they happen along with Desires, denominate them *passionate*. This part of our Constitution is as intelligible as many others universally observed and acknowledged; such as these, that Danger of falling makes us stretch out our Arms; noise makes us wink; that a Child is determined to suck; many other Animals to rise up and walk; some to run into Water, before they can have any Notion of Good to be obtained, or Evil avoided by these Means.

It may perhaps be convenient to confine *Love and Hatred* to our Sentiments toward Moral Agents; *Love* denoting "Desire of the Happiness of another, generally attended with some *Approbation* of him as innocent at least, or being of a mixed Character, where Good is generally prevalent:" And *Hatred* "denoting Disapprobation by our *Sense*, with the Absence of Desire of their Happiness." *Benevolence* may denote only "the Desire of another's Happiness;" and *Malice*, "the Desire of their Misery," abstractly from any Approbation or Condemnation by our *Moral Sense*. This sort of Malice is never found in our Nature, when we are not transported with Passion. The Propensities of Anger and *Envy*. Envy have some Resemblance of it; yet Envy is not an ultimate Desire of another's Misery, but only a sub-

a subordinate Desire of it, as the Means of advancing our selves, or some Person more beloved than the Person envied.

Fear. Fear, as far as it is an *Affection*, and not an undesigning Propensity, is "a Mixture of *Sorrow* and "*Aversion*, when we apprehend the Probability of Evil, "or the Loss of Good befalling our selves, or those we "love:" There is more or less of *Sorrow*, according to the apprehended Degrees of Probability.

Hope. Hope, if it be any way an *Affection*, and not an Opinion, is "a Mixture of *Desire* and *Joy*, upon "the probability of obtaining Good, and avoiding Evil." Both these Passions may have some *Propensities* and *Sensations* attending them, distinct from those of the other Affections.

Confused Use of Names. The confused Use of the Names, *Love*, *Hatred*, *Joy*, *Sorrow*, *Delight*, has made some of the most important Distinctions of our Affections and Passions, to be overlooked. No Modifications of Mind can be more different from each other, than a *private Desire*, and a *publick*; yet both are called *Love*. The *Love of Money*, for Instance, and the *Love of a generous Character*, or a *Friend*: The *Love of a fine Seat*, and the *Love of a Child*. In like manner, what can be more different than the *Sorrow for a Loss befallen our selves*, and *Sorrow for the Death of a Friend*? Of this Men must convince themselves by Reflection.

There is also a considerable Difference even among the *selfish Passions*, which bear the same general Name, according to the different *Senses* which constitute the Objects good or evil. Thus the Desire of *Honour*, and the Desire of *Wealth*, are certainly very different sorts of Affections, and accompanied with different Sensations: The *Sorrow* in like manner for our Loss by a *Shipwreck*, and our *Sorrow* for having done a *base Action*, or *Remorse*: *Sorrow* for our being subject to the *Gout* or *Stone*, and *Sorrow* for

our being *despised* and *condemned*, or *Shame*: Sorrow for the Damage done by a *Fire*, and that Sorrow which arises upon an apprehended *Injury* from a Partner, or any other of our Fellows, which we call *Anger*. Where we get some special distinct *Names*, we more easily acknowledge a Difference, as it may appear in *Shame* and *Anger*; but had we other *Names*, appropriated in the same manner, we should imagine, with good ground, as many distinct *Passions*. The like Confusion is observable about our Senses *.

To say that the *Sensation* accompanying all sorts of Joy is pleasant, and that accompanying Sorrow uneasy, will not argue that there is no farther Diversity. Pains have many differences among themselves, and so have Pleasures, according to the different Senses

False Representations of our Nature rectified.

by which they are perceived. To enumerate all these Diversities, would be difficult and tedious. But some Men have piqued themselves so much upon representing all our Affections as *selfish*; as if each Person were in his whole Frame only a *separate System* from his Fellows, so that there was nothing in his Constitution leading him to a *publick Interest*, further than he apprehended it subservient to his own private Interest; and this Interest made nothing else, than the gratifying our *external Senses* and *Imagination*, or obtaining the Means of it: "that thereby the Wisdom and goodness of the AUTHOR of our Nature is traduced, if he had given us the strongest *Dispositions* toward what he had in his Laws prohibited; and directed us, by the same of our Nature, to the meanest and most contemptible Pursuits; as if *what* all good Men have represented the Excellence of our Nature, were a *Force* or *Constraint* put upon it by *Art* or *Authority*. It may be useful to consider our Affections and Passions more particularly, "they are excited by something in our Frame different

" from *Self-Love*, and tend to something else than the
 " private Pleasures of the *external Senses or Imagination*."
 This we may do under the following Heads, by shew-
 ing,

1. How our Passions arise from the *Moral Sense*, and
Sense of Honour.

2. How our Passions tend toward the *State of others*,
 abstractly from any Consideration of their *Moral Qualities*.

3. How the *publick Passions* are diversified by the *Moral*
Qualities of the Agents, when they appear to our *Moral*
Sense as virtuous or vicious.

4. How the *publick Passions* are diversified by the *Re-*
lations of several Agents to each other, when we consider
 at once their *State*, as to Happiness or Misery, and their
 past as well as present *Actions* towards each other.

5. How all these Passions may be complicated with the
selfish. Under each of these Heads we may find the six
 Passions of *Malebranche*, or the four of *Zeno*; with ma-
 ny other Combinations of them.

I. *Passions*
about our
own Ac-
tions.

The Passion
of Heroism
in Castle-
building.

Moral Joy
or Self-
Approba-
tion.

Remorse.

III. 1. The Passions about our own *Acti-*
ons occasioned by the *Moral Sense*. When
 we form the Idea of a *morally good Action*,
 or see it represented in the *Drama*, or read
 it in *Epicks* or *Romance*, we feel a *Desire* aris-
 ing of doing the like. This leads most
 Tempers into an imagined Series of *Adven-*
tures, in which they are still acting the ge-
 nerous and virtuous Part, like to the Idea
 they have received. If we have executed
 any good Design, we feel inward *Triumph*
 of *Joy*: If we are disappointed thro' our
 own *Negligence*, or have been diverted from
 it by some *selfish View*, we shall feel a Sorrow
 called *Remorse*.

When

When the Idea is in like manner formed of any *morally evil Action*, which we might possibly accomplish, if we reflect upon the Cruelty or pernicious Tendency of it, there arises *Reluctance*, or *Aversion*: If we have committed such a Crime, upon like Reflection we feel the Sorrow called *Remorse*: If we have resisted the Temptation, we feel a secret *Joy* and *Self-Approbation*, for which there is no special Name.

We might enumerate six other Passions from the Sense of *Honour*, according as we apprehend our Actions, or any other Circumstances, shall affect the *Opinions* which others form concerning us. When any Action or Circumstance occurs, from which we imagine Honour would arise, we feel *Desire*; when we attain it, *Joy*; when we are disappointed, *Sorrow*. When we first apprehend any Action or Circumstance as *dishonourable*, we feel *Aversion* arising; if we apprehend our selves involved in it, or in danger of being tempted to it, we feel a Passion we may call *Modesty* or *Shame*; when we escape or resist such Temptations, or avoid what is dishonourable, we feel a *Joy*, for which there is no special Name.

We give the Name *Ambition* to a violent Desire of Honour, but generally in a bad Sense, when it would lead the Agent into *immoral Means* to gratify it. The same Word often denotes the *Desire of Power*. *Pride* denotes sometimes the same Desires of Honour and Power, with Aversion to their contraries; sometimes *Pride* denotes Joy upon any apprehended *Right* or *Claim* to Honour; generally it is taken in a bad Sense, when one claims that to which he has no Right.

Men may feel the Passion of *Shame* for the dishonourable Actions of others when any part of the Dishonour falls upon *themselves*; as when the Person dishonoured is one of their *Club*,

or Party, or Family. The general Relation of *human Nature* may produce some uneasiness upon the Dishonour of another, tho' this is more owing to our *publick Sense*.

2. *Publick Passions abstractly.*

IV. 2. The second Class are the *publick Passions* about the *State of others*, as to Happiness or Misery, abstractly from their *Moral Qualities*. These Affections or Passions extend to all perceptive Natures, when there is no real or imagined Opposition of Interest. We naturally *desire* the absent Happiness of others; *rejoice* in it when obtained, and *sorrow* for it when lost. We have *Aversion* to any impending Misery; we are *sorrowful* when it befalls any Person, and *rejoice* when it is removed. This *Aversion* and *Sorrow* we often call *Pity* or *Congratulation*; the Joy we may call *Congratulation*.

Since our Moral Sense represents *Virtue* as the greatest Happiness to the Person possessed of it, our publick Affections will naturally make us desire the *Virtue of others*. When the Opportunity of a great Action occurs to any Person against whom we are no way prejudiced, we wish he would attempt it, and desire his good Success. If he succeeds, we feel *Joy*; if he is disappointed, or quits the Attempt, we feel *Sorrow*. Upon like Opportunity of, or Temptation to a base Action, we have *Aversion* to the Event: If he resists the Temptation, we feel *Joy*; if he yields to it, *Sorrow*. Our Affections toward the Person arise jointly with our Passions about this Event, according as he acquits himself virtuously or basely.

3. *Publick Passions with moral Perceptions.*

V. 3. The Passions of the third Class are our *publick Affections*, jointly with *moral Perceptions* of the Virtue or Vice of the Agents. When Good appears attainable by a Person of *Moral Dignity*, our Desire of his Happiness is founded upon *Esteem* or *Approbation*, is much stronger than that supposed in the former Class.

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The Misfortune of such a Person raises stronger *Sorrow, Pity, or Regret, and Dissatisfaction* with the Administration of the World, upon a light View of it, with a Suspicion of the *real Advantage* of Virtue. The Success of such a Character raises all the contrary Affections of *Joy and Satisfaction* with Providence, and *Security* in Virtue. When Evil threatens such a Character, we have strong *Aversion* to it, with *Love* toward the Person: His escaping the Evil raises *Joy, Confidence* in Providence, with *Security* in Virtue. If the Evil befalls him, we feel the contrary Passions, *Sorrow, Dissatisfaction* with Providence, and *suspicion* of the Reality of Virtue.

Hence we see how unfit such Representations are in *Tragedy*, as make the perfectly virtuous miserable in the highest degree. They can only lead the Spectators into *Distrust* of Providence, *Diffidence* of Virtue; and into such Sentiments, as some Authors, who probably mistake his meaning, tell us *Brutus* express'd at his Death, "That the Virtue he had pursued as a solid Good, proved but an empty Name." But we must here remember, that, notwithstanding all the frightful Ideas we have inculcated upon us of the *King of Terrors*, yet an honourable Death is far from appearing to a generous Mind, as the greatest of Evils. The *Ruin of a Free State*, the *Slavery of a generous Spirit*, a *Life upon shameful Terms*, still appear vastly greater Evils; beside many other exquisite Distresses of a more private nature, in comparison of which, an honourable Death befalling a favourite Character, is looked upon as a Deliverance.

Which of them fit for the Drama.

Under this Class are also included the Passions employed about the Fortunes of Characters, apprehended as *morally Evil*. Such Characters do raise *Dislike* in any Observer, who has a moral Sense: But *Malice*, *Passions toward moral evil Agents.*

No *disinterested* or *ultimate* Malice in Men.

or the *ultimate Desire* of their Misery, does not necessarily arise towards them. Perhaps our Nature is not capable of desiring the Misery of any Being calmly, farther than it may be necessary to the Safety of the innocent: We may find, perhaps, that there is no Quality in any Object which would excite in us *pure disinterested Malice*, or calm Desire of Misery for its own sake*. When we apprehend any Person as *injurious* to our selves, or to any innocent Person, especially to a Person beloved,

the Passion of *Anger* arises toward the Agent. By *Anger* is generally meant “

“ Propensity to occasion Evil to another, arising upon apprehension of an Injury done by him. This violent Propensity is attended generally, when the Injury is not very sudden, with *Sorrow* for the Injury sustained, or threatened, and *Desire* of repelling it, and making the Author of it *repent* of his Attempt, or *repare* the Damage.

Its Effects.

This Passion is attended with the most violent *uneasy Sensations*, and produces great Changes in our Bodies as any whatsoever. We are precipitantly led by this Passion, to apprehend the *injurious* as *directly malicious*, and designing the Misery of others without farther Intention. While the Heat of the Passion continues, we seem naturally to pursue the Misery of the *injurious*, until they relent, and convince us of their better Intentions, by expressing their Sense of the Injury, and offering Reparation of Damage, with Security against future Offences.

Now as it is plainly necessary, in a System of Agents capable of *injuring* each other, that every one should be made *formidable* to an Invader, by such a violent Passion till the Invader shews his Reformation of Temper, as above, and no longer; so we find it is thus ordered in our

* See Sect. 5. Art. 5. of this Treatise.

Constitution. Upon these Evidences of Reformation in the Invader, our Passion naturally abates; or if in any perverse Temper it does not, the *Sense of Mankind* turns against him, and he is looked upon as cruel and inhuman.

In considering more fully the Passions about the Fortunes of evil Characters, distinct from *Anger*, which arises upon a fresh Injury, we may first consider the evil Agents, such as a sudden View sometimes represents them, *directly evil and malicious*; and then make proper Abate-ments, for *what* the worst of Men come short of this compleatly evil Temper. As Mathematicians suppose perfect *Hardness* in some Bodies, and *Elasticity* in others, and then make Allowances for the imperfect Degrees in natural Bodies.

The Prospect of Good to a Person apprehended as *entirely malicious*, raises *Aversion* in the Observer, or *Desire* of his Disappointment; at least, when his Success would confirm him in any evil Intention. His Disappointment raises *Joy* in the Event, with *Trust* in Providence, and *Security* in Virtue. His Success raises the contrary Passions of *Sorrow*, *Distrust*, and *Suspicion*. The Prospect of Evil, befalling an evil Character, at first, perhaps, seems grateful to the Observer, if he has conceived the Passion of *Anger*; but to a sedate Temper, no Misery is farther the Occasion of *Joy*, than as it is necessary to some prepollent Happiness in the whole. The *escaping* of Evil impending over such a Character, by which he is confirmed in Vice, is the Occasion of *Sorrow*, and *Distrust* of Providence and Virtue; and the Evil befalling him raises *Joy*, and *Satisfaction* with Providence, and *Security* in Virtue. We see therefore, that the *Success of evil Characters*, by obtaining Good, or avoiding Evil, is an unfit Representation in *Tragedy*.

Let any one reflect on this Class of Passions, especially as they arise upon Occasions which do not affect himself, and he will see how little of *Self-Love* there is in them; and

and yet they are frequently as violent as any Passions whatsoever. We seem conscious of some *Dignity* in these Passions above the selfish ones, and therefore never conceal them, nor are we ashamed of them. These *complicated Passions* the Philosophers have confusedly mentioned, under some general Names, along with the simple selfish Passions. The *Poets* and *Criticks* have sufficiently shown, that they felt these Differences, however it did not concern them to explain them. We may find Instances of them in all Dramatick Performances, both Antient and Modern.

Passions about mixed Characters. The *Abatements* to be made for what human Nature comes short of the highest Degree either of Virtue or Vice, may be thus conceived: When the Good in any mixed

Character surpasses the Evil, the Passions arise as toward the Good; where the Evil surpasses the Good, the Passions arise as toward the Evil, only in both Cases with less Violence. And further, the Passions in both Cases are either stopped, or turned the contrary way, by want of due Proportion between the *State* and *Character*. Thus an imperfect good Character, in pursuit of a Good too great for his Virtue, or to the exclusion of more worthy Characters, instead of raising *Desire* of his Success, raises *Aversion*; his Success raises *Envy*, or a Species of *Sorrow*, and his Disappointment *Joy*. An imperfectly evil Character, threatened by an Evil greater than is necessary to make him relent and reform, or by a great Calamity, which has no direct tendency to reform him, instead of raising *Desire* toward the Event, raises *Aversion*; his escaping it raises *Joy*, and his falling under it raises *Pity*, a Species of *Sorrow*.

Envy, Sorrow, Joy. Envy, or a Species of Sorrow, and his Disappointment Joy. An imperfectly evil Character, threatened by an Evil greater than is necessary to make him relent and reform, or by a great Calamity, which has no direct tendency to reform him, instead of raising *Desire* toward the Event, raises *Aversion*; his escaping it raises *Joy*, and his falling under it raises *Pity*, a Species of *Sorrow*.

The best Plots in Tragedy. There is another Circumstance which exceedingly varies our Passions of this Class, when the Agents themselves, by their own Conduct, procure their Misery. When an imperfect good Character, by an evil Action, procures the highest Misery.

Misery to himself; this raises these complicated Passions, *Pity* toward the Sufferer, *Sorrow* for the State, *Abhorrence* of Vice, *Awe* and *Admiration* of Providence, as keeping strict Measures of Sanctity and Justice. These Passions we may all feel, in reading the *Oedipus* of *Sophocles*, when we see the Distress of that Prince, occasioned by his superstitious Curiosity about his future Fortunes; his rash Violence of Temper, in Dueling without Provocation, and in pronouncing Execrations on Persons unknown. We feel the like Passions from the Fortunes of *Creon* in the *Antigone*; or from the Fates of *Phyrrhus* and *Orestes*, in the *Andromache* of *Racine*; or our *Distressed Mother*. We heartily pity these Characters, but without repining at Providence; their Misery is the Fruit of their own Actions. It is with the justest Reason, that *Aristotle** prefers such Plots to all others for *Tragedy*, since these Characters come nearest to those of the Spectators, and consequently will have the strongest Influence on them. We are generally conscious of some good Dispositions, mixed with many Weaknesses: few imagine themselves capable of attaining the height of perfectly good Characters, or arriving to their high Degrees of Felicity; and fewer imagine themselves capable of sinking into the Baseness of perfectly evil Tempers, and therefore few dread the Calamities which befall them.

There is one farther Circumstance which strengthens this Class of Passions exceedingly, that is, the greatness of the Change of Fortune in the Person, or the Surprise with which it comes. As this gives the Person a more acute Perception either of Happiness or Misery, so it strengthens our Passions, arising from Observation of his State. Of this the Poets are very sensible, who so often represent to us the former Prosperity of the Person, for whom they would move our Pity; his Pro-

How these Passions are raised high and complicated.

* *Aristotle Poetic*, Chap. 13.

jeeds, his Hopes, his half-executed Designs. One left his Palace unfinished, another his betrothed Mistress, or young Wife; one promised himself Glory, and a fortunate old Age; another was heaping up Wealth, boasted of his Knowledge, was honoured for his fine Armour, his Activity, his Angury.

Ἄλλ' οὐκ οἰνοῖσιν ἱέουσά τε κῆρα μέλιναν.

— οὐδε τί οἱ τόγ' ἐπήρκεσε λυγρὸν ἔλεθρον.

Home

*Sed non Angurie potuit depellere Pestem;
Sed non Dardania medicari cuspidis ictum
Invulsi.*

Virg

The Joy is in like manner increased upon the Misfortunes of evil Characters, by representing their former Prosperity, Pride and Insolence.

This Sorrow or Joy is strangely diversified or accompanied, when the Sufferers are multiplied, by representing the Persons attached to the principal Sufferer, and setting before us their Affections, Friendships, tender Solicitudes, care in Education, succour in former Distresses; this every one will find in reading the Stories of Pallas, Camilla, Nisus, and Euryalus; or in general, any Battle of Homer or Virgil. What there is in Self-Love to account for the Effects, let all Mankind judge.

4. Publick

Passions and
Relations of
Agents.

VI. The Passions of the fourth Class arise from the same moral Sense and publick Affections, upon observing the Actions of Agents, some way attached to each other, by pri-

Ties of Nature or good Offices, or engaged by prior Injuries; when these Relations are known, the moral Qualities of the Actions appear considerably different, and our Passions are much diversified by them.

the

There is also a great *Complication* of different Passions, and a sort of *Contraste*, or assemblage of opposite Passions toward the several Persons concerned. The most moving *Peripeties*, and *Remembrances*, in *Epick* and *Dramatick* Poetry, are calculated to raise these complicated Passions; and in *Oratory* we study to do the same.

*Contrastes
and complica-
tions of
Passions.*

Thus strong Sentiments of *Gratitude*, and vigorous Returns of good Offices observed, raise in the Spectator the highest *Love* and *Esteem* toward both the *Benefactor*, and even the *Person obliged*, with *Security* and *Delight* in *Virtue*.—*Ingratitude*, or returning bad Offices designedly, raises the greatest *Detestation* against the *Ungrateful*; and *Love* with *Compassion* toward the *Benefactor*; with *Detestation* and *Diffidence* in a virtuous Course of Life.——*Forgiving of Injuries*, and much more *returning Good for Evil*, appears wonderfully great and beautiful to our moral Sense: it raises the strongest *Love* toward the *Forgiver*, *Compassion* for the *Injury* received; toward the *Injurious*, *relenting*, some degree of *Good-will*, with *Compassion*; not *relenting*, the most violent *Abhorrence* and *Hatred*.—*Mutual good Offices* done designedly between morally good Agents, raise *Joy* and *Love* in the Observer toward both, with *delight* in *Virtue*.——*Mutual Injuries* done by evil Agents designedly, raise *Joy* in the Events, along with *Hatred* to the Agents, with *Detestation* of *Vice*.——*Good Offices* done designedly by good Agents toward *Evil*, not so as to encourage, or enable them to further *Mischiefs*, raise *Love* toward the good Agent; *Displacence*, with some *Good-will* toward the evil Agent.——*Good Offices* designedly done mutually among evil Agents, if these Offices do not promote their evil Intentions, diminish our *liking* and *Hatred*, and introduce some *Compassion* and *benevolence*.——*Good Offices* from good Agents, to *Benefactors unknown* to the Agent, or to their unknown friends or *Posterity*, increase *Love* toward both; and raise great *Satisfaction* and *Trust* in *Providence*, with *Security* in *Virtue*,

Virtue, and Joy in the Event.—*Undesigned evil Returns* in like Case with the former, raise *Sorrow* in the Observer upon account of the Event, *Pity* toward both, with *Suspicion* of Providence and Virtue.—An *undesigned Return of Evil* to an evil Agent from a good one, whom he had injured, raises *Joy* upon account of the Event, and *Trust* in Providence.—*Undesigned evil Offices mutually done* to each other by evil Agents, raise *Joy* in the Event, *Abhorrence* of Vice, and *Satisfaction* with Providence.—*Undesigned good Offices* done by good Agents toward the evil, by which they are further excited or impowered to do evil, raise *Pity* toward the good Agent, *Indignation* and *Envy* toward the Evil, with *Distrust* in Providence.—*Undesigned good Offices* done by good to evil Agents, by which they are not excited or enabled to do further mischief, raise *Envy* or *Indignation* toward the evil Agent, if the Benefit be great; if not, they scarce raise any new *Passion* distinct from that we had before, of *Love* toward the one, and *Hatred* or *Dislike* toward the other.

These Passions might have been diversified, according to *Malebranche's* Division, as the Object or Event was *present*, or in *suspense*, or *certainly removed*: And would appear in different Degrees of Strength, according as the Persons concerned were more nearly attach'd to the Observer, by *Nature*, *Friendship*, or *Acquaintance*.

5. *Publick Passions join'd with the selfish.*

VII. The Passions of the last Class, are those in which any of the former Kinds are complicated with *selfish Passions*, when our own Interest is concerned. It is needless here to repeat them over again: Only this may be noted in general, that, as the Conjunction of *selfish Passions* will very much increase the Commotion of Mind, so the Opposition of any *selfish Interests*, which appear of great Importance, will often conquer the *publick Desires* or *Aversions*, or those founded upon the Sense of *Virtue* or *Honour*; and this is the Case in vicious Actions done against *Conscience*.

Thes

These Complications of Passions are often not reflected on by the Person who is acted by them, during their Rage: But a judicious Observer may find them by Reflection upon himself, or by Observation of others; and the Representation of them never fails to affect us in the most lively manner.

—*Æstuat ingens*

*Imo in Corde Pudor, mixtoque Infamia Luctu,
Et Furiis agitatus Amor, & conscia Virtus.*

Virg.

In all this tedious Enumerations, let any one consider, How few of our Passions can be any way deduced from Self-Love, or desire of private Advantage: And how improbable it is, that Persons in the Heat of Action, have any of those *subtle Reflections*, and *selfish Intentions*, which some Philosophers invent for them: How great a part of the Commotions of our Minds arise upon the *moral Sense*, and from *publick Affections* toward the good of others. We should find, that without these Principles in our Nature, we should not feel the one half at least of our present *Pleasures* or *Pains*; and that our Nature would be almost reduced to *Indolence*.

An accurate Observation of the several distinct Characters and Tempers of Men, which are constituted by the various Degrees of their natural Sagacity, their Knowledge, their Interests, their Opinions, or Associations of Ideas, with the Passions which are prevalent among them, is a most useful and pleasant Entertainment for those, who have Opportunities of large Acquaintance and Observation. But our present Purpose leads only to consider the first general Elements, from the various Combinations of which, the several Tempers and Characters are formed.

How Characters and Tempers of Men are formed.

*The Order
of Nature
partly vin-
dicated.*

This account of our Affections will, however, prepare the way for discerning considerable Evidences for the *Goodness of the Deity*, from the Constitution of our Nature; and for removing the Objections of voluptuous luxurious Men, against the Rules of Virtue laid down by Men of Reflection. While no other Ideas of *Pleasure* or *Advantage* are given us than those which relate to the external Senses; nor any other *Affections* represented as natural, save those toward private Good: It may be difficult to persuade many, even of those who are not Enemies to Virtue from *Inclination*, of the Wisdom of the Deity, in making the *Bias* of our Nature opposite to the Laws he would give us; and making all *Pleasure*, the most natural Character of Good, attend the *prohibited Actions*, or the *indifferent* ones; while *Obedience* to the Law must be a *constrained* Course of Action, enforced only by *Penalties* contrary to our *natural Affections* and *Senses*. *Nature* and *Grace* are by this Scheme made very opposite: Some would question whether they could have the same Author. Whereas, if the preceding Account be just, we see no such Inconsistency: "Every Passion or Affection in its moderate Degree is innocent, many are directly amiable, and morally good: we have *Senses* and *Affections* leading us to *publick Good*, as well as to *private*; to *Virtue*, as well as to external *Pleasure*."



S E C T. IV.

How far our several Affections and Passions are under our Power, either to govern them when raised, or to prevent their arising: with some general Observations about their Objects.

FROM what was said above it appears, *Affections and Passions* that our Passions are not so much in *depend* our Power, as some seem to imagine, from *much upon* the Topicks used either to raise or allay them. We are so constituted by Nature, that, as *Opinions.* soon as we form the Idea of certain Objects or Events, our *Desire* or *Aversion* will arise toward them; and consequently our Affections must very much depend upon the *Opinions* we form, concerning any thing which occurs to our Mind, its *Qualities, Tendencies, or Effects.* Thus the Happiness of every sensitive Nature is desired, as soon as we remove all *Opinion* or *Apprehension* of *Opposition of Interest* between this Being and others. The *Apprehension* of morally good Qualities, is the necessary Cause of *Approbation*, by our moral Sense, and of stronger Love. The Cause of *Hatred*, is the *Apprehension* of the opposite Qualities. *Fear* in like manner, must arise from *Opinion of Power*, and *Inclination* to hurt us: *Pity* from the *Opinion* of another's *undeserved Misery*: *Shame* only arises from *Apprehension of Contempt* from others: *Joy*, in any Event, must arise from an *Opinion* of its Goodness. Our *selfish Passions* in this, do not differ from our *publick ones.*

This may shew us some Inconsistency in Topicks of Argument, often used to inculcate *Piety* and *Virtue*. Whatever Motives, of Interest we suggest, either from a present or future *Reward*, must be ineffectual, until we have first laboured to form *amiable Conceptions* of the *Deity*, and of our *Fellow Creatures*. And yet in many Writers, even in this Cause, "Mankind are represented
 " as *absolutely evil*, or at best as *entirely selfish*; nor are there
 " any nobler Ideas of the *DEITY* suggested. It is grown
 " a *fashionable Topick*, to put some *by selfish Construction*
 " upon the most generous human Actions; and he passes
 " for the *shrewdest Writer*, or *Orator*, who is most artful in
 " these *Insinuations*."

*Appetites
 and Affec-
 tions distin-
 guished.*

II. The Government of our Passions must then depend much upon our *Opinions*: But we must here observe an obvious Difference among our Desires, *viz.* that "some of
 " them have a *previous*, painful, or uneasy
 " Sensation, antecedently to any *Opinion* of Good in the
 " Object; nay the Object is often chiefly esteemed good
 " only for its *allaying this Pain* or Uneasiness; or if the
 " Object gives also positive Pleasure, yet the *uneasy Sen-
 sation* is previous to, and independent of this *Opinion* of
 " Good in the Object." These Desires we may call *Ap-
 petites*. "Other Desires and Aversions necessarily pre-
 " suppose an *Opinion* of Good and Evil in their Objects;
 " and the Desires or Aversions, with their concomitant
 " uneasy Sensations, are produced or occasioned by this
 " *Opinion* or *Apprehension*." Of the former kind are
Hunger and *Thirst*, and the Desires between the *Sexes*
 to which Desires there is an uneasy Sensation *previous*
 even in those who have little other Notion of Good in the
 Objects, than allaying this *Pain* or *Uneasiness*. There is
 something like to this in the Desire of *Society*, or the Com-
 pany of our fellow Creatures. Our Nature is so much
 formed for this, that altho the *Absence of Company* is not
 immediately painful, yet if it be long, and the Person be

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not employed in something which tends to *Society* at last, or which is designed to fit him for *Society*, an uneasy *Fretfulness*, *Sullenness* and *Discontent*, will grow upon him by degrees, which Company alone can remove. He shall not perhaps be sensible always, that it is the Absence of Company which occasions his Uneasiness: A painful Sensation dictates nothing of it self; it must be therefore some *Reflection* or *Injunct*, distinct from the Pain, which suggests the Remedy. Our Benevolence and Compassion presuppose indeed some *Knowledge* of other sensitive Beings, and of what is good or evil to them: But they do not arise from any previous *Opinion*, that "the Good of others tends to the Good of the Agent." They are *Determinations of our Nature*, previous to our Choice from Interest, which excite us to Action, as soon as we know other sensitive or rational Beings, and have any Apprehension of their Happiness or Misery.

In other Desires the Case is different. No Man is distressed for want of *fine Smells*, *harmonious Sounds*, *beautiful Objects*, *Wealth*, *Power*, or *Grandeur*, previously to some Opinion formed of these things as good, or some prior Sensation of their Pleasures. In like manner, *Virtue* and *Honour* as necessarily give us Pleasure, when they occur to us, as Vice and Contempt give us Pain; but, antecedently to some *Experience* or *Opinion* of this Pleasure, there is no previous uneasy Sensation in their Absence, as there is in the Absence of the Objects of Appetite. The Necessity of these Sensations previous to our Appetites, has been considered already*. The Sensations accompanying or subsequent to our other Desires, by which they are denominated *Passions*, keep them in a just Balance with our *Appetites*, as was before observed.

* *Señ. 2. Art. 6.*

But this holds in general, concerning all our Desires or Aversions, that according to the *Opinion* or *Apprehension* of Good or Evil, the Desire or Aversion is increased or diminished: Every *Gratification* of any Desire gives at first Pleasure; and Disappointment Pain, proportioned to the Violence of the Desire. In like manner, the *escaping* any Object of Aversion, tho it makes no permanent Addition to our Happiness, gives at first a pleasant *Sensation*, and relieves us from Misery, proportioned to the Degree of *Aversion* or *Fear*. So when any Event, to which we had an Aversion, befalls us, we have at first Misery proportioned to the Degree of Aversion. So that some Pain is subsequent upon all *Frustration* of Desire or Aversion, but it is previous to those Desires only, which are called *Appetites*.

III. Hence we see how impossible it is for one to judge of the *Degrees* of Happiness or Misery in others, unless he knows their *Opinions*, their *Associations* of Ideas, and the *Degrees* of their Desires and Aversions. We see also of how much Consequence our *Associations* of Ideas and *Opinions* are to our Happiness, or Misery, and to the Command of our Passions.

Associations of Ideas and Opinions increase or diminish the strength of our Desires.

For tho in our *Appetites* there are uneasy Sensations, previous to any Opinion, yet our very Appetites may be strengthened or weakned, and variously alter'd by *Opinions* or *Associations* of Ideas. Before their Intervention, the bodily Appetites are easily satisfied: Nature has put it in almost every one's power, so far to gratify them, as to support the Body, and remove Pain. But when *Opinions* and *confused Ideas*, or *Fancy* comes in, and represents some particular kinds of Gratifications, or great Variety of them, as of great Importance; when Ideas of *Dignity*, *Grandeur*, *Magnificence*, *Generosity*, or any other moral

Species

Species, are joined to the Objects of Appetites, they may furnish us with endless Labour, Vexation, and Misery of every kind.

Asto the other Desires which presuppose some *Opinion* or *Apprehension* of Good, previous to any Sensation of uneasiness; they must still be more directly influenced by *Opinion*, and *Associations* of Ideas. The higher the *Opinion* or *Apprehension* of Good or Evil is, the stronger must the *Desire* or *Aversion* be; the greater is the Pleasure of *Success* at first, and the greater the Pain of *Disappointment*. Our publick Desires are influenced in the same manner with the private: what we conceive as Good, we shall desire for those we love, as well as for our selves; and that in proportion to the *Degree of Good* apprehended in it: whatever we apprehend as Evil in any degree to those we love, to that we shall have proportionable *Aversion*.

The common Effect of these *Associations* of Ideas is this, " that they raise the Passions into an extravagant Degree, beyond the proportion of, real Good in the Object: And commonly beget some secret Opinions to justify the Passions. But then the *Confutation* of these false Opinions is not sufficient to break the *Association*, so that the *Desire* or *Passion* shall continue, even when our Understanding has suggested to us, that the Object is not good, or not proportioned to the Strength of the *Desire*." Thus we often may observe, that Persons, who by reasoning have laid aside all Opinion of *Spirits* being in the dark more than in the light, are still uneasy to be alone in the dark *. Thus the *luxurious*, the *extrava-*

* *Ac veluti pueri trepidant, atque omnia cecis
In tenebris metuant, sic nos in luce timemus
Interdum nihilo quæ sunt metienda magis.*

gant Lover, the *Miser*, can scarce be supposed to have *Opinions* of the several Objects of their Pursuit, proportioned to the Vehemence of their Desires; but the constant *Indulgence* of any Desire, the frequent *Repetition* of it, the *diverting* our Minds from all other Pursuits, the *Strain* of *Conversation* among Men of the same Temper, who often haunt together, the *Contagion* in the very Air and Countenance of the passionate, beget such wild *Associations* of Ideas, that a sudden *Conviction* of Reason will not stop the Desire or Aversion, any more than an Argument will surmount the *Loathings* or *Aversions*, acquired against certain Meats or Drinks, by Surfeits or emetick Preparations.

The *Luxurious* are often convinced, when any Accident has revived a *natural Appetite*, of the superior Pleasures in a plain Dinner, with a sharp Stomach *: but this does not reform them; they have got all the Ideas of *Dignity*, *Grandeur*, *Excellence*, and *Enjoyment of Life* joined to their Table. Explain to a Miser the Folly of his Conduct, so that he can alledge nothing in his Defence; yet he will go on,

Ut locuples moriatur egenti vivere fato. Juv.

He has likewise all Ideas of *Good*, of *Worth*, and *Importance* in Life confounded with his Coffers.

A *Romantick Lover* has in like manner no Notion of Life without his *Mistress*; all *Virtue* and *Merit* are sum-

* — *Leporem sectatus, equove*
Lassus ab in domito, vel si Romana fatigat.
Militia assuetum Gracari —
Cum labor extuderit fastidia.
 — *Cum sale panis*
Latrantem stomachum bene leniet —

How

Nil actu

med up in his inviolable *Fidelity*. The *Connoisseur* has all Ideas of valuable *Knowledge*, *Gentleman-like Worth* and *A-bility* associated with his beloved Arts. The Idea of *Pro-perty* comes along with the *Taste*, and makes his Happi-ness impossible, without *Possession* of what he admires. A plain Question might confute the *Opinion*, but will not break the *Association*: "What Pleasure has the Possessor " more than others, to whose Eyes they are exposed as " well as his?"

Our *publick Desires* are affected by confused Ideas, in the same manner with our private Desires. What is ap-prehended as Good, thro' an Association of foreign Ideas, shall be pursued for *those we love*, as well as what is really good for them. Our *benevolent Passions* in the nearer Ties, are as apt to be too violent as any whatsoever: this we may often experience in the *Love of Offspring*, *Rela-tions*, *Parties*, *Cabals*. The Violence of our Passion makes us sometimes incapable of pursuing effectually their Good, and sinks us into an useless State of Sorrow upon their Misfortunes. *Compassion* often makes the E-vil greater to the Spectator than to the Sufferer; and some-times subjects the Happiness of a Person of great Worth, to every Accident befalling one entire'y void of it.

The Desire of Virtue, upon extensive impartial Schemes of publick Happiness, can scarce be too strong; but, up-on mistaken or partial Views of publick Good, this Desire of Virtue may often lead Men into very pernicious Acti-ons. One may conceive a sort of *Extravagancy*, and of-feminate Weakness even of this Desire; as when Men are dissatisfied with themselves for *Disappointments* in good At-tempts, which it was not in their Power to accomplish; when some *heroick Tempers* shew no Regard to private Good; when the Pursuit of the lovely Form is so passionate, that the Agent does not relish his *past Conduct* by agreeable Reflection, but like the Ambitious,

How Nil actum reputas si quid superesset agendum. Lucan.

Bpt

But the most pernicious *Perversions* of this Desire are
 " some *partial Admirations* of certain moral Species, such
 " as *Fortitude, Propagation of true Religion, Zeal for a*
 " *Party*; while other Virtues are overlooked, and the ve
 " ry *End* to which the admired Qualities are subservient
 " is forgotten. Thus some *Phantoms* of Virtue are raised
 " wholly opposite to its true Nature, and to the sole End
 " of it, *the publick Good.*"

Honour, in like manner, has had its foolish Associations
 and the true Nature of it has been overlooked, so that the
 Desire of it has run into *Enthusiasm*, and pernicious *Mani*
ness. Thus, " however our Desires, when our Opin
 " are true, and the Desire is proportioned to the *true Op*
 " *nion*, are all calculated for good, either publick or pr
 " vate; yet *false Opinions*, and *confused Ideas*, or too gre
 " a *Violence* in any of them, above a due Proportion to th
 " rest, may turn the best of them into destructive Fo
 " lies."

*Malicious
 or cruel
 Tempers,
 how they
 arise.*

This is probably the Case in those Affec
 tions which some suppose *natural*, or at least
 incident to our Natures, and yet *absolute*
evil: Such as *Rancour*, or *disinterested Ma*
lice, Revenge, Misanthropy. We indeed find
 our Nature determined to disapprove an
gent apprehended as evil, or malicious, thro' *direct Inten*
tion; we must desire the Destruction of such a Being,
 only from Self-Love, but from our Benevolence to others.
 Now when we rashly form Opinions of *Seets*, or *Nations*
 as absolutely evil; or get associated Ideas of *Impiety*,
Cruelty, Profaneness, recurring upon every mention
 them: when, by repeated Reflection upon Injuries re
 ceived, we strengthen our Dislike into an *obdurate*
version, and conceive that the Injurious are *directly ma*
licious; we may be led to act in such a manner, that Spec
 tators, who are unacquainted with our *secret Opinions*,

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confused Apprehensions of others, may think we have *pure disinterested Malice* in our Nature; a very *Instinct* toward the Misery of others, when it is really only the *overgrowth* of a just natural Affection, upon false *Opinions*, or *confused Ideas*; even as our *Appetites*, upon which our natural Life depends, may acquire accidental *Loathings* at the most wholesom Food. Our Ideas and Opinions of Mankind are often very rashly formed, but our *Affections* are generally suited to our *Opinions*. When our Ideas and Opinions of the moral Qualities of others are just, our Affections are generally regular and good: But when we give loose Reins to our *Imagination* and *Opinion*, our Affections must follow them into all Extravagance and Folly; and inadvertent Spectators will imagine some *Dispositions* in us wholly useless, and absolutely and directly evil.

Now the *Gratification* of these destructive Desires, like those of all the rest, gives at first some *Pleasure*, proportioned to their Violence; and the *Disappointment* gives proportioned *Pain*. But as to the *Continuance* of these Pleasures or Pains, we shall find hereafter great Diversity.

From this view of our Desires, we may see "the great Variety of *Objects*, *Circumstances*, *Events*, which must be of Importance to the Happiness of a Creature, furnished with such a *Variety of Senses* of Good and Evil, with equally various *Desires* corresponding to them: especially considering the strange *Combinations of Ideas*, giving Importance to many Objects, in their own Nature indifferent."

IV. We must in the next Place enquire how far these several *Desires* must necessarily arise, or may be prevented by our Conduct."

*How far
the several
Desires
must necessarily arise
in us.*

The

1. *That of external Pleasures.*

The Pleasures and Pains of the *external Senses* must certainly be perceived by every one who comes into the world; the one raising some Degree of Desire, and the other Aversion: the *Pains of Appetites* arise yet more certainly than others, and are previous to any Opinion. But then it is very much in our power to keep these Sensations *pure and unmixed* with any foreign Ideas: so that the plainest Food and Raiment, if sufficiently nourishing and healthful, may keep us easy, as well as the *rarest or most expensive*. Nay the Body, when accustomed to the simpler Sorts, is easiest in the Use of them: And we are raised to an higher Degree of *Chearfulness*, by a small Improvement in our Table, than it is possible to bring a *pampered Body* into, by any of the Productions of Nature. Whatever the Body is once accustomed to, produces no considerable Change in it.

2. *The Desires of the Pleasures of the Imagination.*

The Pleasures of the *Imagination*, or of the *internal Sense of Beauty*, and *Decency*, and *Harmony*, must also be perceived by us. The *Regularity, Proportion and Order* in external Forms, will as necessarily strike the Mind, as any Perceptions of the external Senses. But then, as we have no uneasiness of *Appetite*, previous to the Reception of those grateful Ideas, we are not necessarily made miserable in their Absence, unless by some fantastick *Habit* we have raised very violent Desires, or by a long Pursuit of them, have made our selves incapable of other Enjoyments.

Again, the Sense and Desire of *Beauty* of several kinds is entirely abstracted from *Possession or Property*; so that the finest *Relish* of this kind, and the strongest subsequent *Desires*, if we admit no foolish Conjunctions of Ideas, may almost every where be gratified with the Prospects of *Nature*, and with the Contemplation of the more curious *Works of Art*, which the Proprietors generally allow to others without Restraint. But if this Sense or Desire

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of Beauty itself be accompanied with the Desire of Possession or Property; if we let it be guided by Custom, and receive Associations of foreign Ideas in our Fancy of Dress, Equipage, Furniture, Retinue; if we relish only the Modes of the Great, or the Marks of Distinction as beautiful; if we let such Desires grow strong, we must be very great indeed, before we can have any Pleasure by this Sense: and every Disappointment or Change of Fortune must make us miserable. The like Fate may attend the Pursuit of speculative Sciences, Poetry, Musick, or Painting; to excel in these things is granted but to few. A violent Desire of Distinction and Eminence may bring on Vexation and Sorrow for the longest Life.

The Pleasures and Pains of the publick 3. The Publick Desires.
Sense will also necessarily arise in us. Men cannot live without the Society of others, and their good Offices; they must observe both the Happiness and Misery, the Pleasures and Pains of their Fellows: Desire and Aversion must arise in the Observer. Nay farther, as we cannot avoid more near Attachments of Love, either from the Instinct between the Sexes, or that toward Offspring, or from Observation of the benevolent tempers of others, or their particular Virtues and good Offices, we must feel the Sensations of Joy and Sorrow, from the State of others even in the stronger Degrees, and have the publick Desires in a greater Height. All we can do to prevent the Pains of general Benevolence, will equally lessen the Pleasures of it. If we restrain our publick affection from growing strong, we abate our Pleasures from the good Success of others, as much as we lessen our Compassion for their Misfortunes: If we confine our Desires to a small Circle of Acquaintance, or to a Cabal Faction, we contract our Pleasures as much as we do our Pains. The Distinction of Pleasures and Pains into real and imaginary, or rather into necessary and voluntary, would be of some use, if we could correct the Imaginations of others, as well as our own; but if we cannot, we are sure, whoever thinks himself miserable, is really so; however he might possibly, by a better

Conduct of his Imagination, have prevented this Misery. All we can do in this affair, is to enjoy a great Share of the Pleasures of the *stronger Ties*, with fewer Pains of them, by confining the stronger Degrees of Love, or our Friendships, to Persons of *corrected Imaginations*, to whom as few of the uncertain Objects of Desire are necessary to Happiness as is possible. Our Friendship with such Persons may probably be to us a much greater Source of Happiness than of Misery, since the Happiness of such Persons is more probable than the contrary.

Since there is nothing in our Nature determining us to *disinterested Hatred* toward any Person; we may be secure against all the Pains of *Malice*, by preventing false *Opinions* of our Fellows as absolutely evil, or by guarding against *habitual Anger*, and rash *Aversions*.

The *moral Ideas* do arise also necessarily in our Minds. We cannot avoid observing the *Affections* of those we converse with; their *Actions*, their *Words*, their *Looks* betray them. We are conscious of our own Affections, and cannot avoid Reflection upon them sometimes: the kind and generous Affections will appear amiable, and all Appearance of Cruelty, Malice, or even very selfish Affections, will be disapproved, and appear odious. Our *own Temper*, as well as that of others, will appear to our moral Sense either lovely or deformed, and will be the Occasion either of Pleasure or Uneasiness. We have not any proper *Appetite* toward Virtue, so as to be uneasy, even antecedently to the Appearance of the lovely Form; but as soon as it appears to any Person, as it certainly must very early in Life, it never fails to raise *Desire*, as Vice does raise *Aversion*. This is so rooted in our Nature, that no *Education*, *false Principles*, *depraved Habits*, or even *Affectation* itself can entirely root it out. LUCRETIVS and HOBBS shew themselves in innumerable Instances struck with some *moral Species*; they are full of Expressions of *Admiration*, *Gratitude*, *Praise*, *Desire of doing Good*; and of *Censure*, *Disapprobation*, *Aversion to some Forms of Vice*.

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Since then there is no avoiding these Desires and Perceptions of *Morality*, all we can do to secure our selves in the possession of Pleasures of this kind, without Pain, consists in “ a vigorous Use of our Reason, to discern what Actions really tend to the publick Good in the *whole*, that we may not do *that* upon a partial View of Good, which afterwards, upon a fuller Examination, we shall condemn and abhor our selves for; and withal, to fix our *Friendships* with Persons of like Dispositions, and just Discernment.” Men of partial Views of publick Good, if they never obtain any better, may be easy in a very pernicious Conduct, since the *moral Evil* or *Deformity* does not appear to them. But this is seldom to be hop'd for in any partial Conduct. Those who are injured by us fail not to complain; the Spectators, who are disengaged from our partial Attachments, will often take the Freedom to express their Sentiments, and set our Conduct in a full Light: This must very probably occasion to us *Shame* and *Remorse*. “ It cannot therefore be an indifferent Matter, to an Agent with a moral Sense, what *Opinions* he forms of the Tendency of Actions; what partial *Attachments* of Love he has toward *Parties* or *Factions*. If he has true Opinions of the Tendencies of *Actions*; if he carefully examines the real Dignity of *Persons* and *Causes*, he may be sure that the Conduct which he now approves he shall always approve, and have delight in Reflection upon it, however it be censured by others. But if he takes up at hazard *Opinions* of Actions; if he has a foolish *Admiration* of particular Sects, and as foolish *Aversions* and Dislike to others, not according to any real Importance or Dignity, he shall often find occasion for *Inconstancy* and *Change* of his Affections, with *Shame* and *Remorse* for his past Conduct, and an inward *Dislike* and *Self-Condernnation*.”

What most deeply affects our Happiness or Misery, are the Dispositions of those Persons with whom we voluntarily contract some *nearer Intimacies* of Friendship: If we act wisely in this Point, we may secure to our selves

the greatest Pleasures with the fewest Pains, by attaching our selves to Persons of real Goodness, good Offices toward whom are useful to the World. The Ties of *Blood* are generally very strong, especially toward *Offspring*; they need rather the Bridle than the Spur, in all Cases wherein the Object is not recommended to a singular Love by his good Qualities. We may, in a considerable measure, restrain our *natural Affection* toward a worthless Offspring, by setting our *publick Affections* and our *moral Sense* against it, in frequent Contemplation of their Vices and of the Mischief which may arise to Persons of more worth from them, if we give them any Countenance in their Vices.

The regulating our Apprehensions of the *Actions of others*, is of very great Importance, that we may not imagine Mankind worse than they really are, and thereby bring upon our selves a Temper full of *Suspicion*, *Hatred*, *Anger* and *Contempt* toward others; which is a constant State of Misery, much worse than all the Evils to be feared from *Credulity*. If we examine the true *Springs* of human Action, we shall seldom find their Motives worse than *Self-Love*. Men are often subject to *Anger*, and upon sudden *Provocations* do Injuries to each other, and that only from *Self-Love*, without Malice; but the greater part of their Lives is employed in Offices of *natural Affection*, *Friendship*, *innocent Self-Love*, or *Love of a Country*. The little *Party-Prejudices* are generally founded upon Ignorance, or false Opinions, rather apt to move *Pique* than *Hatred*. Such Considerations are the best Preservative against *Anger*, *Malice*, and *Discontent* of Mind with the Order of Nature. "When you would make yourself self chearful and easy (says the Emperor *) consider the *Virtues* of your several Acquaintances, the *Industry* and *Diligence* of one, the *Modesty* of another, the *Generosity* or *Liberality* of a third; and in other Persons some other *Virtue*. There is nothing so delightful, as the Re-

* Marcus Antoninus, *Lib. vi. C. 48.*

" sem-

“semblances of the *Virtues* appearing in the Conduct of
“your Contemporaries as frequently as possible. Such
“Thoughts we should still retain with us.”

When the *moral Sense* is thus assisted by a sound Understanding and Application, our own Actions may be a constant Source of solid Pleasure, along with the Pleasures of *Benevolence*, in the highest Degree which our Nature will admit, and with as few of its Pains as possible.

As to the Désires of *Honour*, since we cannot avoid observing or hearing of the Sentiments of others concerning our Conduct, we must feel the Desire of the good *Opinions* of others, and Aversion to their *Censures* or *Condemnation*: since the one necessarily gives us Pleasure, and the other Pain. Now it is impossible to bring all Men into the same *Opinions* of particular Actions, because of their different *Opinions* of *publick Good*, and of the *Means* of promoting it; and because of *opposite Interests*; so that it is often impossible to be secure against all Censure or Dishonour from some of our Fellows. No one is so much Master of *external Things*, as to make his honourable Intentions successful; and yet *Success* is a Mark by which many judge of the Goodness of Attempts. Whoever therefore suffers his Desire of *Honour* or *Applause* to grow violent, without Distinction of the *Persons* to whose Judgment he submits, runs a great hazard of misery. But our natural Desire of Praise, to speak in the Mathematical Style, is in a compounded Proportion of the *Numbers* of Applauders, and their *Dignity*. “He therefore who makes *Distinction* of Persons justly, and acts wisely for the *publick Good*, may secure himself from much uneasiness upon injudicious Censure, and may obtain the Approbation of those whose Esteem alone is valuable, or at least far over-balance the Censure of others.”

*How far
our Sense
of Honour
is in our
power.*

*The Desire
of Wealth
and Power.*

The *Desire of Wealth* must be as necessary as any other Desires of our Nature, as soon as we apprehend the usefulness of Wealth to gratify all other Desires. While it is desired as the Means of something farther, the Desire tends to our Happiness, proportionably to the good Oeconomy of the principal Desires to which it is made subservient. It is in every Man's power, by a little Reflection, to prevent the Madness and Enthusiasm with which Wealth is insatiably pursued, even for it self, without any direct Intention of using it. The Consideration of the small Addition often made by Wealth to the Happiness of the Possessor, may check this Desire, and prevent that *Injuriability* which sometimes attends it.

Power in like manner is desired as the Means of gratifying other original Desires; nor can the Desire be avoided by those who apprehend its usefulness. It is easy to prevent the *Extravagance* of this Desire, and many of its consequent Pains, by considering "the Danger of affecting it by injurious Means, supporting it by Force, without consent of the Subject, and employing it to private Interest, in opposition to publick Good." No Mortal is easy under such Subjection; every Slave to such a Power is an *Enemy*: The Possessor must be in a continual State of *Fear, Suspicion and Hatred*.

*The Occa-
sion of fan-
tastick De-
sires.*

There is nothing in our Nature leading necessarily into the *fantastick Desires*; they wholly arise thro' our *Ignorance and Negligence*; when, thro' want of Thought, we suffer foolish *Associations* of Ideas to be made, and imagine certain trifling Circumstances to contain something *honourable and excellent* in them, from their being used by Persons of *Distinction*. We know how the *Inadvertences, Negligences, Infirmities*, and even *Vices*, either of great or ingenious Men, have been affected and imitated by those who were incapable of imitating their Excellencies. This happens often to young Gentlemen

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men of plentiful Fortunes, which set them above the Employments necessary to others, when they have not cultivated any relish for the Pleasures of the *Imagination*, such as *Architecture*, *Musick*, *Painting*, *Poetry*, *Natural Philosophy*, *History*: When they have no farther Knowledge of these things, than stupidly to praise what they hear others praise: When they have neglected to cultivate their *publick Affections*, are bantered a long time from *Marriage* and *Offspring*; and have neither themselves Minds fit for *Friendships*, nor any intimate Acquaintance with such as are fit to make Friends of: When their *moral Sense* is weakned, or, if it be strong in any points, these are fixed at random, without any *regular Scheme*: When thro' Ignorance of *publick Affairs*, or want of *Eloquence* to speak what they know, they despair of the *Esteem* or *Honour* of the Wise: When their Hearts are too gay to be entertained with the dull Thoughts of increasing their *Wealth*, and they have not Ability enough to hope for *Power*; such poor empty Minds have nothing but Trifles to pursue; any thing becomes agreable, which can supply the Void of Thought, or prevent the sullen Discontent which must grow upon a Mind conscious of no *Merit*, and expecting the *Contempt* of its Fellows: as a *Pack of Dogs*, an *Horse*, a *Jewel*, an *Equipage*, a *Pack of Cards*, a *Tavern*; any thing which has got any confused Ideas of *Honour*, *Dignity*, *Liberality*, or *genteel Enjoyment of Life* joined to it. These fantastick Desires any Man might have banished at first, or entirely prevented. But if we have lost the Time of substituting better in their stead, we shall only change from one sort to another, with a perpetual Succession of *Inconstancy* and *Dissatisfaction*.

—Cui si vitiosa Libido

Fecerit Auspicium—

Idem eadem possunt horam durare probantes.

Hor. Ep. 1.

V. The End of all these Considerations, is to find out the most effectual way of advancing the Happiness of Mankind; in order to which, they may perhaps appear of

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considerable Consequence, since Happiness consists in
 "the highest and most durable Gratifications of either all
 "our *Desires*, or, if all cannot be gratify'd at once, of
 "those which tend to the greatest and most durable Plea-
 "sures, with exemption either from all Pains and Objects
 "of *Aversion*, or at least from those which are the most
 "grievous." The following general Observations may be
 premised concerning their Objects.

The full
 Pursuit of
 all kinds of
 Pleasure is
 impossible.

1. "It is plainly impossible that any Man
 "should pursue the Gratifications of all these
 "Desires at once, with Prudence, Diligence,
 "and Vigour, sufficient to obtain the high-
 "est Pleasures of each kind, and to avoid
 "their opposite Pains." For, not to men-
 tion the *Narrowness* of the Powers of our Minds, which
 makes them incapable of a Multiplicity of Pursuits at
 once; the very *Methods* of obtaining the highest Gratifi-
 cation of the several Senses and Desires, are directly in-
 consistent with each other. For example, the violent Pur-
 suit of the Pleasures of the *external Senses*, or *Sensuality*,
 is opposite to the Pleasures of the *Imagination*, and to the
 Study of the ingenious *Arts*, which tend to the Ornament
 of Life: These require Labour and Application, inconsis-
 tent with the *Voluptuousness* of the external Senses,
 which by it self would engross the whole Application of
 our Minds, thro' vain Associations of Ideas.

Again: The violent Pursuits of either of the former
 kinds of Pleasures, is often directly inconsistent with *pub-
 lick Affections*; and with our *moral Sense*, and *Sense of Ho-
 nour*. These Pleasures require a quite different Temper,
 a Mind little set upon selfish Pleasures, strongly possessed
 with Love for others, and Concern for their interests ca-
 pable of Labour and Pain. However our desire of Ho-
 nour be really *selfish*, yet we know it is never acquired by
 Actions appearing selfish; but by such as appear publick-
 spirited, with neglect of the Pleasures of the external
 Senses and Wealth. *Selfishness* is generally attended with

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Shame; * and hence we conceal even our *Desire of Honour* it self, and are ashamed of *Praise* in our own Presence, even when we are doing beneficent Actions, with design to obtain it. The Pursuits of *Wealth and Power* are often directly opposite to the Pleasures of all the other kinds, at least for the present, however they may be intended for the future Enjoyment of them.

2. " There is no such *Certainty* in human Affairs, that a Man can assure himself of the perpetual Possession of these Objects " which gratify any one Desire," except that of *Virtue* it self: which, since it does not depend upon external Objects and Events †, but upon our own *Affections and Conduct*, we may promise to our selves that we shall always enjoy. But then *Virtue* consists in Benevolence, or Desire of the publick Good: *The Happiness of others* is very uncertain, so that our publick Desires may often be disappointed; and every Disappointment is uneasy, in proportion to the Degree of Desire. And therefore, however the *Admiration* and fixed Pursuit of *Virtue* may always secure one stable and constant Pleasure of *Self-Approbation*, yet this Enjoyment presupposes a *Desire of publick Good*, subject to frequent Disappointments, which will be attended with Uneasiness proportioned to the Degree of publick Desire, or the *Virtue* upon which we reflect. There seems therefore no possibility of securing to our selves, in our present State, an *unmixed Happiness* independently of all other Beings. Every Apprehension of Good raises Desire, every Disappointment of Desire, is uneasy; every Object of Desire is uncertain except *Virtue*, but the *Enjoyment of Virtue* supposes the Desire of an uncertain Object, viz. the *publick Happiness*. To secure

No Certainty of Success in any Pursuit, save that of Virtue.

* *Treat. 2. Sect. 5. Art. 7.*

† *Treat. 2. Sect. 3. last Paragraph.*

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therefore independently of all other Beings invariable and pure Happiness, it would be necessary either to have the Power of directing all Events in the Universe, or to root out all *Sense of Evil*, or Aversion to it, while we retained our *Sense of Good*, but without previous Desire, the Disappointment of which could give Pain. The rooting out of all Senses and Desires, were it practicable, would cut off all Happiness as well as Misery: The removing or stopping a part of them, might indeed be of consequence to the Happiness of the *Individual* on some Occasions; however pernicious it might be to the *Whole*. But 'tis plain, we have not in our Power the modelling of our *Senses or Desires*, to form them for a private Interest: They are fixed for us by the AUTHOR of our Nature, subservient to the Interest of the *System*; so that each Individual is made, previously to his own Choice, a Member of a great *Body*, and affected with the Fortunes of the *Whole*, or at least of many Parts of it; nor can he break himself off at pleasure.

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bout com-
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piness.

This may shew the Vanity of some of the lower rate of Philosophers of the *Stoick* Sect, in boasting of an undisturbed Happiness and Serenity, independently even of the DEATH, as well as of their Fellow-Creatures, wholly inconsistent with the *Order* of Nature, as well as with the Principles of some of their great Leaders: for which, Men of Wit in their own Age did not fail to ridicule them.

That must be a very fantastick Scheme of Virtue which represents it as a *private sublimely selfish Discipline* to preserve our selves wholly unconcerned, not only in the Changes of Fortune as to our *Wealth or Poverty, Liberty or Slavery, Ease or Pain*, but even in all external Events whatsoever, in the Fortunes of our dearest Friends or Country, solacing our selves that we are easy and undisturbed. If there be any thing amiable in human Nature, the Reflection upon which can give us pleasure, it must be kind *disinterested Affections* towards our Fellows, or towards

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wards the whole, and its AUTHOR and Cause. These Affections, when reflected upon, must be one constant Source of Pleasure in *Self-Approbation*. But some of these very Affections, being toward an uncertain Object, must occasion Pain, and directly produce one sort of Misery to the virtuous in this Life. 'Tis true indeed, it would be a much greater Misery to want such an amiable Temper, which alone secures us from the basest and most detestable State of *Self-Condemnation* and *Abhorrence*. But, allowing such a Temper to be the necessary Occasion of one sort of Happiness, even the greatest we are capable of, yet it may also be the Occasion of no inconsiderable Pains in this Life.

That this *Affectionate Temper* is true Virtue, and not that *undisturbed Selfishness*, were it attainable, every one would readily own who saw them both in Practice. Would any honest Heart relish such a Speech as this from a *Cato* or an *Emilius Paulus*? "I foresee the Effects of this Defeat, my *Fellow-Creatures*, my *Countrymen*, my honourable *Acquaintances*; many a generous gallant *Patriot* and *Friend*, *Fathers*, *Sons*, and *Brothers*, *Husbands* and *Wives*, shall be enslaved, tortured, torn from each other, or in each others sight made subject to the *Pride*, *Avarice*, *Petulancy*, or *Lust* of the Conqueror. I have, for my own Pleasure, to secure agreeable *Reflections*, laboured in their Defence. I am unconcerned in their Misfortunes; their *bodily Tortures*, or more exquisite *Distresses of Mind* for each other, are to me indifferent. I am entirely absolute, compleat in my self; and can behold their Agonies with as much Ease or Pleasure, as I did their Prosperity." This is the plain Language of some boasting *Refiners* upon Virtue; Sentiments as disagreeable as those of *Catiline*.

The Desire of Virtue is toward an Object *ἐν τῷ ἐφ' ἡμῶν*, in our power, since all Men have naturally *kind Affections*, which they may increase and strengthen; but these kind Affections tend toward an *uncertain Object*, which is not our Power. Suppose the *Stoick* should alledge, "Vice
" is

"is the only Evil, and Virtue the only Good." If we have *Benevolence* to others, we must wish them to be virtuous; and must have Compassion toward the Vicious: thus still we may be subjected to Pain or Uneasiness, by our *very Virtue*; unless we suppose, *what* no Experience can confirm; that Men may have strong Desires, the Disappointment of which will give no *Uneasiness*, or that *Uneasiness* is no Evil. Let the *Philosopher* regulate his own Notions as he pleases about Happiness or Misery; whoever imagines himself unhappy, is so in reality; and whoever has *kind Affections* or Virtue, must be uneasy to see others really Happy.

But tho' a pure unmixed Happiness is not attainable in this Life, yet all their Precepts are not rendered useless.

Est quâdam prodire tenus, si non datur ulra.

3. The full Sense of Good may be preserved, without the greater Pains of Desire in many Cases.

3. For we may observe, thirdly, that "the *Sense of Good* can continue in its full Strength, when yet we shall have but *weak Desires*." In this case we are capable of enjoying all the Good in any Object, when we obtain it, and yet exposed to no great Pain upon *Disappointment*. This may be generally observed, that "the *Violence of Desire* does not proportionably enliven the Satisfaction of Good, when it is obtained; nor does *diminishing the Desire* weaken the Satisfaction, tho' it will diminish the *Uneasiness* of *Disappointment*, or the *Misery of contrary Evils*." Our high Expectations of Happiness from any Object, either thro' the *Acuteness* of our Senses, or from our *Opinions* or *Associations* of Ideas, never fail to increase Desire: But then the *Violence of Desire* does not proportionably enliven our *Sensation* in the Enjoyment. During the first confused Hurry of our Success, our Joy may perhaps be increased by the *Violence* of our *previous Desire*, were it only by allaying the great Uneasiness accompanying the Desire itself. But this Joy soon vanishes, and is often suc-

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ceeded by *Disgust* and *Uneasiness*, when our *Sense* of the Good, which is more fixed in Nature than our *Fancy* or *Opinions*, represents the Object far below our Expectation. Now he who examines all *Opinions* of Good in Objects, who prevents or corrects *vain Associations* of Ideas, and thereby prevents *extravagant Admirations*, or *enthusiastick Desires*, above the real Moment of Good in the Object, if he loses the *transient Raptures* of the first Success, yet he enjoys all the *permanent Good* or Happiness which any Object can afford; and escapes, in a great measure, both the uneasy Sensations of the more *violent Desires*, and the *Torments of Disappointment*, to which Persons of irregular Imaginations are exposed.

This is the Case of the *Temperate* and the *Chaste*, with relation to the Appetites; of the Men of *Moderation* and *Frugality*, and *corrected Fancy*, with regard to the Pleasures of *Imagination*; of the *Humble* and the *Content*, as to *Honour, Wealth* or *Power*. Such Persons upon good success, want only the first *transitory Ecstasies*; but have a full and lively *Sense* of all the lasting Good in the Objects of their Pursuit; and yet are in a great measure secure against both the Uneasiness of *violent Desire*, and the *Dejection of Mind*, and *abject Sorrow* upon Disappointment, upon their being exposed to the contrary Evils.

Further, Persons of *irregular Imaginations* are not soon reformed, nor their Associations of Ideas broke by every experience of the Smallness of the Good in the admired Object. They are often rather set upon *new Pursuits* of the same kind, or of greater *Variety* of like Objects. So their experience of *Disappointment*, or of contrary Evils, does not soon correct their Imaginations about the Degrees of Good or Evil. The Loss of Good, or the Presence of any Calamity, will continue to torment them, by their *vain Notions* of these Events, and make them insensible of the real Good which they might still enjoy in their present State. Thus the *Covetous* have smaller Pleasure in any given *Degree of Wealth*; the *Luxuries* from a sumptuous Table; the *Ambitious* from any given *Degree of*

Honour or Power, than Men of more moderate Desires: And on the other Hand, the Miseries of *Poverty, mean Fare, Subjection, or Contempt*, appear much greater to them, than to the moderate. Experience, while these confused Ideas remain, rather increases the Disorder: But if just *Reflection* comes in, and tho' late, applies the proper Cure, by correcting the *Opinions* and the *Imagination*, every Experience will tend to our Advantage.

▪ The same way may our *publick Desires* be regulated. If we prevent confused Notions of Good, we diminish or remove many Anxieties for our *Friends* as well as our selves. Only this must be remembred, that weakning our *publick Affections*, necessarily weakens our *Sense* of publick Good founded upon them, and will deprive us of the Pleasures of the *moral Sense*, in reflecting on our Virtue.

4. *Laying our account to meet with Evil, often lessens our Misery.*

4. We may lastly remark, " That the Expectation of any Pain, or the frequent Consideration of the Evils which may befall us, or the Loss of Good we now enjoy before these Events actually threaten us, or raise any Consternation in our Minds by their Approach, does not diminish our Joy upon escaping Evil, or our Pleasure upon the arrival of any Good beyond Expectation: But this previous Expectation generally diminishes our Fear while the Event is in suspense, and our Sorrow upon its arrival. Since thereby the Mind examines the Nature of the Event, sees how far it is necessarily Evil, and what Supports under it are in its power: This Consideration may break various Conjunctions of foreign Ideas, which occasion our greatest Fears in Life, and even in Death itself. If, indeed, a weak Mind does not study to correct the Imagination, but still dwells upon its possible Calamities, under all their coloured Forms of Terror; or if it industriously aggravates them to it self, this previous Consideration may embitter its whole Life, without arming it against the smallest Evil.

This Folly is often occasioned by that Delight which most Men find in the *Pity of others* under Misfortunes; those especially, who are continually indulgent as the *Favourites of Families or Company*, being long enured to the Pleasure arising from the perpetual *Marks of Love* toward them from all their Company, and from their tender *Sympathy* in Distress: This often leads them even to *feign Misery* to obtain Pity, and to raise in themselves the most dejected Thoughts, either to procure *Consolation*, or the Pleasure of observing the *Sympathy* of others. This *peevish or pettish Temper*, tho' it arises from something sociable in our Frame, yet is often the Fore-runner of the greatest Corruption of Mind. It disarms the Heart of its natural *Integrity*; it induces us to throw away our true *Armour*, our natural *Courage*, and cowardly to commit ourselves to the vain Protection of others, while we neglect our own Defence.



S E C T. V.

A Comparison of the Pleasures and Pains of the several Senses, as to Intensity and Duration.

I. **H**AVING considered how far these Desires must necessarily affect us, and when they are the Occasions of Pleasure or Pain; since by the first general Observation, the Pursuits of their several Pleasures, and the avoiding their several Pains, may often be inconsistent with each other; let us next examine, which of these several Pleasures are *the most valuable*, so as to deserve our Pursuit, even with neglect of the others; and which of these Pains are *most grievous*, so as to be shunned even by the enduring of other Pains if necessary.

“The *Value* of any Pleasure, and the *Quantity* or *Moment* of any Pain, is in a compounded Proportion of the *Intensity* and *Duration*.” In examining the Duration of Pleasure, we must include not only the Constancy of the *Object*, but even of our *Fancy*; for a Change in either of these will put an end to it.

The difficulty in comparing the several Pleasures, as to Intensity.

To compare these several Pleasures and Pains as to their *Intensity*, seems difficult, because of the Diversity of *Tastes*, or Turns of Temper given by Custom and Education, which make strange *Associations of Ideas*, and from *Habits*; from whence it happens, that tho all the several kinds of original Senses and Desires seem equally natural, yet some are led into a constant Pursuit of the Pleasures of one kind as the only Enjoyment of Life, and are indifferent about others. Some pursue, or seem to pursue only the Pleasures of the *external Senses*, and all other Pursuits are made subservient

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subservient to them: Others are chiefly set upon the Pleasures of *Imagination* or *internal Senses*; *social* and *kind Affections* employ another sort, who seem indifferent to all private Pleasure: This last Temper has generally joined with it an high *moral Sense*, and *Love of Honour*. We may sometimes find an high *Sense of Honour*, and desire of *Applause*, where there is indeed a *moral Sense*, but a very weak one, very much perverted; so as to be influenced by *popular Opinion*, and made subservient to it: In this *Character* the Pleasures of the external Senses, or even of the *Imagination*, have little room, except so far as they may procure *Distinction*. Now upon comparing the several Pleasures, perhaps the Sentence of the *Luxurious* would be quite opposite to that of the *Virtuous*. The *Ambitious* would differ from both. Those who are devoted to the *internal Senses* or *Imagination*, would differ from all the three. The *Miser* would applaud himself in his Wealth above them all. Is there therefore no disputing about Tastes? Are all Persons alike happy, who obtain the several Enjoyments for which they have a Relish? If they are, the Dispute is at an end: A Fly or Maggot in its proper haunts, is as happy as a *Hero*, or *Patriot*, or *Friend*, who has newly delivered his *Country* or *Friend*, and is surrounded with their grateful *Praises*. The Fly or Maggot may think so of itself; but who will stand to its Judgment, when we are sure that it has experienced only one sort of Pleasure, and is a stranger to the others? May we not in like manner find some Reasons of appealing from the Judgment of certain Men? Or may not some *Characters* be found among Men, who alone are capable of judging in this matter?

II. It is obvious that "those alone are capable of judging, who have experienced all the several kinds of Pleasure, and have their Senses acute and fully exercised in them all." Now a high Relish for *Virtue*, a strong *moral Sense*, with its concomitant *publick Sense and Affections*, and a *Sense of Honour*, was never alledged to impair our ex-

The Pleasures of a moral Kind proved superior, by the Testimony of the Virtuous.

ternals.

ternal Senses, or to make us incapable of any pleasure of the Imagination; Temperance never spoiled a good *Palate*, whatever *Luxury* may have done; a generous affectionate publick Spirit, reflecting on itself with delight, never vitiated any Organ of external Pleasure, nor weakened their Perceptions. Now all virtuous Men have given *Virtue* this Testimony, that its Pleasures are superior to any other, nay to all others jointly; that a friendly generous Action gives a *Delight* superior to any other; that other Enjoyments, when compared with the Delights of *Integrity*, *Faith*, *Kindness*, *Generosity*, and *publick Spirit*, are but trifles scarce worth any regard*.

By the Testimony of the Vicious.

Nay, we need not confine our Evidence to the Testimony of the perfectly Virtuous. The vicious Man, tho' no fit judge, were he entirely abandoned, since he loses his Sense of the Pleasures of the moral Kind, or at least has not experienced them fully, yet he generally retains so much of human Nature, and of the Senses and Affections of our Kind, as sometimes to experience even moral Pleasures. There is scarce any Mortal, who is wholly insensible to all Species of Morality.

A luxurious Debauchee has never perhaps felt the Pleasures of a wise publick-spirited Conduct, of an entirely upright, generous, social, and affectionate Life, with the Sense of his own moral Worth, and merited Esteem and Love; this course of Life, because unknown to him, he may despise in comparison of his Pleasures. But if in any particular Affair, a moral Species, or Point of Honour has affected him, he will soon despise his sensual Pleasures in comparison of the Moral. Has he a Person whom he calls his Friend, whom he loves upon whatever fantastical Reasons, he can quit his Debauch to serve him, nay can

* See this Argument in Plato de Repub. Lib. 9. And Lord Shaftsbury's Inquiry concerning Virtue.

run the Hazard of *Wounds* and *Death* to rescue him from Danger? If his *Honour* be concerned to resent an *Affront*, will he not quit his Pleasures, and run the hazard of the greatest bodily Pain, to shun the Imputation of *Cowardice* or *Falshood*? He will scorn one who tells him, that "a *Liar*, or a *Coward*, may be happy enough, while he has "all things necessary to *Luxury*." 'Tis in vain to alledge, "that there is no disputing about *Tastes*:" To every Nature there are certain *Tastes* assigned by the great AUTHOR of all. To the *human Race* there are assigned a *publick Taste*, a *moral one*, and a *Taste for Honour*. These Senses they cannot extirpate, more than their *external Senses*: They may pervert them, and weaken them by false *Opinions*, and foolish *Associations* of Ideas; but they cannot be happy but by keeping them in their natural State, and gratifying them. The Happiness of an *Insect* or *Brute*, will only make an *Insect* or *Brute* happy. But a Nature with further *Powers*, must have further *Enjoyments*.

Nay, let us consider the different *Ages* in our own Species. We once knew the time when an *Hobby-Horse*, a *Top*, a *Rattle*, was sufficient Pleasure to us. We grow up, we now relish *Friendships*, *Honour*, good *Offices*, *Marriage*, *Offspring*, *serving a Community* or *Country*. Is there no difference in these *Tastes*? We were happy before, are we no happier now? If not, we have made a foolish Change of Fancy. An *Hobby-Horse* is more easily procured than an *Employment*; a *Rattle* kept in order with less trouble than a *Friend*; a *Top* than a *Son*. But this Change of Fancy does not depend upon our *Will*. Our Nature determines us to certain Pursuits in our several Stages; and following her Dictates, is the only way to our Happiness. Two States may both be happy, and yet the one infinitely preferable to the other: Two Species may both be *content*, and yet the Pleasures of the one, greater beyond all comparison, than those of the other." The *virtuous Man*, who has as true a Sense of all external Pleasure as any, gives the preference to *moral Pleasures*. The Judgment of the *Vicious* is either not to be regarded, because of his Ignorance on one side;

or,

or, if he has experience of *moral Sentiments* in any particular Cases, he agrees with the *Virtuous*.

Experience
proves the
same.

III. Again, we see in fact, that in the virtuous Man, *publick Affections*, a *moral Sense* and *Sense of Honour*, actually overcome all other Desires or Senses, even in their full Strength. Here there is the fairest Combate, and the Success is on the side of Virtue.

There is indeed an obvious Exception against this Argument: "Do not we see, in many Instances, the *external Senses* overcome the *moral*?" But the Reply is easy. A constant Pursuit of the Pleasures of the external Senses can never become agreeable, without an Opinion of *Innocence*, or the *Absence* of moral Evil; so that here the moral Sense is not engaged in the Combat. Do not our *luxurious Debauchees, among their Intimates, continually defend their Practices as *innocent*? Transient Acts of Injustice may be done, contrary to the moral Sentiments of the Agent, to obtain relief from some pressing Evil, or upon some violent Motion of *Appetite*; and yet even in these cases, Men often argue themselves into some *moral Notions* of their *Innocence*. But for a continued Course of Life disapproved by the Agent, how few are the Instances? How avowedly miserable is that State, wherein all *Self-Approbation*, all *consciousness of Merit or Goodness* is gone? We might here also alledge, what universal Experience confirms, "that not only an Opinion of *Innocence* is a necessary Ingredient in a Course of *selfish Pleasures*, so that there should be no Opposition from the *moral Sense* of the Agent; but that some *publick Affections*, some *Species of moral Good*, is the most powerful *Charm* in all sensual Enjoyments." And yet, on the other hand, "*Publick Affections*, *Virtue*, *Honour*, need no *Species of sensual Pleasure* to recommend them; nor

* Treat. 2. Sect. 4. Art. 4. last Paragraph.

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“ even an Opinion or Hope of Exemption from external Pain. These powerful Forms can appear amiable, and engage our Pursuit thro’ the rugged Paths of *Hunger, Thirst, Cold, Labour, Expenses, Wounds and Death.*”

Thus, when a Prospect of external Pleasure, or of avoiding bodily Pain, engages Men into Actions really evil, the moral Sense of the Agent is not really overcome by the external Senses. The Action or Omission does not appear morally evil to the Agent. The *Temptation* seems to extenuate, or wholly excuse the Action. Whereas when a *Point of Honour*, or a *moral Species*, makes any one despise the Pleasures or Pains of the external Senses, there can be no question made of a real Victory. The external Senses represent these Objects in the same manner, when they are conquered. None denies to the Virtuous their Sense of Pain, Toil or Wounds. They are allowed as lively a Sense as others, of all external Pleasure of every kind. The Expenses of *Generosity, Humanity, Charity and Compassion* are allowed, even when yielded to Virtue, to be known to the full. But the moral Sense, weak as it often is, does not yield even to known external Pleasure, Ease or Advantage: but, where there is a depraved Taste, and a weak Understanding, private Advantage, or the avoiding of some external Evil, may make Actions appear innocent, which are not; and then the moral Sense gives no Opposition. All the Conquest on such Occasions is only this, that private external Advantage surmounts our Aversion to Dishonour, by making us do Actions which others will censure, but we esteem innocent. In these Cases we generally fear only the Reproach of a Party, of whom we have conceived an unfavourable Opinion *.

Nay farther: It was before observed, that “ fantastick Associations of Ideas do not really increase the Pleasure of Enjoyment, however they increase the previous De-

* Sect. 4, Art. 3.

"*fire*. The want of such Associations does not abate the external Pain, tho it diminishes the previous Fear, or takes away some farther Fears which may attend the Pain." So that a Man of the most correct Imagination does feel and know all the Good in external Pleasure, and all the Evil in Pain. "When therefore the *moral Sense*, and *publick Affections*, overcome all *sensual Pleasure*, or *bodily Pain*, they do it by their own Strength, without foreign Aids. Virtue is never blended with *bodily Pleasure*, nor Vice with *bodily Pain* in our Imaginations. But when the external Senses seem to prevail against the moral Sense, or publick Affections, it is continually by an Aid borrowed from the *moral Sense*, and *publick Affections* themselves, or from our Sense of Honour." The Conquest is over a weakened moral Sense, upon partial views of Good, not by external Pleasure alone, but by some *moral Species*, raised by a false Imagination.

Set before Men in the clearest Light all external Pleasures, but strip them of their borrowed Notions of Dignity, Hospitality, Friendship, Generosity, Liberality, Communication of Pleasure; let no regard be had to the Opinions of others, to Credit, to avoiding Reproach, to Company. Separate from the Pursuit of Wealth all Thoughts of a Family, Friends, Relations, Acquaintance; let Wealth be only regarded as the Means of private Pleasure of the external Senses, or of the Imagination, to the Possessor alone: let us divide our confused Ideas, and consider things barely and apart from each other: and in opposition to these Desires, set but the weakest *moral Species*, and see if they can prevail over it. On the other hand, let us examine as much as we please, a friendly, generous, grateful, or publick-spirited Action; divest it of all external Pleasure, still it will appear the more lovely; the longer we fix our Attention to it, the more we admire it. What is it which we feel in our own Hearts, determining as it were our Fate to Happiness or Misery? What sort of Sensations are the most lively and delightful? In what sort of Possession does the highest Joy and Self-Satisfaction consist? Who has ever felt the Pleasure of a generous friendly Temper

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of mutual Love, of compassionate Relief and Succour to the distressed; of having served a Community, and render'd Multitudes happy; of a strict Integrity, and thorow Honesty, even under external Disadvantages, and amidst Dangers; of Congratulation and publick Rejoycing, in the Wildom and Prosperity of Persons beloved, such as Friends, Children, or intimate Neighbours? Who would not, upon Reflection, prefer that State of Mind, these Sensations of Pleasure, to all the Enjoyments of the external Senses, and of the Imagination without them? *

IV. The truth, in a Question of this nature, one might expect would be best known by the Judgment of *Spectators*, concerning the Pursuits of others. Let them see one entirely employed in Solitude, with the most exquisite Tastes, Odours, Prospects, Painting, Musick; but without any *Society*, Love or *Friendship*, or any Opportunity of doing a kind or generous *Action*; and see also a Man employed in protecting the Poor and Fatherless, receiving the Blessings of those who were ready to perish, and making the Widow to sing for Joy; a Father to the Næedy, an Avenger of Oppression; who never despised the Cause of his very Slave, but considered him as his Fellow-Creature, formed by the same Hand; who never eat his Morfel alone, without the Orphan at his Table, nor caused the Eyes of the Poor to fail; who never suffered the Naked to perish, but warmed them with the Fleece of his Sheep; who never took advantage of the Indigent in Judgment, thro' Confidence in his own Power or Interest: Let this Character be compared with the former; nay, add to this latter some considerable Pains of the external Senses, with Labour and

Our Judgments in the Case of others proves the same.

* See this Subject fully treated, in the second Part of Lord Shaftsbury's Inquiry concerning Virtue.

† See the Character of Job, Ch. 31. See also Treat. 2. Sect. 6.

kind *Anxiety* : which of the two would a Spectator chuse ? Which would he admire, or count the happier, and most suitable to human Nature ? Were he given to *Castle-building*, or were he advising a *Son*, or a *Friend*, which of these States would he chuse or recommend ? Such a Trial would soon discover the Prevalence of the *moral Species* above all Enjoyments of Life.

Little Happiness in malicious Pleasures.

V. There are a sort of Pleasures opposite to those of the publick Sense, arising from the Gratification of *Anger* or *Hatred*. To compare these Pleasures with those of Benevolence, we must observe what holds universally of all Mankind. The Joy, and Gaiety, and Happiness of any Nature, of which we have formed no previous Opinion, either favourable or unfavourable, nor obtained any other Ideas than merely that it is *sensitive*, fills us with Joy and Delight : The apprehending the Torments of any such sensitive Nature, gives us Pain. The Poets know how to raise delight in us by such *pastoral Scenes*, they feel the Power of such *pleasing Images* : they know that the human Heart can dwell upon such Contemplations with *delight* ; that we can continue long with Pleasure, in the View of *Happiness* of any Nature whatsoever. When we have received unfavourable Apprehensions of any Nature, as *cruel* and *savage*, we begin indeed from our very publick Affections, to desire their Misery as far as it may be necessary to the Protection of others.

But that the Misery of another, for its *own sake*, is never grateful, we may all find by making this Supposition : " That had we the most savage Tyger, or Crocodile, or some greater Monster of our own Kind, a *Nero*, or *Demitian*, chained in some Dungeon ; that we were perfectly assured they should never have power of doing farther *Injuries* ; that no Mortal should ever know their Fates or Fortunes, nor be influenced by them ; that the *Punishments* inflicted on them would never restrain others by way of example, nor any *Indulgence* shown be discovered ; that the first Heat of our *Resentment* were

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"allayed by Time" — No Mortal, in such a Case, would incline to torture such wretched Natures, or keep them in continual Agonies, without some prospect of *Good* arising from their Sufferings. What farther would the fiercest Rage extend to, if once the Tyrant, thus eternally confined from Mischief, began himself to feel *Remorse* and *Anguish* for his Crimes? Nay, did he continue without Reflection on his past Life, so as neither to betray Remorse nor Approbation, were Mankind well secured against his Temper, who would delight to load him with *useless Misery*?

If the Misery of others then be not grateful for itself, whence arises the Pleasure of *Cruelty* and *Revenge*? The Reason is plainly this: Upon apprehending *Injury* to our selves or others, NATURE wisely determines us to study *Defence*, not only for the present, but for the future. *Anger* arises with its most *uneasy Sensations*, as every one acknowledges. The *Misery* of the Injurious allays this furious Pain. Our Nature scarce leads to any farther Resentment, when once the Injurious seems to us fully seized with *Remorse*, so that we fear no farther Evils from him, or when all his Power is gone. Those who continue their *Revenge* further, are prepossessed with some *false Opinion* of Mankind, as worse than they really are; and are not easily inclined to believe their hearty Remorse for Injuries, or to think themselves secure. Some *Point of Honour*, or *fear of Reproach*, engages Men in cruel Acts of *Revenge*: But this farther confirms, that the *Misery* of another is only grateful as it allays, or secures us against a furious Pain; and cannot be the Occasion, by itself, of any satisfaction. Who would not prefer *Absence of Injury* to *Injury* revenged? Who would not chuse an untainted *Retiation*, for *Courage* gained in a just War, in which, without *Hatred* or *Anger*, we acted from *Love* of our Country, rather than the Fame acquired by asserting our questioned *Courage* with furious *Anger* in a *Duel*, and with continued *Hatred* toward the Person conquered? Who can dwell upon a *Scene of Tortures*, tho' practis'd upon the vilest Wretch; or can delight either in the Sight or De-

description of *Vengeance*, prolonged beyond all necessity of *Self-Defense*, or *publick Interest*? "The Pleasure of Revenge then is to the Pleasures of Humanity and Virtue, as the flaking the burning, and constantly recurring Thirst of a Fever, to the natural Enjoyments of grateful Food in Health."

Moral

Evil compared with other Evils, appears greater.

VI. Were we to compare, in like manner, the Pains of the publick and moral Sense, and of the Sense of Honour, with other Pains of the external Senses, or with the greatest external Losses, we should find the former by far superior. And yet nothing is more ordinary, than to find Men, who will allow "the Pleasures of the former Classes superior to any other, and yet look upon external Pain as more intolerable than any." There are two

Causes of Mistake.

Reasons for this Mistake. 1. "They compare the most acute Pains of the external Senses with some smaller Pains of the other Senses." Whereas, would they compare the strongest of both Kinds, they would find the Ballance on the other side. How often have Parents, Husbands, Friends, Patriots, endured the greatest bodily Pains, to avoid the Pains of their publick and moral Sense, and Sense of Honour? How do they every day suffer Hunger, Thirst, and Toil, to prevent like Evils to those they love? How often do Men endure, for their Party or Faction, the greatest external Evils, not only when they are unavoidable, but, when by counter-acting their publick or moral Sense, or Sense of Honour, they could extricate themselves. Some Crimes appear so horrid, some Actions so cruel and detestable, that there is hardly any Man but would rather suffer Death, than be conscious of having done them.

The second Cause of Mistake in this Matter, is this. "The avoiding moral Evil by the Sufferance of external Pain, does not diminish the Sense of the Pain; but on the other hand, the Motive of avoiding grievous Pain really diminishes the moral Evil in the Action done with

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“that design.” So that in such Instances we compare *external Pain* in its full strength, with a *moral Pain* of the lighter sort, thus alleviated by the Greatness of the *Temptation* *. To make a just Comparison, it should be thus : “Whether would a Man chuse to be tortured to Death, or to have, without any *Temptation* or *Necessity*, tortured another, or a dear Friend, or Child to Death?” Not whether a Man will betray his Friend or Country, for fear of Tortures, but, “whether it be better voluntarily, and under no fear, to betray a Friend, or our Country, than to suffer Tortures. or the Pain of the Gout or Stone equal to Tortures?” Upon such Comparisons as these, we should find some other Pains and Misery superior to any *external Pain*. When we judge of the *State of others*, we would not be long in suspense which of these Evils to chuse as the lightest for those whom we † most regarded.

VII. We have hitherto only compared on the one side the *publick and moral Sense*, and the *Sense of Honour* jointly, with the *external Senses*, the *Pleasures of Imagination*, and *external Advantage* or *Disadvantage* jointly. The reason of joining them thus must be obvious, since, to a Mind not prepossessed with any false *Apprehensions* of things, the former three Senses and Desires really concur, in exaiting to the same Course of Action; for promoting the publick Good, can never be opposite to *private Virtue*; nor can the *Desires of Virtue* ever lead to any thing pernicious to the Publick: Had Men true Opinions, *Honour* could only be obtained by *Virtue*, or serving the Publick.

Publick Affections compared with our Desire of Virtue.

But since there may be some *corrupt partial Notions* of *virtue*, as when Men have inadvertently engaged them-

* *Treat. 2. Sect. 7, 9. Cor. 3.*

† *Treat. 2. Sect. 6. Art. 1.*

selves into some Party or Faction pernicious to the Publick, or when we mistake the *Tendencies* of Actions, or have some Notions of the *D E I T Y*, * as requiring some Actions apprehended pernicious to the publick, as *Duties* to himself; in such cases there is room to compare our *publick Sense or Desires* with our *moral*, to see which is prevalent. The Pleasures of these Senses, in such cases, need not be compared; the following either the one or the other will give little Pleasure: The Pain of the counteracted *Sense* will prevent all *Satisfaction*. This State is truly deplorable, when a Person is thus distracted between two noble Principles, his *publick Affections*, and *Sense of Virtue*. But it may be inquired, which of these Senses, when counteracted, would occasion the *greater Pain*? Perhaps nothing can be answered *universally* on either side. With Men of *recluse contemplative Lives*, who have dwelt much upon some *moral Ideas*, but without large *extensive View* of publick Good, or without engaging themselves to the full in the *publick Affections*, and common *Affairs of Life*: The *Sense of Virtue*, in some partial confined View of it, would probably prevail; especially since these par-

* Such mistaken Notions of Religion, and of some particular moral Species, have produced these monstrous *Decisions or Apothegms*; viz. "Some Actions are not lawful, though they were necessary not only to universal temporal Happiness, but to the eternal Salvation of the whole World" "or to avoid universal eternal Misery."

"Fiat Justitia & ruat Caelum."

Whereas the only Reason why some Actions are looked upon as universally and necessarily Evil, is only this, "that our present Constitution of Nature, they cannot possibly produce any good, prepollent to their evil Consequences. Whatever Action would do so, in the whole of its Effects must necessarily be good. This Proposition is Identick.

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tial Species of Virtue have always some sort of *kind Affection* to assist them. With *active Men*, who have fully exercised their *publick Affections*, and have acquired as it were an *Habit* this way, 'tis probable the *publick Affections* would be prevalent. Thus we find active Men, upon any *publick Necessity*, do always break thro' the *limited narrow Rules* of Virtue or Justice, which are publickly received, even when they have scarce any *Scheme of Principles* to justify their Conduct : Perhaps, indeed, in such cases, their *moral Sense* is brought over to the Side of their *Affections*, tho' their *speculative Opinions* are opposite to both.

VIII. It is of more consequence to compare the *publick and moral Senses*, in opposition to the *Sense of Honour*. Here there may be direct Opposition, since Honour is conferred according to the moral Notions of those who confer it, which may be contrary to those of the *Agent*, and contrary to what he thinks conducive to the publick Good.

The Moral Sense compared with the Sense of Honour.

To allow the Prevalence of *Honour*, cannot with any person of just Reflection, weaken the Cause of Virtue, since Honour presupposes * a *moral Sense*, both in those who desire it, and those who confer it. But it is enough for some *Writers*, who affect to be wondrous shrewd in their Observations on human Nature, and fond of making the World, as well as themselves, a *selfish Generation*, capable of any real Excellence or *Virtue*, without any *natural Disposition* toward a *publick Interest*, or toward any *moral Species*; to get but a " Set of different Words from those commonly used, yet including the same *natural Dispositions* + or presupposing them," however an inadvertent Reader may not observe it; and they are sufficient to shew, that there is no real *Virtue*, that all is *Hypocrisy, Disguise, Art, or Interest*. " To be honoured,

See Treat. 2. Sect. 5. Art. 4. + Ibid.

"highly esteemed, valued, praised, or on the contrary, to be despised, undervalued, censured or condemned; to be proud or ashamed, are Words without any meaning, if we take away a *moral Sense*." Let this Sense be as capricious, inconstant, different in different Persons as they please to alledge. "a *Sense of Morality* there must be, and natural it must be, if the *Desire of Esteem, Pride* or *Shame* be natural."

To make this comparison between the *publick* and *moral Senses* on the one hand, and that of *Honour* on the other, 'tis to be observed, that all *Aversion to Evil* is stronger than *Desire of positive Good*. There are many sorts of positive Good, without which any one may be easy, and enjoy others of a different kind: But Evil of almost any kind, in a high Degree, may make Life intolerable. The avoiding of Evil is always allowed a more extenuating Circumstance in a *Crime*, than the Prospect of positive Good: to make therefore just Comparisons of the Prevalence of several Desires or Senses, their several Goods should be opposed to each other, and their Evils to each other, and not the Pleasures of one compared with the Pains of another.

Publick Affections, in their nearer Ties, frequently overcome not only the Pleasures of Honour, but even the Pains of Shame. This is the most common Event in Life, that for some apprehended Interest of Offspring, Families, Friends, Men should neglect Opportunities of gaining Honour, and even incur Shame and Contempt. In Actions done for the Service of a Party, there can be no comparison, for Honour is often a Motive on both sides.

'Tis also certain, that the Fear of Shame, in some Instances, will overcome all other Desires whatsoever, even natural Affection, Love of Pleasure, Virtue, Wealth, and even of Life it self. This Fear has excited Parents to the Murder of their Offspring; has persuaded Men to the most dangerous Enterprizes; to squander away their Fortunes to counteract their Duty, and even to throw away the

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Lives. The Distraction and Convulsion of Mind observable in these *Conflicts* of Honour, with Virtue and publick Affection, shews how *unnatural* that State is, where in the strongest *Principles of Action*, naturally designed to co-operate and assist each other, are thus set in Opposition.

'Tis perhaps impossible to pronounce any thing universally concerning the Superiority of the Desire of *Honour* on the one hand, or that of the Desire of *Virtue* and publick Good on the other. *Habits* or *Custom* may perhaps determine the Victory on either side. Men in high Stations, who have long indulged the Desire of *Honour*, and have formed the most frightful Apprehensions of *Contempt* as the worst of Evils; or even those in lower Stations, who have been long enured to value *Reputation* in any particular, and dread *Dishonour* in that point, may have *Fear of Shame* superior to all Aversions. Men, on the contrary, who have much indulged good *Nature*, or reflected much upon the Excellency of *Virtue* it self, abstracted from *Honour*, may find Affections of this kind prevalent above the Fear of Shame.

To compare the *moral Sense* with the Sense of *Honour*, we must find cases where the Agent condemns an Action with all its present Circumstances as evil, and yet fears *Injury* by omitting it, without any unequal Motives of other kinds on either side: Or when one may obtain *Praise* by an Action, when yet the Omission of it would appear to himself as considerable a Virtue, as the *Praise* to be expected from the Action would represent the Action to be. The common Instances, in which some, who pretend deep Knowledge of *human Nature*, triumph much, have not these necessary Circumstances. When a Man condemns *Duelling* in his private Sentiments, and yet practises it, we have indeed a considerable Evidence of the Strength of this *Desire of Honour*, or *Aversion to Shame*, since it surpasses the Fear of Death. But here on one hand, besides the *Fear of Shame*, there is the *Fear of constant Insults*, of

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losing all the *Advantages* depending upon the Character of *Courage*, and sometimes even some *Species of Virtue* and *publick Good*, in restraining an insolent Villain : On the other hand is the *Fear of Death*. The *moral Sense* is seldom much concerned : for however Men may condemn *voluntary Duelling* ; however they may blame the *Age* for the Custom, or censure the *Laws* as defective, yet generally, in their present Case, Duelling appears a necessary Piece of *Self-Defence* against opprobrious Injuries and Affronts, for which the Law has provided no Redress, and consequently leaves Men to the natural Rights of *Self-Defence* and *Prosecution of Injuries*. The Case seems to them the same with that of *Thieves* and *Night-Robbers*, who may be put to Death by private Persons, when there is no hope of overtaking them by Law. These are certainly the Notions of those who condemn *Duelling*, and yet practise it.

It is foreign to our present Purpose, to detect the Fallacy of these Arguments, in defence of *Duels*, as they are commonly practised among us ; when Men from a sudden Anger, upon some trifling or imaginary *affronts* the despising of which would appear honourable in every wise Mans Eyes, expose themselves, and often their dearest Friends to Death, and hazard the Ruin of their own Families, as well as that of their Adversary ; tho' the *Success* in such Attempts can have no tendency to justify them against the dishonourable *Charge*, or to procure any Honour from Men of worth.

Nor the
Case of
Lucretia.

The magnified Instance of *Lucretia* * is yet less to our purpose. Some talk, as if " she indeed would rather have died than " consented to the Crime ; but the *Crime* did " not appear so great an Evil as the *Dishonour* ; to the Guilt " she submitted to avoid the Shame." Let us consider

* *Livy, Lib. i. c. 57.*

this renowned Argument. Was there then no Motive on either side, but *Fear of Shame*, and a *Sense of Duty*? If we look into the Story, we shall find, that to persuade her to consent, there conspired, beside the *Fear of Shame*, and of *Death*, which she little regarded, the Hope of *noble Revenge*, or rather of *Justice* on the Ravisher, and the whole Tyrant's Family; nay, the Hopes of a *nobler Fame* by her future Conduct; the *Fear* of suffering that contumely by *force*, which she was tempted to consent to, and that in such a manner as she could have had no Redress. All these Considerations concurred to make her consent. On the other side, there was only the *moral Sense* of a Crime thus extenuated by the most grievous *Necessity*, and by hopes of *doing Justice* to her Husband's Honour, and *rescuing her Country*: Nay, could she not have at once saved her *Character* and her *Life* by consenting; when in that virtuous Age she might have expected *Secrecy* in the Prince, since boasting of such Attempts would have been dangerous to the greatest Man in *Rome*?

It is not easy to find just Room for a Comparison even in fictitious Cases, between these two Principles. Were there a Person who had no Belief of any DEITY, or of any reality in Religion, in a Country where his *secular Interest* would not suffer by a Character of *Atheism*; and yet he knew that the Profession of zealous Devotion would tend to his *Honour*: If such a Person could have any Sense of *Morality*, particularly an Aversion to *Disimulation*, then his *Profession of Religion* would evidence the Superiority of the *Sense of Honour*; and his *Discovery* of his Sentiments, or *Neglect* of Religion, would evidence the Ballance to be on the other side. I presume in *England* and *Holland*, we have more Instances of the latter than the former. 'Tis true, our Gentlemen who affect the Name of *Freedom*, may have now their Hopes of *Honour* from their own *Party*, as well as others.

The Adherence to any particular Religion by one in a strange Country, where it was dishonourable, would not be

be allowed a good Instance of the Prevalence of a *moral Species*; it is a very common thing indeed, but here are *Interests* of another Life, and Regard to a *future Return* to a Country where this Religion is in repute,

The Pleasures of Imagination greater than those of external Senses.

IX. The Pleasures of the *internal Senses*, or of the Imagination, are allowed by all, who have any tolerable Taste of them, as a much superior Happiness to those of the *external Senses*, tho' they were enjoyed to the full.

Other Comparisons might be made but with less use, or certainty in any general Conclusions, which might be drawn from them.

These Pleasures of *Wealth* or *Power*, are proportioned to the Gratifications of the *Desires* or *Senses*, which the Agent intends to gratify by them: So that, for the Reasons above offered, Wealth and Power give greater Happiness to the *Virtuous*, than to those who consult only *Luxury* or *external Splendor*. If these Desires are grown *enthusiastick* and *habitual*, without regard to any other end than *Possession*, they are an endless Source of Vexation, without any real *Enjoyment*; a perpetual *Craving*, without *Nourishment* or *Digestion*; and they may surmount all other Affections, by Aids borrowed from other Affections themselves.

The *fantastick Desires* are violent, in proportion to the Senses from which the *associated Ideas* are borrowed. Only it is to be observed, that however the Desires may be violent, yet the obtaining the *Object desired* gives little Satisfaction; the *Possession* discovers the Vanity and Deceit, and the *Fancy* is turned toward different Objects, in a perpetual Succession of inconstant Pursuits.

X. These

X. These several kinds of Pleasure or Pain are next to be compared as to their *Duration*. Here we are not only to consider the *Certainty* of the Objects occasioning these Sensations, but the *Constancy* of our Relish or *Fancy*.

A Comparison of the several Pleasures as to Duration.

1. The Objects necessary to remove the Pains of *Appetite*, and to give as grateful *external Sensations* as any others, to a Person of a *correct Imagination*, may be universally secured by common Prudence and Industry. But then the *Sensations* themselves are short and transitory; the *Pleasure* continues no longer than the *Appetite*, nor does it leave any thing behind it, to supply the *Intervals* of Enjoyment. When the Sensation is past, we are no happier for it, there is no Pleasure in *Reflection*; nor are past Sensations any Security against, or Support under either *external Pain*, or any other sort of Evil incident to us. If we keep these Senses pure, and unmixed with *foreign Ideas*, they cannot furnish Employments for Life: If *foreign Ideas* come in, the Objects grow difficult and uncertain, and our *Relish* or *Fancy* full of Inconstancy and Caprice.

2. In like manner, the Pleasures of the *Imagination* may be enjoyed by all, and be a sure Foundation of Pleasure, if we abstract from *Property*, and keep our Imagination pure. Such are the Pleasures in the Observation of *Nature*, and even the Works of *Art*; which are ordinarily exposed to wear. But as these give less Pleasure the more *familiar* they grow, they cannot sufficiently employ or entertain mankind, much less can they secure us against, or support us under the *Calamities of Life*, such as *Anger*, *Sorrow*, *Dishonour*, *Remorse*, or *external Pain*. If the monstrous *trifling Taste* take place, or the Ideas of *Property*, they may indeed give sufficient Employment, but they bring along with them little Pleasure, frequent *Disgusts*, *Anxieties*, and *Disappointments*, in the acquiring and retaining their Objects.

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3. The *publick Happiness* is indeed, as to external Appearance, a very uncertain Object; nor is it often in our Power to remedy it, by changing the Course of *Events*. There are perpetual Changes in Mankind from Pleasures to Pains, and often from Virtue to Vice. Our *publick Desires* must therefore frequently subject us to *Sorrow*; and the pleasures of the *publick Sense* must be very inconsistent. 'Tis true indeed, that a general *Good-will* to our kind, is the most constant Inclination of the Mind, which grows upon us by Indulgence; nor are we ever dissatisfied with the *Fancy*: The *Incertainty* therefore is wholly owing to the *Objects*. If there can be any Considerations found out to make it probable, that in the Whole all *Events* tend to Happiness, this implicit *Hope* indeed may make our *publick Affections* the greatest and most constant Source of Pleasure. Frequent *Reflection* on this, is the best Support under the *Sorrow* arising from particular Evils, befalling our Fellow-Creatures. In our *nearer Attachments* brought upon our selves, we may procure to our selves the greatest Enjoyments of this kind, with considerable *Security* and *Constancy*, by chusing for our *Friends* or *dearest Favourites*, Persons of just Apprehensions of Things, who are subjected only to the *necessary Evils* of Life, and can enjoy all the certain and constant Good. And in like manner, our Attachments to a *Country* may be fixed by something else than the *Chance* of our *Nativity*. The Enjoyments of the *publick Sense* cannot indeed secure us against bodily *Pains* or *Loss*; but they are often a considerable Support under them. Nothing can more allay *Sorrow* and *Dejection* of Mind for private Misfortune, than good Nature, and Reflection upon the *Happiness* of those we love.

4. The *moral Sense*, if we form *true Opinions* of the Tendencies of Actions, and of the *Affections* whence they spring, as it is the Fountain of the most intense Pleasure, so "it is in itself *constant*, not subject to Caprice or Change. If we resolutely encourage this Sense, "grows more acute by frequent *Gratification*, never

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“cloys, nor ever is surfeited. We not only are sure never
 “to want *Opportunities* of doing Good, which are in eve-
 “ry one’s power in the highest Degree; * but each good
 “Action is Matter of pleasant *Reflection* as long as we live.
 “These Pleasures cannot indeed, wholly secure us against
 “all kinds of *Uneasiness*, yet they never tend naturally to
 “increase them. On the contrary, their general Ten-
 “dency is to lead the virtuous Agent into all Pleasures, in
 “the highest Degree in which they are consistent with
 “each other. Our *external Senses* are not weakened by
 “Virtue, our *Imaginations* are not impaired; the *tempe-*
 “*rate Enjoyment* of all external Pleasures is the highest.
 “A virtuous Conduct is generally the most prudent, even
 “as to outward *Prosperity*. Where Virtue costs us much,
 “its own *Pleasures* are the more sublime. It directly ad-
 “vances the Pleasures of the *publick Sense*, by leading us
 “to promote the publick Happiness as far as we can; and
 “*Honour* is its natural and ordinary Attendant. If it can-
 “not remove the *necessary Pains* of Life, yet it is the best
 “Support under them. These moral Pleasures do some-
 “way more nearly affect us than any other: They make
 “us delight in our *selves*, and relish our very *Nature*. By
 “these we perceive an *internal Dignity* and *Worth*; and
 “seem to have a Pleasure like to that ascribed often to the
 “DEITY, by which we enjoy our own *Perfection*, and
 “that of every other Being.”

It may perhaps seem too *metaphysical* to alledge on this
 subject, that other *Sensations* are all dependent upon, or
 related by the Constitution of our Nature, to something
 different from our *selves*; to a *Body* which we do not call
 self, but something belonging to this *Self*. That other
 perceptions of *Joy* or *Pleasure* carry with them Relations
 to *Objects*, and *Spaces* distinct from the *Self*; whereas “the
 Pleasures of Virtue are the very *Perfection* of this SELF,

* *Treat. 2. Sect. 3. last Paragraph.*

“ and are immediately perceived as such, independent of external Objects.”

Our Sense of *Honour* may afford very constant Pleasures by good Oeconomy: If our *moral Sense* be not perverted; if we form just Apprehensions of the *Worth* of others, Honour shall be pleasant to us in a compound Proportion of the *Numbers* and *Worth* of those who confer it. If therefore we cannot approve our selves to all, so as to obtain *universal Honour* among all to whom we are known, yet there are still Men of just Thought and Reflection, whose *Esteem* a virtuous Man may procure. Their *Dignity*, will compensate the Want of *Numbers*, and support us against the Pains of *Censure* from the Injudicious.

The Inconstancy of the Pleasures of *Wealth* and *Power* is well known, and is occasioned, not perhaps by Change of Fancy, for these Desires are found to continue long enough, since they tend toward the *universal Means* of gratifying all other Desires; but by the Uncertainty of *Objects* or *Events* necessary to gratify such continually increasing Desires as these are, where there is not some fixed View different from the *Wealth* or *Power* itself. When indeed they are desired only as the Means of gratifying some other well-regulated *Desires*, we may soon obtain such Portion as will satisfy us. But if once the *End* be forgotten, and *Wealth* or *Power* become grateful for themselves, no farther Limits are to be expected: the Desires are insatiable, not is there any considerable *Happiness* in any given Degree of either.

The Duration of the several Pains considered.

XI. Were we to consider the Duration of the several Pains, we may find it generally as the Duration of their Pleasures. As to the external Series, the old *Epicurean* Consolation is generally just: “Where the Pain is violent it shortens our *Duration*: where it does not shorten our *Duration*, it is generally either tolerable, or admits of frequent *Intermissions*,” and

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then, when the external Pain is once past, no Mortal is the worse for having endured it. There is nothing uneasy in the *Reflection*, when we have no present *Pain*, or fear no *Return* of it.

The *internal Senses* are not properly *Avenues of Pain*. No *Form* is necessarily the Occasion of positive Uneasiness.

The Pains of the *moral Sense* and Sense of *Honour*, are almost perpetual. *Time*, the Refuge of other Sorrows, gives us no *Relief* from these. All other Pleasures are made insipid by these Pains, and Life itself an uneasy Burden. Our very *Self*, our Nature is disagreeable to us. 'Tis true, we do not always observe the Vicious to be uneasy. The *Deformity of Vice* often does not appear to those who continue in a Course of it. Their Actions are under some Disguise of *Innocence*, or even of *Virtue* itself. When this Mask is pulled off, as it often happens, nor can any vicious Man prevent its happening, Vice will appear as a *Ugly*, whose Aspect no Mortal can bear. This we may see in one *Vice*, which perhaps has had fewer false or fantastick Associations of favourable Ideas than any, *viz.* *Envy*, or such a selfish Love of Life, and Aversion to Death, or to the very Hazard of it, as hinders a Man from serving his Country or his Friend, or supporting his own Reputation. How few of our gay Gentlemen can bear to be reputed *Cowards*, or even secretly to imagine themselves void of *Courage*? This is not tolerable to any, how diligent soever they may be about other Points of *Mortality*. Other *Vices* would appear equally odious and detestable, and bear as horrid an Aspect, were they equally subject of the *Disguises of Virtue*. A vicious Man has no other Security against the Appearances of this terrifying *Form*, than *Ignorance* or *Inadvertance*. If *Truth* break in on him, as it often must, when any *Adversity* stops his intoxicating Pleasures, or Spectators use *Freedom* with his Conduct, he is render'd perpetually miserable, or must have to the only Remedy which Reason would suggest, all possible *Reparation of Injuries*, and a new Course of Life,

the Necessity of which is not superseded by any Remedy suggested by the *Christian Revelation*.

The Pains of the *publick Sense* are very lasting. The *Misery* of others, either in past or present Ages, is matter of very uneasy *Reflection*, and must continue so, if their State appears in the whole *absolutely Evil*. Against this there is no Relief but the Consideration of a "good governing MIND, ordering all for good in the Whole, with the Belief of a *future State*, where the particular seeming Disorders are rectified." A firm Persuasion of these Things, with strong *publick Affections* interesting us strongly in this *Whole*, and considering this *Whole* as one great *System*, in which all is wisely ordered for good, may secure us against these Pains by removing the Opinion of any *absolutely Evil*.

The Pains arising from foolish *Associations* of mere *Ideas*, with the Gratifications of *external Senses*, or with the Enjoyment of Objects of *Beauty* or *Grandeur*, or from the Desires of *Property*, the Humour of *Distinction* may be as constant as the Pains of the *Senses* from which these *Ideas* are borrowed. Thus what we gain by these *Associations* is very little. "The *Desires* of Trifles are often made very strong and uneasy; the *Pleasures* of Possession very small and of short Continuance, only the Objects be familiar, or the *Fancy* change: But the Pains of *Disappointment* are often very lasting and violent. Would we guard against these *Associations*, even real *Pleasure* in Life remains, and we may be easy without these things, which to others occasion the greatest Pains.

*Gemmas, Marmor, Ebur, Tyrrhena Sigilla, Tabellae,
Argentum, vestes Getulo Murice tinctas,
Est qui non habet, est qui nec curat habere.*

S E C T. VI.

Some general Conclusions concerning the best Management of our Desires. With some Principles necessary to Happiness.

WE see therefore, upon comparing the several kinds of Pleasures and Pains, both as to *Intention* and *Duration*, that "the whole Sum of Interest lies upon the Side of *Virtue*, *Publick-spirit*, and *Honour*. That to forsake these Pleasures in who'e, or in part, for any other *Enjoyment*, is the most foolish Bargain; and on the contrary, to secure them with the *Sacrifice* of all others, is the *truest Gain*."

There is one general *Observation* to be pre- Constant-
 mised, which appears of the greatest Ne- Discipline-
 cessity for the just Management of all our De- necessary.
 sires; viz. that we should, as much as possi-
 ble, in all Affairs of Importance to our selves or others,
 prevent the *Violence* of their *confused Sensation*, and stop
 their *Propensities* from breaking out into Action, till we
 have fully examined the real *Moment* of the Object, either
 of our Desires or Aversions. The only way to effect this
 is, "a constant *Attention* of Mind, an habitual *Discipline*
 over our selves, and a fixed *Resolution* to stop all Action,
 before a calm *Examination* of every Circumstance at-
 tending it; more particularly, the real *Values* of exter-
 nal Objects, and the moral *Qualities* or *Temper*s of rati-
 onal Agents, about whom our Affections may be em-
 ployed." This Power we may obtain over our selves,
 by a frequent Consideration of the great *Calamities*, and
 pernicious Actions; to which even the *best of our Passions*
 may lead us, when we are rashly hurried into Action by

their Violence, and by the *confused Sensations*, and *fantastick Associations* of Ideas which attend them : Thus we may raise an *habitual Suspicion* and *Dread* of every violent *Passion*, which, recurring along with them continually, may in some measure counter-balance their *Propensities* and *confused Sensations*. This *Discipline* of our Passions is in general necessary. The *unkind* or *destructive Affections*, our *Anger*, *Hatred*, or *Aversion* to rational Agents, seem to need it most ; but there is also a great Necessity for it, even about the *tender and benign Affections*, lest we should be hurried into *universal* and *absolute Evil*, by the Appearance of *particular Good* : And consequently it must be of the highest Importance to all, to strengthen as much as possible, by frequent Meditation and Reflection, the calm Desires either private or publick, rather than the particular Passions, and to make the *calm universal Benevolence* superior to them.

Resignation of sensual Pleasures.

That the necessary *Resignation* of other Pleasures may be the more easy, we must frequently suggest to our selves these Considerations above-mentioned. " *External Pleasures* are short and transitory, leave no agreeable Reflection, and are no manner of Advantage to us when they are past ; we are no better than if we had wanted them altogether."

Inlike manner, " past Pains give us no unpleasant Reflection, nor are we the worse for having endured them. " If they are violent, our Existence will probably be short ; if not, they are tolerable, or allow long Intervals of Ease." Let us join to these *stoical Consideration* ; " that *external Pains* give us a noble Opportunity of *moral Pleasures* in Fortitude, and *Submission* to the Order of the whole, if we bear them resolutely ; but if we fret under them, we do not alleviate the Suffering, but rather increase it by *Discontent* or *Sullenness*." When *external Pains* must be endured voluntarily to avoid *moral Evil*, we must, as much as possible, present to our selves " the *moral Species* itself, with the *publick Good* to ensue, the

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"Honour and Approbation to be expected from all good Men, the DEITY, and our own Hearts, if we continue firm; and on the contrary, the Remorse, Shame and Apprehension of future Punishments, if we yield to this Temptation."

How necessary it is to break off the vain Associations of moral Ideas, from the Objects of external Senses, will also easily appear. This may be done, by considering how trifling the Services are which are done to our Friends or Acquaintances, by splendid Entertainments, at an Expence, which, otherways employed, might have been to them of considerable Importance. Men who are at ease, and of as irregular Imaginations as our selves, may admire and praise our Magnificence; but those who need more durable Services, will never think themselves much obliged. We cannot expect any Gratitude for what was done only to please our own Vanity: The Indigent easily see this, and justly consider upon the whole how much they have profited.

If the Wealth of the Luxurious fails, he is the Object of Contempt: Nobody pities him nor honours him: his personal Dignity was placed by himself in his Table, Equipage and Furniture; his Admirers placed it also in the same: When these are gone all is lost.

—Non est melius quo insumere possis?
Cur eget indignus quis quam te Divite? quare
Templa ruunt antiqua Deum? cur improbe cara
Non aliquid Patria ex tanto emetiris acervo?
Uninimirum tibi recte semper erunt res:
O magnus posthac inimicis Risus.—

Hor.

There is no Enjoyment of external Pleasure, which has more imposed upon Men of late, by some confused Species of Morality, than Gallantry. The sensible Pleasure alone must, by all Men who have the least Reflection, be esteemed at a very low rate: But the Desires of this kind, as they were by Nature intended to found the most constant uninterrupted

uninterrupted *Friendship*, and to introduce the most venerable and lovely *Relations*, by *Marriages* and *Families*, arise in our Hearts, attended with some of the sweetest *Affections*, with a disinterested *Love* and *Tenderness*, with a most gentle and obliging Deportment, with something great and heroick in our Temper. The Wretch who rises no higher in this Passion than the mean *sensual Gratification*, is abhorred by every one: But these sublimer Sensations and Passions do often so fill the Imaginations of the *Amorous*, that they are unawares led into the most contemptible and cruel Conduct which can be imagined. When for some trifling transitory *Sensations*, which they might have innocently enjoyed along with the highest moral *Pleasures* in Marriage, they expose the very Person they love and admire to the deepest *Infamy* and *Sorrow*, to the *Contempt* of the World, to perpetual *Confusion*, *Remorse*, and *Anguish*; or, to what is worse, an *Insensibility* of all Honour or Shame, Virtue or Vice, Good or Evil, to be the Scorn and Aversion of the World; and all this coloured over with the gay Notions of *Pleasantry*, *Genielinefs*, *Politeness*, *Courage*, *high Enjoyment of Life*.

Would Men allow themselves a little Time to reflect on the *whole Effect* of such capricious Pursuits, the *Anguish* and *Distractions* of Mind which these Sallies of Pleasure give to *Husbands*, *Fathers*, *Brothers*; would they consider how they themselves would resent such Treatment of a *Wife*, a *Child*, a *Sister*; how much deeper such Distresses are, than those trifling Losses or Damages, for which we think it just to bring the Authors of them to the Gallows; sure none but a thorow Villain could either practise or approve the one more than the other.

A wise Man in his Oeconomy, must do much even in Complaisance to the *Follies* of others, as well as his own *Conveniency*, to support that general good Opinion which must be maintained by those who would be publicly useful. His *Expences* must be some way suited to his *Fortune* to avoid the Imputation of *Avarice*. If indeed what is saved in *private Expences*, be employed in general Offices there

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there is little danger of this Charge. Such a *Medium* may be kept as to be above *Censure*, and yet below any *Affectation* of *Honour* or *Distinction* in these matters. If one corrects his own *Imagination* in these things, he will be in no danger of doing any thing pernicious to please others. He is still in a State fit to judge of the real *Importance* of every thing which occurs to him, and will gratify the false *Relish* of others, no farther than it is consistent with, and subservient to some nobler Views.

II. To make the Pleasures of *Imagination* a constant Source of *Delight*, as they seem intended in the Frame of our Nature, with no hazard of *Pain*, it is necessary to keep the Sense free from foreign *Ideas* of *Property*, and the *Desire* of *Distinction*, as much as possible. If this can be done, we may receive Pleasure from every *Work* of *Nature* or *Art* around us. We enjoy not only the whole of *Nature*, but the united Labours of all about us. To prevent the Idea of *Property*, let us consider "how little the *Proprietor* enjoys more than the *Spectator*: Wherein is he the better or the happier?" The *Poet*, or the *Connoisseur*, who judges nicely of the Perfection of the Works of *Art*, or the Beauties of *Nature*, has generally a *higher Taste* than the Professor. The *magnificent Palace*, the *grand Apartments*, the *Vistas*, the *Fountains*, the *Urns*, the *Statues*, the *Grottoes* and *Arbours*, are exposed either in their own *Nature*, or by the Inclination of the *Proprietor*, to the Enjoyment of others. The *Pleasure* of the *Proprietor* depends upon the *Admiration* of others; he robs himself of his chief Enjoyment if he excludes *Spectators*: Nay, may not a *Taste* for *Nature* be acquired, giving greater *Delight* than the Observation of *Art*?

Deterius Lybicus olet, aut nitet, Herba lapillis?
Purior in vicis aqua tendit rumpere Plumbum,
Quam qua per prorum trepidat cum murmure rivum?
Nempe inter varias nutritur Sylva Columnas,

Laudaturque

*Laudaturque Domus, longos qua prospicit Agros.
Naturam expellas furca licet, usque recurret.* Hor.

Must an *artful Grove*, an *Imitation* of a *Wilderness*, or the more confined *Forms* or *Ever-greens*, please more than the real *Forest*, with the *Trees of God*? Shall a *Statue* give more Pleasure than the *human Face Divine*?

Where the *Humour of Distinction* is not corrected, our Equals become our Adversaries: The Grandeur of another is our *Misery*, and makes our Enjoyments insipid. There is only one way of making this Humour tolerable, but this way is almost inconsistent with the *Inclination* itself, viz. "continually to haunt with our Inferiors, and compare our selves with them." But if inconstant *Fortune*, or their own Merit do raise any of them to equal us, our *Pleasure* is lost, or we must sink our selves to those who are still *Inferior*, and abandon the Society of every Person whose *Art* or *Merit* raises him. How poor a Thought is this!

The Pursuits of the *Learned* have often as much Folly in them as any others, when Studies are not valued according to their *Use in Life*, or the real Pleasures they contain, but for the *Difficulty* and *Obscurity*, and consequently the *Rarity* and *Distinction*. Nay, an abuse may be made of the most noble and manly Studies, even of *Morals*, *Politics*, and *Religion* itself, if our Admiration and Desire terminate upon the *Knowledge* itself, and not upon the Possession of the *Dispositions* and *Affections* inculcated in these Studies. If these Studies be only matter of *Amusement* and *Speculation*, instead of leading us into a constant *Discipline* over our selves, to correct our Hearts, and to guide our Actions, we are not much better employed, than if we had been studying some useless Relations of *Numbers* or Calculations of *Chances*.

There is not indeed any part of Knowledge which can be called entirely *useless*. The most *abstracted Parts* of *Mathematicks*, and the Knowledge of *mythological History*, or
antient

ancient *Allegories*, have their own Pleasures not inferior to the more gay Entertainments of *Painting*, *Musick*, or *Architecture*; and it is for the Advantage of Mankind that some are found, who have a Taste for these Studies. The only Fault lies, in letting any of those *inferior Tastes* engross the whole Man to the Exclusion of the nobler Pursuits of *Virtue* and *Humanity*.

Concerning all these Pleasures of the Imagination, let us consider also "how little support they can give Men under any of the Calamities of Life," such as the Treachery or Baseness of a *Friend*, a *Wife*, a *Child*, or the perplexing Intricacies of our common Affairs, or the Apprehension of *Death*.

*Re veraque Metus hominum, Curaque sequaces
Nec metuant sonitus Armorum, nec fera Tela;
Audacterque inter Reges, rerumque Potentes
Versantur, nec fulgorem reverentur ab auro,
Nec clarum vestis splendorem purpurei
Quid dubitas quin omne sit hoc rationis egestas?* Luc.

III. Under this Head of our Internal *Ideas* of Sense, we must observe one natural Effect *Divinity* of it, that it leads us into *Apprehensions* of a *DEITY*. Grandeur, Beauty, Order, Harmony, wherever they occur, raise an Opinion of a *MIND*, of *Design*, and *Wisdom*. *arise from the Internal Senses.*

Every thing great, regular, or proportioned, excites *Veneration*, either toward it self, if we imagine it animated, or not animated, toward some apprehended Cause. No Determination of our Mind is more *natural* than this, no Effect more *universal*. One has better Reason to deny the Inclination between the *Sexes* to be natural, than a Disposition in Mankind to *Religion*.

We cannot open our Eyes, without discerning *Grandeur* and *Beauty* every where. Whoever receives these *Ideas*, feels an inward *Veneration* arise. We may fall into a Thousand vain Reasonings: foolish limited Notions of *DIVINITY*

NITY may be formed, as attached to the particular *Places* or *Objects*, which strike us in the most lively manner. Custom, Prejudice of Sense or Education, may confirm some foolish Opinion about the *Nature* or *Cause* of these Appearances: But whatever a superior MIND, a governing INTENTION or DESIGN is imagined, there Religion begins in its most simple Form, and an inward Devotion arises. Our Nature is as much determined to this, as to any other Perception or Affection. How we manage these Ideas and Affections, is indeed of the greatest Importance to our Happiness or Misery.

The Apprehension of an universal MIND with Power and Knowledge, is indeed an agreeable Object of Contemplation. But we must form our Ideas of all intelligent Natures, with some Resemblance or Analogy to ourselves: We must conceive something correspondent to our Affections in the DIVINITY, with some moral Apprehensions of the Actions and Tempers of his Creatures. The Order of Nature will suggest many Confirmations of this. We must conclude some Worship acceptable, and some Expressions of Gratitude as our Duty. The Conceptions of the DEITY must be various, according to the different Degrees of Attention and Reasoning in the Observers, and their own Tempers and Affections. Imagining the divine MIND as cruel, wrathful, or capricious, must be a perpetual Source of Dread and Horror; and will be apt to raise a Resemblance of Temper in the Worshipper, with its attendant Misery. A contrary Idea of the DIVINITY, as good, and kind, delighting in universal Happiness, and ordering all Events of the Universe to this End, as it is the most delightful Contemplation, so it fills the good Mind with a constant Security and Hope, amidst either public Disorders, or private Calamities.

To find out which of these two Representations of the DEITY is the true one, we must consult the Universe, the Effect of his Power, and the Scene of his Actions. As what has been observed by so many ingenious Authors

both *Antient* and *Modern*, one cannot be at a loss which Opinion to chuse. We may only on this occasion consider the Evidences of divine Goodness appearing in the *Structure of our own Nature*, and in the Order of our *Passions and Senses*.

It was observed above, how admirably our Affections are contrived for good in the *whole*. Many of them indeed do not pursue the *private Good* of the Agent; nay, many of them, in various Cases, seem to tend to his Detriment, by concerning him violently in the Fortunes of *others*, in their *Adversity*, as well as their *Prosperity*. But they all aim at *Good*, either private or publick: and by them each particular Agent is made, in a great measure, subservient to the *good of the whole*. Mankind are thus inseparably link'd together, and make one great *System*, by an invisible Union. He who *voluntarily* continues in this Union, and delights in employing his Power for his Kind, makes himself happy: He who does not continue this Union freely, but affects to break it, makes himself wretched; nor yet can he break the *Bonds of Nature*. His *publick* *Use*, his *Love of Honour*, and the very *Necessities* of his *Nature*, will continue to make him depend upon his *System*, and engage him to serve it, whether he inclines to it or not. Thus we are formed with a View to a general *Good End*; and may in our own Nature discern a universal mind watchful for the whole.

*Evidence
of the Good-
ness of God
in the
Frame of
our Senses
and Affec-
tions.*

The same is observable in the Order of our *external Sensations*. The simple Productions of Nature, which are useful to any Species of Animals, are also *grateful* to them; and the pernicious or useless Objects are made disagreeable. Our external Sensations are no doubt often *painful*, when our Bodies are in a dangerous State; when they want Supplies of Nourishment; when any thing external would be injurious to them. But if it appears, "that the *general Laws* are wisely constituted, and that it is necessary to the Good of a System of such Agents, to be under

"the Influence of *general Laws*, upon which there is occasion for *Prudence and Activity*;" the particular Pains occasioned by a necessary *Law* of Sensation, can be no Objection against the Goodness of the Author.

Now that there is no room for Complaint, that "our external Sense of *Pain* is made too acute," must appear from the Multitudes we daily see so careless of preserving the Blessing of *Health*, of which many are so prodigal as to lavish it away, and expose themselves to external Pains for very trifling Reasons. Can we then repine at the friendly *Admonitions* of Nature, joined with some *Austerity*, when we see that they are scarce sufficient to restrain us from Ruin? The same may be said of the Pains of other kinds. *Shame* and *Remorse* are never to be called too severe, while so many are not sufficiently restrained by them. Our *Compassion* and friendly *Sense of Sorrow*, what are they else but the *Alarms* and *Exhortations* of a kind impartial *Father*, to engage his *Children* to relieve a distressed *Brother*? Our *Anger* it self is a necessary Piece of Management, by which every pernicious Attempt is made dangerous to its Author.

Would we allow room to our Invention, to conceive what sort of *Mechanism*, what *Constitutions* of Senses and Affections a *malicious powerful Being* might have formed, we should soon see how few Evidences there are for any such Apprehension concerning the AUTHOR of this World. Our *Mechanism*, as far as we have ever yet discovered, is wholly contrived for good. No cruel *Devices*, no *Art* or *Contrivance* to produce evil: No such *Mark of Scope* seems ever to be aimed at. How easy had it been to have contrived some necessary Engines of *Misery* without any use; some *Member* of no other service but to be matter of *Torment*; *Senses* incapable of bearing the surrounding Objects without Pain; Eyes pained with the *Light*; a *Palate* offended with the *Fruits* of the Earth; a *Skin* as tender as the Coats of the *Eye*, and yet some more furious Pain forcing us to bear these Torments? Human Society might have been made as uneasy as the Company of En-

misery, and yet a perpetual more violent Motive of *Fear* might have forc'd us to bear it. *Malice, Rancour, Distrust*, might have been our natural Temper. Our *Honour* and *Self-Approbation* might have depended upon *Injuries*; and the *Torments* of others been made our *Delight*, which yet we could not have enjoyed thro' perpetual *Fear*. Many such Contrivances we may easily conceive, whereby an evil *Mind* could have gratified his *Malice* by our *Misery*. But how unlike are they all to the Intention or Design of the Mechanism of this World?

Our *Passions* no doubt are often matter of Uneasiness to ourselves, and sometimes occasion Misery to others, when any one is indulged into a Degree of Strength beyond its proportion. But which of them could we have wanted, without greater Misery in the whole? They are by Nature allanced against each other, like the *Antagonist Muscles* of the Body; either of which Separately would have occasioned *Distortion* and irregular *Motion*, yet jointly they form a Machine, most accurately subservient to the *Necessities, Convenience, and Happiness* of a rational System. We have a Power of *Reason* and *Reflection*, by which we may direct what Course of Action will naturally tend to procure the most valuable *Gratifications* of all our Desires, and prevent any intolerable or unnecessary Pains, or provide some support under them. We have Wisdom sufficient to form Ideas of *Rights, Laws, Constitutions*; so as to preserve large Societies in Peace and Prosperity, and promote a general Good amidst all the private Interests.

If from the present Order of Nature, in which Good appears far superior to Evil, we have just Presumptions to conclude the DEITY to be benevolent, it is not conceivable that any Being, who desires the Happiness of others, should not desire a greater Degree of Happiness to them rather than a less; and that consequently the whole Series of Events is the best possible, and contains in the whole the greatest possible absolute Good: especially since we have no Presumption of any private Interest, which an universal MIND can have in view, in opposi-

tion to the greatest Good of the whole. Nor are the particular Evils occurring to our Observation, any just Objection against the perfect Goodness of the universal PROVIDENCE to us, who cannot know how far these Evils may be necessarily connected with the *Means* of the greatest possible absolute Good.

The Conduct of our publick Sense and Affections.

IV. In managing our *publick Sense* of the State of others, we must beware of one common Mistake, viz. "apprehending every Person to be miserable in those Circumstances, which we imagine would make our selves miserable." We may easily find, that the *lower Rank* of Mankind, whose only Revenue is their bodily Labour, enjoy as much *Contentment, Health, Gaiety*, in their own way, as any in the highest Station of Life. Both their Minds and Bodies are soon fitted to their State. The *Farmer* and *Labourer*, when they enjoy the bare Necessaries of Life are easy. They have often more *correct Imagination* thro' *Necessity* and *Experience*, than others can acquire by *Philosophy*. This Thought is indeed a poor Excuse for a base selfish Oppressor, who, imagining Poverty a great Misery, bears hard upon those in a low Station of Life, and deprives them of their natural *Conveniences*, or even of bare *Necessaries*. But this Consideration may support a compassionate Heart, too deeply touched with apprehended Miseries, of which the *Sufferers* are themselves insensible.

The Pains of this *Sense* are not easily removed. They are not allayed by the Distinction of Pains into *real* and *imaginary*. Much less will it remove them, to consider how much of human Misery is owing to their own *Folly* and *Vice*. Folly and Vice are themselves the most pitiable Evils. It is of more consequence to consider, what Evildences there are "that the Vice and Misery in the World are smaller than we sometimes in our melancholy Hours imagine." There are no doubt many furious Starts of Passion, in which Malice may seem to have place in our

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Constitution; but how seldom, and how short, in comparison of Years spent in fixed kind Pursuits of the Good of a *Family*, a *Party*, a *Country*? How great a Part of human Actions flow directly from *Humanity* and kind *Affection*? How many censurable Actions are owing to the same Spring, only chargeable on *Inadvertence*, or an Attachment to too narrow a *System*? How few owing to any thing worse than *selfish* Passions above their Proportion?

Here Men are apt to let their Imaginations run out upon all the *Robberies*, *Piracies*, *Murders*, *Perjuries*, *Frauds*, *Massacres*, *Assignations*, they have ever either heard of, or read in History; thence concluding all Mankind to be very wicked: as if a *Court of Justice* were the proper Place of making an Estimate of the *Morals* of Mankind, or an *Hospital* of the *Healthfulness* of a Climate. Ought they not to consider, that the Number of honest *Citizens* and *Farmers* far surpasses that of all sorts of Criminals in any State; and that the innocent or kind Actions of even Criminals themselves, surpass their Crimes in Numbers? That 'tis the *Rarity* of Crimes, in comparison of innocent or good Actions, which engages our Attention to them, and makes them be recorded in History; while incomparably more honest, generous, domestick Actions are overlooked, only because they are so common; as one great *Danger*, or one *Month's Sickness*, shall become a frequently repeated Story, during a long Life of Health and safety.

The Pains of the *external Senses* are pretty frequent, but how short in comparison of the long Tracts of Health, Ease and Pleasure? How rare is the Instance of a Life, with one tenth spent in violent Pain? How few want absolute Necessaries; nay have not something to spend on *Decency* and *Ornament*? The Pleasures of *Beauty* are exposed to all in some measure. These kinds of *Beauty* which require *Property* to the full Enjoyment of them, are not so ardently desired by many. The good of every kind in the universe, is plainly superior to the Evil. How few would accept of *Annihilation*, rather than Continuance in Life

in the middle State of Age, Health and Fortune? Or what separated Spirit, who had considered human Life, would not, rather than perish, take the hazard of it again, by turning into a Body in the State of Infancy?

—— *Who would lose,*

*For fear of Pain, this intellectual Being,
These Thoughts which wander thro' Eternity,
To perish rather, swallowed up and lost
In the wide Womb of uncreated Night,
Devoid of Sense and Motion——?*

Milton's *Par. lost*, Book 2

These Thoughts plainly shew a Prevalence of Good in the World. But still our publick Sense finds much matter of compassionate Sorrow among Men. The *Many* are in a tolerable good State; but who can be unconcerned for the distressed *Few*? They are few in comparison of the whole, and yet a great *Multitude*.

What Parent would be much concerned at the Pains of breeding of *Teeb*, were they sure they would be short and end well? Or at the Pain of a Medicine, or an Incision, which was necessary for the Cure, and would certainly accomplish it? Is there then no *Parents* in *NATURE*, no *Physician* who sees what is necessary for the *Whole*, and for the good of each Individual in the whole of his Existence as far as is consistent with the general Good: Can we expect, in this our *Childhood* of Existence, to understand all the Contrivance and Art of this Parent and Physician of Nature? May not some harsh Discipline be necessary for Good? May not many natural Evils be necessary to prevent future moral Evils, and to correct the Tempers of the Agents, nay to introduce moral Good? Is not *Suffering* and *Distress* requisite, before there can be room for generous Compassion, *Succour*, and *Liberality*? Can there be *Forgiveness*, *Returns of good for evil*, unless there be some moral Evil? Must the *Whole* want the eternally delightful *Consciousness* of such *Actions* and *Dispositions*, to prevent few transient Sensations of Pain, or natural Evil? May

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there not be some unseen Necessity for the greatest universal Good, that * there should be an *Order of Beings* no more perfect than we are, subject to Error and wrong Affections sometimes? May not all the present Disorders which attend this State of *prevalent Order*, be rectified by the *directing Providence* in a future Part of our Existence? This Belief of a DEITY, a PROVIDENCE, and a *future State*, are the only sure Supports to a good Mind. Let us then acquire and strengthen our Love and Concern for this *Whole*, and acquiesce in what the governing MIND, who presides in it, is ordering in the wisest manner, tho' not yet fully known to us, for its most universal Good.

A future State, firmly believed, makes the greatest Difficulties on this Subject to vanish. No particular *finite Evils* can be looked upon as intolerable, which lead to Good, infinite in *Duration*. Nor can we complain of the Conditions of Birth, if the present Evils of Life have even a probable hazard of *everlasting Happiness* to compensate them; much more if it be placed in our power certainly to obtain it. Never could the boldest Epicurean bring the lightest Appearance of Argument against the *Possibility* of such a State, nor was there ever any thing tolerable advanced against its *Probability*. We have no Records of any Nation which did not entertain this Opinion. Men of Reflection in all Ages, have found at least probable Arguments for it; and the Vulgar have been prone to believe it, without any other *Argument* than their natural Notions of *Justice* in the *Administration of the World*. Present *Hope* is present Good; and this very Hope has enlivened human Life, and given ease to generous Minds, under Anxieties about the publick Good.

The Necessity of believing a future State.

This Opinion was interwoven with all Religions; and as it in many instances overbalanced the Motives to Vice,

* See the Archbishop of Dublin, *De Origine Mali*.

so it removed Objections against *Providence*. The good Influence of this Opinion, however it might not justify any *Frands*, yet probably did more good than what might overballance many Evils flowing from even very corrupt *Religions*. How agreeable then must it be to every good Man, that this Opinion, were there even no more to be done, should be confirmed beyond question or doubt, by a wellattested *divine Revelation*, for the perpetual *Security* of the virtuous, and for the constant Support of the kind and compassionate? How gladly must every honest Heart receive it; and rejoice that even those who have neither *Leisure* nor *Capacity* for deep *Reflection*, should be thus convinced of it.

The Conduct of the unkind Affections.

As to the Management of those Passions which seem *opposite* to the *Happiness* of others, such as *Anger*, *Jealousy*, *Envy*, *Hatred*; it is very necessary to represent to our selves continually the most favourable Conceptions of others, and to force our Minds to examine the real Springs of the resenting Actions. We may almost universally find, that "no Man acts from pure *Malice*; that the Injurious "only intended some *Interest of his own*, without any ultimate *Desire* of our *Misery*; that he is more to be pitied for his own mean selfish *Temper*, for the want of true *Goodness*, and its attendant *Happiness*, than to be hated for his Conduct, which is really more pernicious to himself than to others *. Our *Lenity*, *Forgiveness*, and *Indulgence* to the Weakness of others, will be constant Matter of delightful *Consciousness*, and *Self-Approbation*; and will be as probably effectual in most cases, to obtain *Reparation* of Wrongs, from an hearty *Remorse*, and thorough *Amendment of the Temper* of the Injurious, as any Methods of *Violence*." Could we raise our Goodness even to an higher Pitch, and consider "the Injurious

* See this Point handled with great Judgment, in *Plato's Gorgias*.

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“ as our *Fellow-Members* in this great intellectual Body,
 “ whose Interest and Happiness it becomes us to promote,
 “ as much as we can consistently with that of others, and
 “ not to *despise, scorn, or cut them off*, because of every
 “ *Weakness, Deformity, or lighter Disorder*; ” we might
 bring our selves to that divine Conduct, of even *returning*
Good for Evil.

In like manner, our *Emulation, Jealousy, or Envy*,
 might be restrained in a great measure, by a constant *Reso-*
lution of bearing always in our Minds the * *Lovely Side* of
 every Character: † “ The compleatly Evil are as rare as
 “ the perfectly *Virtuous*: There is something amiable al-
 “ most in every one.” Could we enure our selves con-
 stantly to dwell on these things, we might often bear pa-
 tiently the *Success of a Rival*, nay, sometimes even rejoice
 in it, be more happy our selves, and turn him into a real
Friend. We should often find those *Phantoms* of Vice and
 Corruption which torment the *Jealous*, vanishing before
 the bright Warmth of a thorow good Temper, relolved to
 search for every thing *lovely and Good*, and averse to think
 any evil.

V. In governing our moral Sense, and De-
 sires of *Virtue*, nothing is more necessary than
 to study the *Nature and Tendency* of human
 Actions; and to extend our views to the
whole Species, or to all *sensitive Natures*, as far
 as they can be affected by our Conduct. Our
 moral Sense thus regulated, and constantly
 followed in our Actions, may be the most constant Source
 of the most *stable Pleasure*. The same Conduct is always
 the most probable Means of obtaining the *Pleasures of Ho-*
nour. If there be a Distinction between *Truth and Falshood*,
 Truth must be stronger than Falshood: It must be more
 probable that *Truth* will generally prevail; that the real

Conduct of
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 Sense, and
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 Honour.

* Epictet. Enchir. Cap. 65. † Plato Phædon.

good Tendency of our Actions, and the Wisdom of our Intentions will be known; and Misrepresentations or partial Views will vanish. Our Desire of Honour is not confined to our present State. The Prospect of future Glory is a strong Motive of Action. And thus the Time, in which our Character may have the hazard of obtaining Justice, has no other Limits than those of the Existence of rational Natures. Whereas, partial Notions of Virtue, and partial Conduct, have no other Foundation for Self-Approbation, than our Ignorance, Error, or Inadvertence; nor for Honour, than the like Ignorance, Error, or Inadvertence of others.

That we may not be engaged into any thing contrary to the publick Good, or to the true Schemes of Virtue, by the Desire of false Honour, or Fear of false Shame, it is of great use to examine the real Dignity of those we converse with, and to confine our Intimacies to the truly virtuous and wise. From such we can expect no Honour, but according to our sincere Pursuit of the publick Good; nor need we ever fear any Shame in such a Course. But above all, did we frequently, and in the most lively manner, present to our selves that great, and wise, and good MIND, which presides over the Universe, sees every Action, and knows the true Character and Disposition of every Heart, approving nothing but sincere Goodness and Integrity, did we consider that the time will come, when we shall be as conscious of his Presence, as we are of our own Existence; as sensible of his Approbation or Condemnation, as we are of the Testimony of our own Hearts; when we shall be engaged in a Society of Spirits, stripped of these Prejudices and false Notions which so often attend us in Flesh and Blood, how should we despise that Honour which is from Men, when opposite to the truest Honour from God himself?

The Desires
of Wealth
and Power.

IV. Concerning the Desires of Wealth and Power, besides what was suggested above to allay their Violence, from considering the small Addition commonly made to the Happi-

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pinefs of the Possessor, by the greatest Degrees of them, and the *Uncertainty* of their Continuance; if we have obtained any share of them, let us examine their *true Use*, and what is the best Enjoyment of them.

————— *Quid asper*
Utile Nummus habet? Patria carisque propinquis
Quantum elargiri decet? ——— Persius.

What *moral Pleasures*, what *Delights of Humanity*, what *Gratitude* from Persons obliged, what *Honour*, may a wise Man of a generous Temper purchase with them? How foolish is the Conduct of heaping up Wealth for *Posterity*, when smaller Degrees might make them equally happy! when great *Prospects* of this kind are the strongest *Temptations* to them, to indulge *Sloth, Luxury, Debauchery, Insolence, Pride, and Contempt* of their Fellow-Creatures; and to banish some noble Dispositions, *Humility, Compassion, Industry, Hardiness of Temper and Courage*, the Offspring of the sober rigid Dame *Poverty*. How often does the *Example*, and almost direct *Instruction* of Parents, lead *Proterity* into the basest Views of Life!

————— *Qui nulla exempla beati*
Pauperis esse putat ———
Cum dicis Iuveni stultum qui donat amico,
Qui paupertatem leuat attollitque propinqui,
Et spoliare doces & circumscribere ———
Ergo Ignem, cujus scintillas is se dedisti,
Flagrantem late, & rapien'em cuncta videbis.

Juv. Sat. 14.

How powerfully might the Example of a wisely generous Father, at once teach his Offspring the true *Value* of Wealth or Power, and prevent their *Neglect* of them, or *Wastefulness* throwing them away, and yet inspire them with a generous Temper, capable of the just *Use* of them!

Death

Support a-
gainst
Death.

Death is one Object of our *Aversion*, which yet we cannot avoid. It can scarcely be said, that "the *Desire of Life* is as strong as the "Sum of all *selfish Desires*." It may be so with those who enure themselves to no Pleasures but those of the *external Senses*. But how often do we see Death endured, not only from Love of *Virtue*, or *publick Affections*, in Heroes and Martyrs, but even from Love of *Honour* in lower Characters! Many Aversions are stronger than that to Death. *Fear of bodily Pain*, *fear of Dishonour*, which are selfish Aversions, do often surpass our Aversion to Death, as well as *publick Affections* to Countries or Friends. It is of the greatest Consequence to the *Enjoyment* of Life, to know its true *Value*; to strip Death of its borrowed Ideas of Terror; to consider it barely as the *Cessation of both the Pains and Pleasures we now feel*, coming frequently upon us with no more Pain than that of *Swooning*, with a noble Hazard, or rather a certain *Prospect* of superior Happiness to every good *Mind*. Death in this view must appear an inconsiderable Evil, in comparison of *Vice*, *Self-Abhorrence*, real *Dishonour*, the *Slavery of one's Country*, the *Misery of a Friend*.

The tender Regards to a *Family* and *Offspring*, are often the strongest Bands to restrain a generous Mind from submitting to Death. What shall be the Fate of a *Wife*, a *Child*, a *Friend*, or a *Brother*, when we are gone, are the frequent Subjects of grievous Anxiety. The Fortunes of such Persons often depend much upon us; and when they do not, yet we are more anxious about their State when we shall be absent.

*Ut affidens implumibus pullis avis,
Serpentium allapsus timet
Magis relictis, non ut adsit Auxilii
Latura plus presentibus.*

Hor.

Next to the Belief of a good PROVIDENCE, nothing can support Men more under such *Anxieties*, than considering

dering how often the *Orphan* acquires a *Vigor* of Mind, *Sagacity* and *Industry*, superior to those who are enfeebled by the constant *Care* and *Services* of others. A wise Man would desire to be provided with Friends against such an Exigency; Persons of such Goodness, as would joytully accept the *Legacy* of a *Child*, or indigent *Friend* committed to their Protection.

If Death were an *entire End* of the Person, so that no Thought or Sense should remain, all *Good* must cease at Death, but no *Evil* commence. The *Loss of Good* is *Evil* to us now, but will be no *Evil* to a Being which has lost all *Sense of Evil*. Were this the Case, the Consolation against Death would only be this, frequently to look upon *Life* and all its Enjoyments as granted to us only for a *short Term*; to employ this uncertain Time as much as we can in the Enjoyment of the *noblest Pleasures*; and to prevent surprise at our Removal, by *laying our Account* for it.

But if we exist, and think after Death, and retain our *Senses* of Good and Evil, no Consolation against Death can be ingested to a *wicked Man*; but for the *virtuous*, there are the best Grounds of *Hope* and *Joy*. If the *Administration* of the whole be good, we may be sure "that *Order* and *Happiness* will in the whole prevail: Nor will *Misery* be inflicted any farther than is necessary for some pre-pollent *Good*." Now there is no Presumption, that the *absolute Misery* of any *virtuous* Person can be necessary for any good End: Such Persons therefore are the most likely to enjoy a State of perfect Happiness.

VII. To conclude: Let us consider that *What is* common Character, which when ascribed *the natural* any *State, Quality, Disposition, or Action, State of* engages our *Favour* and *Approbation* of it, *Men.* its being *natural*. We have many *Sus-* tions about *Temper*s or *Dispositions* formed by *Art*, but some way prepossessed in favour of what is *natural*: we imagine it must be advantageous and delightful to be in a *natural State*, and to live according to *Nature*. "This

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"very Presumption in favour of what is natural, is a plain
 "Indication that the Order of Nature is good, and that
 "Men are some way convinced of it. Let us enquire
 "then what is meant by it."

If by natural we mean "that which we enjoy or do,
 "when we first begin to exist, or to think," it is impossi-
 ble to know what *State*, *Temper*, or *Actions*, are *natural*.
 Our *natural State* in this Sense differs little from that of a
Plant, except in some accidental *Sensations of Hunger*, or
 of *Ease*, when we are well nourished.

Some elaborate Treatises of great Philosophers about
innate Ideas, or Principles practical or speculative, amount
 to no more than this, "That in the Beginning of our
 "Existence we have no *Ideas* or *Judgments*;" they might
 have added too, no *Sight*, *Taste*, *Smell*, *Hearing*, *Desire*,
Volition. Such Dissertations are just as useful for under-
 standing *human Nature*, as it would be in explaining the
animal Oeconomy, to prove that the *Fœtus* is animated be-
 fore it has *Teeth*, *Nails*, *Hair*, or before it can *eat*, *drink*,
digest, or *breathe*: Or in a *natural History of Vegetables*, to
 prove that *Trees* begin to grow before they have *Branches*,
Leaves, *Flower*, *Fruit*, or *Seed*: And consequently that all
 these things were adventitious, or the Effect of Art.

But if we call "that *State*, those *Dispositions* and *Acti-*
ons, *natural*, to which we are inclined by some part of
 "our Constitution, antecedently to any *Volition* of our
 "own; or which flow from some *Principles* in our Na-
 "ture, not brought upon us by our own *Art*, or that of
 "others;" then it may appear, from what was said a-
 bove, that "a *State of Good-will*, *Humanity*, *Compassion*,
 "mutual *Aid*, *propagating and supporting Offspring*, *Love*,
 "of a *Community* or *Country*, *Devotion*, or *Love and Gratitude*
 "to some governing *Mind*, is our natural State," to
 which we are naturally inclined, and do actually arrive,
 universally, and with as much uniformity, as we do to
 certain *Stature* and *Shape*.

If by natural we understand "the highest Perfection of the Kind, to which any Nature may be improved by cultivating its natural Dispositions or Powers;" as few arrive at this in the Growth of their Bodies, so few obtain it in their Minds. But we may see what this Perfection is, to which our natural Dispositions tend, when we improve them to the utmost, as far as they are consistent with each other, making the weaker or meaner yield to the more excellent and stronger. Our several Senses and Affections, publick and private, with our Powers of Reason and Reflection, shew this to be the Perfection of our Kind, viz. "to know, love, and reverence the great AUTHOR of all things; to form the most extensive Ideas of our own true Interests, and those of all other Natures, rational or sensitive; to abstain from all Injury; to pursue regularly and impartially the most universal absolute Good, as far as we can; to enjoy constant Self-Approbation, and Honour from wise Men; with Trust in divine PROVIDENCE, Hope of everlasting Happiness, and a full Satisfaction and Assurance of Mind, that the whole Series of Events is directed by an unerring Wisdom, for the greatest universal Happiness of the whole."

To assert that "Men have generally arrived to the Perfection of their Kind in this Life," is contrary to Experience. But on the other hand, to suppose "no Order at all in the Constitution of our Nature, or no prevalent Evidences of good Order," is yet more contrary to Experience, and would lead to a Denial of PROVIDENCE in the most important Affair which can occur to our Observation. We actually see such Degrees of good Order, of social Affection, of Virtue and Honour, as make the Generality of Mankind continue in a tolerable, nay, an agreeable State. However, in some Tempers we see the selfish Passions by Habits grown too strong; in others we may observe Humanity, Compassion, and Good-nature sometimes raised by Habits, as we say, to an Excess.

Were we to strike a *Medium* of the several Passions and Affections, as they appear in the whole Species of Mankind, to conclude thence what has been the natural Balance previously to any Change made by Custom or Habit, which we see casts the Balance to either side, we should perhaps find the *Medium* of the publick Affections not very far from a sufficient *Counter-balance* to the *Medium* of the Selfish; and consequently the *Overbalance* on either side in particular Characters, is not to be looked upon as the *original Constitution*, but as the *accidental Effect* of Custom, Habit, or Associations of Ideas, or other preternatural Causes: So that an universal increasing of the Strength of either, might in the whole be of little advantage. The raising universally the *publick Affections*, the Desires of *Virtue* and *Honour*, would make the *Hero* of *Cervantes* pining with *Hunger* and *Poverty*, no rare Character. The universal increasing of *Selfishness*, unless we had more accurate Understandings to discern our *nicest Interests*, would fill the World with universal *Rapine* and *War*. The Consequences of either universally *abating*, or *increasing* the Desires between the *Sexes*, the *Love of Offspring*, or the several *Tastes* and *Fancies* in other Pleasures, would perhaps be found more pernicious to the whole, than the present Constitution. What seems most truly wanting in our Nature, is greater *Knowledge*, *Attention* and *Consideration*: had we a greater Perfection this way, and were evil *Habits*, and foolish *Associations of Ideas* prevented, our Passions would appear in better order.

But while we feel in our selves so much *publick Affection* in the various Relations of Life, and observe the like in others; while we find every one desiring indeed his *Happiness*, but capable of discerning, by a little Attention, that not only his external *Convenience*, or *worldly Interest*, but even the most immediate and lively *Sensations of Delight*, of which his Nature is susceptible, immediately flow from a *Publick Spirit*, a *generous, human, compassionate Temper*, and a suitable *Deportment*; while we observe so many Thousands enjoying a tolerable State of *Ease* and

Safety

Safety, for each one whose Condition is made intolerable, even during our present *Corruption*: How can any one look upon this World as under the Direction of an *evil Nature*, or even question a perfectly good PROVIDENCE? How clearly does the *Order of our Nature* point out to us our true Happiness and Perfection, and lead us to it as naturally as the several Powers of the Earth, the Sun, and Air, bring Plants to their Growth, and the Perfection of their Kinds? We indeed are directed to it by our Understanding and Affections, as it becomes rational and active Natures; and they by mechanick Laws. We may see, that "Attention to the most universal Interest of all sensitive Natures, is the Perfection of each individual of Mankind." That they should thus be like well-tuned Instruments, affected with every Stroke or Touch upon any one. Nay, how much of this do we actually see in the World? What generous Sympathy, Compassion, and Congratulation witness each other? Does not even the flourishing State of the inanimate Parts of Nature, fill us with joy? It not thus our Nature admonished, exhorted and commanded to cultivate universal Goodness and Love, by a Voice heard thro' all the Earth, and Words sounding to the Ends of the World?



For such are the passions of the human mind, that they are not only the cause of our actions, but also of our sufferings. The passions are the springs of all our conduct, and the passions are the cause of all our misery. The passions are the cause of all our sin, and the passions are the cause of all our sorrow. The passions are the cause of all our trouble, and the passions are the cause of all our pain. The passions are the cause of all our distress, and the passions are the cause of all our grief. The passions are the cause of all our affliction, and the passions are the cause of all our sorrow. The passions are the cause of all our trouble, and the passions are the cause of all our pain. The passions are the cause of all our distress, and the passions are the cause of all our grief. The passions are the cause of all our affliction, and the passions are the cause of all our sorrow.



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TREATISE II.

ILLUSTRATIONS *upon the* MORAL SENSE.

THE Differences of Actions from which some are constituted *morally Good*, and others *morally Evil*, have always been accounted a very important Subject of Inquiry: And therefore, every Attempt to free this Subject from the usual Causes of Error and Difficultie, the *Confusion of ambiguous Words*, must be excusable.

In the following Discourse, *Happiness* denotes pleasant *Sensation* of any kind, or a continued State of such *Sensations*; and *Misery* denotes the contrary *Sensations*.

Such Actions as tend to procure Happiness to the Agent, are called *privately useful*: and such Actions as procure Misery to the Agent, *privately hurtful*.

Actions procuring Happiness to others may be called *publickly useful*, and the contrary Actions *publickly hurtful*. Some Actions may be both *publickly and privately useful*, and others both *publickly and privately hurtful*.

These different *natural Tendencies* of Actions are universally acknowledged; and in proportion to our *Reflection* upon human Affairs, we shall enlarge our Knowledge of these Differences.

Two Questions about Morality. When these *natural Differences* are known, it remains to be inquired into: 1st, "What *Quality* in any Action determines our Election of it rather than the contrary?" Or, if the Mind determines it self, "What *Motives* or *Desires* excite to an Action, rather than the contrary, or rather than to the *Omission*?" 2dly, "What *Quality* determines our *Approbation* of one Action, rather than of the contrary Action?"

The Words *Election* and *Approbation* seem to denote simple Ideas known by *Consciousness*; which can only be explained by *synonymous Words*, or by concomitant or consequent Circumstances. *Election* is purposing to do an Action rather than its contrary, or than being inactive. *Approbation* of our own Action denotes, or is attended with a Pleasure in the *Contemplation* of it, and in *Reflection* upon the *Affections* which inclined us to it. *Approbation* of the Action of another is pleasant, and is attended with *Love* toward the Agent.

The *Qualities* moving to *Election*, or exciting to Action are different from those moving to *Approbation*: We often do Actions which we do not approve, and approve Actions which we omit: We often desire that an Agent had committed an Action which we approve; and wish he would do an Action which we condemn. *Approbation* is employed about the Actions of others, where there is no room for our Election.

Now in our Search into the *Qualities* exciting either our *Election* or *Approbation*, let us consider the several *Notions* advanced of moral Good and Evil in both these *Respects*; and what *Senses*, *Instincts*, or *Affections*, must

be necessarily supposed to account for our *Approbation* or *Election*.

There are two Opinions on this Subject *The Epicurean Opinion*.
 entirely opposite: The one that of the old *Epicureans*, as it is beautifully explained in the first Book of *Cicero, De finibus*; which is revived by Mr. *Hobbes*, and followed by many better Writers: "That all the Desires of the *human Mind*, nay of all *thinking Natures*, are reducible to *Self-Love*, or *Desire of private Happiness*: That from this Desire all Actions of any Agent do flow." Our *Christian Moralists* introduce other sorts of Happiness to be desired, but still 'tis the *Prospect of private Happiness*, which, with some of them, is the sole *Motive of Election*. And that, in like manner, what determines any Agent to approve his own Action, is its *Tendency to his private Happiness* in the whole, tho' it may bring *present Pain* along with it: That the *Approbation* of the Action of another, is from an Opinion of its Tendency to the Happiness of the Approver, either *immediately* or more *remotely*: That each Agent may discover it to be the surest way to promote his private Happiness, to do *publicly useful Actions*, and to abstain from those which are *publicly hurtful*: That the neglecting to observe this, and doing *publicly hurtful Actions*, does mischief to the whole of Mankind, by hurting any one part; that every one has some little *damage* by this Action: Such an *inadvertent Person* might possibly be *pernicious* to any one, were he in his Neighbourhood; and the very *Example* of such Actions may extend over the whole World, and produce some pernicious Effects upon any Observer. That therefore every one may look upon such Actions as *hurtful to himself*, and in this view does disapprove them, and hates the Agent. In the like manner, a *publicly useful Action* may diffuse some small *Advantage* to every Observer, whence he may approve it, and love the Agent."

This

Does not
answer the
Appearances.

This Scheme can never account for the principal Actions of human Life *: Such as the Offices of Friendship, Gratitude, natural Affection, Generosity, publick Spirit, Compassion. Men are conscious of no such Intentions or acute Reflections in these Actions. Ingenious speculative Men, in their straining to support an Hypothesis, may contrive a thousand subtle selfish Motives, which a kind generous Heart never dreamed of. In like manner, this Scheme can never account for the sudden Approbation, and violent Sense of something amiable in Actions done in distant Ages and Nations, while the Approver has perhaps never thought of these distant Tendencies to his Happiness. Nor will it better account for our want of Approbation toward publickly useful Actions done casually, or only with Intention of private Happiness to the Agent. And then, in these Actions reputed generous, if the Agent's Motive was only a view to his own Pleasure, how come we to approve them more than his enriching himself, or his gratifying his own Taste with good Food? The whole Species may receive a like Advantage from both, and the Observer an equal Share.

Were our Approbation of Actions done in distant Ages and Nations, occasioned by this Thought, that such an Action done toward our selves would be useful to us, why don't we approve and love in like manner any Man who finds a Treasure, or indulges himself in any exquisite Sensation, since these Advantages or Pleasures might be conferred on our selves; and tend more to our Happiness than any Actions in distant Ages?

The Sanctions of Laws may make any Agent chuse the Action required, under the Conception of useful to himself, and lead him into an Opinion of private Advantage.

* See Treat. 3. Sect. 1.

in it, and of detriment in the contrary Actions; but what should determine any Person to approve the *Actions of others*, because of a Conformity to a Law, if Approbation in any Person were only an Opinion of private Advantage?

The other Opinion is this, "That we have not only *Self-Love*, but *benvolent Affections* also toward others, in various Degrees, making us desire their Happiness as an *ultimate End*, without any view to private Happiness: That we have a *moral Sense* or Determination of our Mind, to *approve every kind Affection* either in our selves or others, and all publicly useful Actions which we imagined do flow from such Affection, without our having a view to our *private Happiness*, in our Approbation of these Actions."

The opposite Opinion does plainly.

These two Opinions seem both intelligible, each consistent with it self. The former seems not to represent human Nature as it is; the other seems to do it.

There have been many *ways of speaking* introduced, which seem to signify something different from both the former Opinions. Such as these, that "Morality of Actions consists in *Conformity to Reason*, or *Disformity from it*:" That "*Virtue* is acting according to the *absolute Fitness and Unfitness of Things*, or agreeably to the *Natures or Relations of Things*," and many others different Authors. To examine these is the Design of the following Sections; and to explain more fully how the *moral Sense* alledged to be in Mankind, must be presupposed even in these Schemes.

Schemes seemingly different from both.

SECT.

S E C T. I.

Concerning the Character of Virtue, agreeable
to Truth or Reason.

SINCE Reason is understood to denote our Power of finding out true Propositions, Reasonableness must denote the same thing, with Conformity to true Propositions, or to Truth.

Reasonableness in an Action is a very common Expression, but yet upon inquiry, it will appear very confused, whether we suppose it the Motive to Election, or the Quality determining Approbation.

Conformity to Truth examined. There is one sort of Conformity to Truth which neither determines to the one or the other; viz. that Conformity which is between every true Proposition and its Object. This sort of Conformity can never make us chuse or approve one Action more than its contrary, for it is found in all Actions alike: Whatever attribute can be ascribed to a generous kind Action, the contrary Attribute may as truly be ascribed to a selfish cruel Action: Both Propositions are equally true, and the two contrary Actions, the Objects of the two Truths are equally conformable to their several Truths, with that sort of Conformity which is between Truth and its Object. This Conformity then cannot make a Difference among Actions, or recommend one more than another either to Election or Approbation, since a Man may make as many Truths about Villainy, as about Heroism, by ascribing to it contrary Attributes.

For Instance, these are *Truths* concerning the *Preservation of Property*. "It tends to the Happiness of human Society: It encourages Industry: It shall be rewarded by God." These are also *Truths* concerning *Robbery*. "It disturbs Society: It discourages Industry: It shall be punished by God." The former *three Truths* have the *Preservation of Property* for their *Object*; the latter *three* have *Robbery*. And each Class of *Truths* have that sort of *Conformity* to its *Object*, which is common to all *Truths* with their *Objects*. The *moral Difference* cannot therefore depend upon this *Conformity*, which is common to both.

The *Number* of *Truths* in both cases may be plainly the same; so that a good Action cannot be supposed to agree to more *Truths* than an evil one, nor can an evil Action be disagreeable to any *Truth* or *Compages of Truths* made about it; for whatever Propositions do not agree with their *Objects* are not *Truths*.

If *Reasonableness*, the Character of *Virtue*, denote some other sort of *Conformity* to *Truth*, it were to be wished that these Gentlemen, who make it the original Idea of moral Good, antecedent to any *Sense* or *Affections*, would explain it, and shew how it determines us antecedently to *Sense*, either to *Election* or *Approbation*.

They tell us, "we must have some *Standard* antecedently to all *Sense* or *Affections*, since we judge even of our *Senses* and *Affections* themselves, and approve or disapprove them: This *Standard* must be our *Reason*, *Conformity* to which must be the original Idea of moral Good."

But what is this *Conformity of Actions to Reasons*? When we ask the *Reason* of an action we sometimes mean, "What *Truth* either justifying or exciting." Thus, why does a *Luxurious* Man pursue *Wealth*? The *Reason* is given by this

O

Truth,

Truth, "Wealth is useful to purchase Pleasures." Sometimes for a Reason of Actions we shew the *Truth expressing a Quality, engaging our Approbation*. Thus the Reason of hazarding Life in just War, is, that "it tends to preserve our honest Countrymen, or evidences publick Spirit." The Reason for Temperance, and against Luxury is given thus, "Luxury evidences a selfish base Temper." The former sort of Reasons we will call *exciting*, and the latter *justifying*.* Now we shall find that all *exciting Reasons* presuppose *Instincts and Affections*; and the *justifying* presuppose a *moral Sense*.

Exciting Reasons suppose Affections.

As to *exciting Reasons*, in every calm rational Action some end is desired or intended; no end can be intended or desired previously to some one of these Classes of Affections: *Self-Love, Self-Hatred*, or desire of private Misery, (if this be possible) *Benevolence* towards others or *Malice*: All Affections are included under these; none can be previous to them all; there can therefore be no *exciting Reason* previous to *Affection*.

We have indeed many confused Harangues on this Subject, telling us, "We have two Principles of Action, Reason, and Affection, or Passion (*i. e.* strong Affection): the former in common with Angels, the latter with Brutes." No Action is wise, or good, or reasonable, to which we are not excited by Reason, as distinct from all Affections; or, if any such Actions as flow from Affections are good, 'tis only by chance, or materially and not formally. As if indeed Reason, or the Knowledge of the Relations of things, could excite to Action when we proposed an End, or as if Ends could be intended without Desire or Affection.

* Thus Grotius distinguishes the Reasons of War, into *Justificæ, and Suasoriæ*.

But are there not also exciting Reasons, even previous to any end, moving us to propose one end rather than another? To this Aristotle long ago answered, "that there are *ultimate Ends* desired without a view to any thing else, and *subordinate Ends* or Objects desired with a view to something else." To *subordinate Ends* whose Reasons or Truths excite, which shew them to be conducive to the *ultimate Ends*, and shew one Object to be more effectual than another: thus *subordinate Ends* may be called *reasonable*. But as to the *ultimate Ends*, to suppose exciting Reasons for them, would infer, that there is no *ultimate End*, but that we desire one thing for another in an infinite series.

No exciting
Reasons for
ultimate
Ends.

Thus ask a Being who desires *private Happiness*, or has *Self-Love*? "what Reason excites him to desire Wealth?" He will give this Reason, that "Wealth tends to procure Pleasure and Ease." Ask his Reason for desiring Pleasure or Happiness: One cannot imagine what Proposition he could assign as his *exciting Reason*. This Proposition is indeed true, "There is an *Instinct* or *Desire* fixed in his Nature, determining him to pursue his Happiness;" but it is not this *Reflection* on his own Nature, or this *Proposition* which excites or determines him, but the *Instinct* itself. This is a Truth, "*Rhubarb* strengthens the Stomach:" But 'tis not a *Proposition* which strengthens the Stomach, but the *Quality* in that Medicine. The Effect is not produced by *Propositions* shewing the *Cause*, but by the *Cause* itself.

In like manner, what Reason can a benevolent Being give, as exciting him to hazard his Life in just War? This perhaps, "such Conduct tends to the Happiness of his Country." Ask him, "why he serves his Country?" He will say, "His Country is a very valuable Part of Mankind." Why does he study the Happiness of Mankind? His Affections be really *disinterested*, he can give no exciting Reasons for it: The Happiness of Mankind in general,

ral, or of any valuable Part of it, is an *ultimate End* to that Series of Desires.

Men have We may transiently observe one Mistake, which many fall into, who in their Philosophical Inquiries have learned to form very *abstract general Ideas*: They suppose, because they have formed some Conception of an *infinite Good*, or *greatest possible Aggregate*, or *Sum of Happiness*, under which all *particular Pleasures* may be included; that there is also some *one great ultimate End*, with a view to which every *particular Object* is desired; whereas, in truth, each *particular Pleasure* is desired without farther view, as an *ultimate End* in the *selfish Desires*. 'Tis true, the *Prospect* of a greater inconsistent Pleasure may surmount or stop this Desire; so may the *Fear* of a prepollent Evil. But this does not prove, that "all Men have formed Ideas of infinite Good, or greatest possible Aggregate, or that they have any *Instinct* or *Desire*, without an Idea of its Object." Just so in the *benevolent Affections*, the *Happiness* of any one Person is an *ultimate End*, desired with no farther view: And yet the observing its *Inconsistency* with the *Happiness* of another more beloved, or with the *Happiness* of many, tho each one of them were but equally beloved may overcome the former Desire. Yet this will not prove that in each *kind Action* Men do form the abstract Conception of *all Mankind*, or the *System of Rationals*. The forming such large Conceptions is indeed useful, that we may gratify either our *Self-Love* or *kind Affections* in the fullest manner, as far as our Power extends; and may not content our selves with smaller Degrees either of *private* or *publick Good*, while greater are in our power: But when we have formed these Conceptions, we do not serve the *Individual* only from Love to the *Species*, no more than we desire *Grapes* with an Intention of the *greatest Aggregate* of Happiness, or from an Apprehension that they make a Part of the *General sum* of our Happiness. These Conceptions only serve to suggest *greater Ends* than would occur to us without Reflection; and by the *Prepollency* of one Desire toward the *greater Good*, either private or publick

lick, to stop the Desire toward the *smaller Good*, when it appears inconsistent with the greater.

Let us examine the Truths assigned as *exciting* to the Pursuit of publick Good, even by those, who, tho they allow *disinterested Affections*, and a *moral Sense*, yet suppose something *reasonable* in it antecedently. They assign such as these "publick Good is the End proposed by the DEITY." Then what *Reason* excites Men to concur with the DEITY? Is it this, "Concurring with the DEITY will make the Agent *happy*?" This is an *exciting Reason* indeed, but plainly supposes *Self-Love*: And let any one assign the *exciting Reason* to the Desire of Happiness. Is the Reason exciting to concur with the DEITY this, "The DEITY is our *Benefactor*?" Then what *Reason* excites to concur with Benefactors? Here we must recur to an *Instinct*. Is it this Truth, "The divine Ends are *reasonable*?" Then what means the Word *reasonable*? Does it mean, that "the Deity has *Reasons* exciting him to promote the publick Good?" What are these *Reasons*? Why, perhaps "we do not know them particularly, but in general are sure that the DEITY has *Reasons* for them." Then the Question recurs, What Reason excites us to *implicit Concurrence* with the Ends of the DEITY? The *Reasons* which excite *one Nature* may not excite another: The Tendency of an Action to the *Happiness of one Agent* may excite him, but will not excite another *Agent* to concur, unless there appears a like Tendency to the Happiness of that *other*. They may say, they are sure the *divine Ends* are good." What means *goodness*? Is it *moral* or *natural*? If the divine Ends be *natural Good*, i.e. *pleasant*, or the *Cause of Pleasure*, to whom is this *Pleasure*? If to the DEITY, then why do we study the Happiness or the pleasing of the DEITY? What *Reason* excites us? All the possible *Reasons* must either presuppose some *Affection*, if they are exciting; or some *moral Cause*, if they are justifying.—Is the divine End naturally good to us? This is an exciting Reason, but supposes *Self-Love*. If we say the divine Ends are *morally Good*, we

The common Reasons examined.

are just where we began. What is *moral Goodness*? *Conformity to Reason*. What are the *Reasons* exciting or justifying?

If any alledge as the Reason exciting us to pursue publick Good, this Truth, that "the Happiness of a System, a Thousand, or a Million, is a greater Quantity of Happiness than that of one Person: and consequently, if Men desire Happiness, they must have stronger Desires toward the greater Sum, than toward the less." This Reason still supposes an *Instinct toward Happiness* as previous to it: And again, To whom is the Happiness of a System a greater Happiness? To one Individual, or to the System? If to the Individual, then his Reason exciting his Desire of a happy System supposes *Self-Love*: If to the System, then what Reason can excite to desire the greater Happiness of a System, or any Happiness to be in the Possession of others? None surely which does not presuppose publick Affections. Without such Affections this Truth, "that a hundred Felicities is a greater Sum than one Felicity," will no more excite to study the Happiness of the Hundred, than this Truth, "an hundred Stones are greater than one," will excite a Man, who has no desire of Heaps to cast them together.

The same may be observed concerning that Proposition assigned by some as the *ultimate Reason* both exciting to and justifying the Pursuit of publick Good, viz. "It is best that all should be happy." Best is most good: Good to whom? To the Whole, or to each Individual? If to the former, when this Truth excites to Action, it must presuppose kind Affections; if it is good to each Individual, it must presuppose *Self-Love*.

The true
Meaning of
Reasons
exciting to
Actions,
and reason-
able Acti-
ons.

Let us once suppose Affections, *Instinctive Desires* previously implanted in our Nature and we shall easily understand exciting Reasons for Actions, viz. "These Truths which lead them to be conducive toward some mate End, or toward the greatest End that kind in our Power." He acts reasonably, who considers the various Actions in his Power, and forms true Opinions of their Tendency

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dependencies; and then chuses to do that which will obtain the highest Degree of *that*, to which the *Instincts* of his Nature incline him, with the smallest Degree of those things to which the *Affections* in his Nature make him averse.

More particularly, the *exciting Reasons* to a Nature which had only *selfish Affections*, are those Truths which shewed " what Object or Event would occasion to it the " greatest Quantity of *Pleasure*:" these would excite to the Prosecution of it. The *exciting Truths* about *Means*, would be only those which pointed out some Means as more certainly effectual than any other, or with less *Pain* or *Trouble* to the *Agent*. *Publick Usefulness* of *Ends* or *Means*, or *publick Hurtfulness* would neither excite nor dissuade, farther than the *publick State* might affect *that* of the *Agent*.

If there is any Nature with *publick Affections*: The Truths exciting to any *End* in this Order, are such as shew, " that any Event would promote the Happiness of " others." That *End* is called most *reasonable*, which our Reason discovers to contain a greater Quantity of *publick Good*, than any other in our power.

When any Event may affect both the *Agent* and *others*, if the *Agent* have both *Self-Love* and *publick Affections*, he acts according to that Affection which is *strongest*, when there is any *Opposition* of Interests; if there be no *Opposition*, he follows both. If he discovers this Truth, that his constant pursuit of *publick Good* is the most probable way of promoting his *own Happiness*," then his Pursuit is truly reasonable and constant; thus both Affections are at once gratify'd, and he is consistent with himself. Without knowledge of that Truth he does not act *reasonably* for his *own Happiness*, but follows it by *Means* not tending effectually to this *End*: and must frequently, from the power of *Self-Love*, neglect or counteract his other *End*, the *publick Good*. If there be also a *moral Sense* in such an *Agent*, while yet he is inadvertent to the *Connexion* of *private Happiness* with the *Study of the publick*; he must be perpetually yet more uneasy, either thro' the apprehended

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Neglect of *private Interest* when he serves the Publick; or when he pursues only *private Interest*, he will have perpetual Remorse and Dissatisfaction with his own Temper, thro' his *moral Sense*. So that the Knowledge of this Connexion of *private Interest*, with the Study of publick Good, seems absolutely necessary to preserve a constant Satisfaction of Mind, and to prevent an *alternate Prevalence* of seemingly contrary Desires.

Should any one ask even concerning these two *ultimate Ends*, *private Good* and *publick*, is not the latter more reasonable than the former?—What means the Word *reasonable* in this Question? If we are allowed to presuppose *Instincts* and *Affections*, then the Truth just now supposed to be discoverable concerning our State, is an *exciting Reason* to serve the *publick Interest*, since this Conduct is the most *effectual Means* to obtain both ends. But I doubt if any Truth can be assigned which *excites* in us either the Desire of *private Happiness* or *publick*. For the former none ever alledged any *exciting Reason*: and a *benevolent Temper* finds as little *Reason* exciting him to the latter, which he desires without any view to *private Good*. If the meaning of the Question be this, “does not every Spectator approve the Pursuit of publick Good more than private?” The Answer is obvious that he does: but not for any *Reason* or *Truth*, but from a *moral Sense*.

This leads to consider *Approbation* of Actions, whether it be for *Conformity to any Truth*, or *Reasonableness*, that Actions are ultimately approved, independently of any *moral Sense*? Or if all *justifying Reasons* do not presuppose it?

Justifying Reasons If *Conformity to Truth*, or *Reasonable*, denote nothing else but that “an Action is the *Object of a true Proposition*,” ’tis plain, that all Actions should be approved equally, since as many Truths may be made about the worst, as can be made about the best. See what was said above about *exciting Reasons*.

But let the *Truths* commonly assigned as *justifying* be examined. Here 'tis plain, *A Truth* "*shewing an Action to be fit to attain an End,*" does not justify it; nor do we approve a *subordinate End* for any Truth, which only shews it to be fit to promote the *ultimate End*; for the worst Actions may be conducive to their *Ends*, and *reasonable* in that Sense. The *justifying Reasons* then must be about the *Ends* themselves, especially the *ultimate Ends*. The Question then is, "Does a *Conformity to any Truth* make us approve an *ultimate End*, previously to any *moral Sense*?" For example, we approve *pursuing the publick Good*. For what Reason? or what is the *Truth* for *Conformity* to which we call it a *reasonable End*? I fancy we can find none in these Cases, more than we could give for our liking any *pleasant Fruit*.

The Reasons assigned are such as these; "*'Tis the End proposed by the DEITY.*" But why do we approve concurring with the divine Ends? This Reason is given, "*He is our Benefactor:*" But then, for what Reason do we approve *Concurrence with a Benefactor*? Here we must recur to a *Sense*. Is this the Reason moving to *Approbation*, *Study of publick Good tends to the Advantage of the Approver*?" Then the Quality moving us to approve an Action, is its being *advantageous to us*, and not *Conformity to Truth*. This Scheme is intelligible, but not true in fact. Men approve without Preception of *private Advantage*; and often do not condemn or disapprove what is plainly *pericious*; as in the Execution of a *just Sentence*, which even the Criminal may approve.

If any alledge, that this is the *justifying Reason* of the *Pursuit of publick Good*, "*that it is best all be happy,*" then we approve Actions for their *Tendency to that State which is best*, and not for *Conformity to Reason*. But here again, what means *best*? *morally best*, or *naturally best*? If the former, they explain the same Word by itself in a Circle: If they mean the latter, that "*it is the most happy State where men are happy,*" then, *most happy*, for whom? the *System*,

or the *Individual*? If for the former, what Reason makes us approve the *Happiness* of a *System*? Here we must recur to a *Sense* or kind *Affections*. Is it most happy for the *Individual*? Then the *Quality* moving *Approbation* is again *Tendency* to *private Happiness*, not *Reasonableness*.

There are some other *Reasons* assigned in *Obligation* Words differing from the former, but more *supposes* either *Aff-* confused, such as these: " 'Tis our *Duty* to study publick Good. We are obliged to do it. We owe *Obedience* to the Deity. The whole is to be preferred to a *Part*." But let these Words *Duty*, *Obligation*, *Owing*, and the meaning of that *Gerund*, is to be preferred, be explained; and we shall find our selves still at a *Loss* for exciting *Reasons* previously to *Affections*, or justifying *Reasons* without recourse to a *moral Sense*.

The meaning of *Obligation*. When we say one is obliged to an *Action*, we either mean, 1. That the *Action* is necessary to obtain *Happiness* to the *Agent*, or to avoid *Misery*: Or, 2. That every *Spectator*, or he himself upon *Reflection*, must approve his *Action*, and disapprove his omitting it, if he considers fully all its *Circumstances*. The former Meaning of the Word *Obligation* presupposes *selfish Affections*, and the *Senses* of *private Happiness*: The latter Meaning includes the *moral Sense*. Mr. *Barbeyrac*, in his *Annotations* upon *Grotius* *, makes *Obligation* denote an *indispensable Necessity* to act in a certain manner. Who ever observes his *Explication* of this *Necessity* (which is not natural otherwise no *Man* could act against his *Obligation*) will find that it denotes only " such a *Constitution* of a powerful Superior, as will make it impossible for any Being to obtain *Happiness*, or avoid *Misery*, but by such a *Course* of *Action*." This agrees with the former Meaning tho' sometimes he also includes the latter.

* *Lib. 1. Chap. 1. Sect. 10.*

Many other confused Definitions have been given of Obligation, by no obscure Names in the learned World. But let any one give a distinct Meaning different from the two above-mentioned. To pursue them all would be endless; only let the *Definitions* be substituted in place of the Word OBLIGATION, in other parts of each Writer, and let it be observed whether it makes good Sense or not.

Before we quit this Character *Reasonable*, let us consider the Arguments brought to prove that there must be some Standard of moral Good antecedent to any Sense. Say they, "*Perceptions of Sense* are deceitful, we must have some Perception or Idea of *Virtue* more stable and certain; this must be *Conformity to Reason*: *Truth* discovered by our *Reason* is certain and invariable: *That* then alone is the Original Idea of *Virtue*, *Agreement with Reason*." But in like manner our *Sight* and *Sense of Beauty* is deceitful, and does not always represent the true Forms of Objects. We must not call that *beautiful* or *regular*, which pleases the *Sight*, or an *internal Sense*; but *Beauty* in external Forms too, consists in *Conformity to Reason*. So our *Taste* may be vitiated: we must not say that *our* *Savour* is perceived by *Taste*, but must place the original Idea of *grateful Savours* in *Conformity to Reason*, and *ungrateful* in *Contrariety to Reason*. We may mistake the *real Extent of Bodies*, or their *Proportions*, by making a conclusion upon the first sensible Appearance: Therefore *Ideas of Extension* are not originally acquired by a *Sense*, but consist in *Conformity to Reason*.

Arguments for some Standard of Morals prior to a Sense Considered.

If what is intended in this *Conformity to Reason* be this, "That we should call no Action *virtuous*, unless we have some *Reason* to conclude it to be virtuous, or some *Truth* shewing it to be so." This is very true; but then in like manner we should count no Action *vicious*, unless we have some *Reason* for counting it so, or when 'tis *Truth* "that it is vicious." If this be intended *Conformity to Truth*, then at the same rate we may make

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Conformity to Truth the original of *Idea of Vice* as well as *Virtue*; nay, of every Attribute whatsoever. That *Taste* alone is *sweet*, which there is *Reason* to count *sweet*; that *Taste* alone is *bitter*, concerning which 'tis *true* that it is *bitter*; that *Form* alone is *beautiful*, concerning which 'tis *true* that it is *beautiful*; and that alone *deformed*, which is *truly deformed*. Thus *Virtue*, *Vice*, *Sweet*, *Bitter*, *Beautiful*, or *Deformed*, originally denote *Conformity to Reason*, antecedently to Perceptions of any *Sense*. The *Idea of Virtue* is particularly that concerning which 'tis *Truth*, that it is *Virtue*; or *Virtue* is *Virtue*; a wonderful Discovery!

So when some tell us, "That *Truth* is naturally pleasant, and more so than any *sensible Perception*; this must therefore engage Men more than any other Motive, in they attend to it." Let them observe, that as much *Truth* is known about *Vice* as *Virtue*. We may demonstrate the publick *Miseries* which would ensue upon *Perjury*, *Murder*, and *Robbery*. These Demonstrations would be attended with that *Pleasure* which is peculiar to *Truth*; as well as the Demonstrations of the publick *Happiness* to ensue from *Faith*, *Humanity* and *Justice*. There is equal *Truth* on both sides.

Whence it is that *Virtue* is called *reasonable* and not *Vice*. We may transiently observe what has occasioned the Use of the Word *reasonable*, as an Epithet of only *virtuous Actions*. Tho' we have *Instincts* determining us to desire *Ends* without supposing any previous *Reasoning*; yet 'tis by use of our *Reason* that we find out the Means of obtaining our *Ends*. When we do not use our *Reason*, we often are disappointed of our *End*. We therefore call those *Actions* which are *effectual* to their *Ends*, *reasonable* in one Sense of that Word.

Again, in all Men there is probably a *moral Sense*, making publickly useful *Actions* and kind *Affections* grateful to the Agent, and to every Observer: Most Men who have thought of human *Actions*, agree, that the publickly useful

are in the whole also *privately useful* to the Agent, either in this Life or the next : We conclude, that all Men have the *same Affections and Senses* : We are convinced by our Reason, that 'tis by publickly useful Actions alone that we can promote *all our Ends*. Whoever then acts in a contrary manner, we presume is *mistaken, ignorant of, or indifferent* to, these Truths which he might know ; and say he acts *unreasonably*. Hence some have been led to imagine, some *Reasons* either exciting or justifying previously to all *Affections* or a *moral Sense*.

Two Arguments are brought in defence of this Epithet, as antecedent to any Sense, *viz.* "That we judge even of our *Affections and Senses* themselves whether they are *morally Good or Evil*."

Objections from our judging even of our Affections and Senses themselves.

The second Argument is, that "if all *moral Ideas* depend upon the *Constitution* of our *Sense*, then all *Constitutions* would have been alike reasonable and good to the DEITY, which is absurd."

As to the first Argument, 'tis plain we judge of our own *Affections*, or those of others by our *moral Sense*, by which we approve kind *Affections*, and disapprove the contrary. But none can apply *moral Attributes* to the very *Faculty* of perceiving *moral Qualities*; or his *moral Sense* *morally Good or Evil*, any more than he is the *Power of Tasting*, *sweet*, or *bitter*; or of *Seeing*, *right* or *crooked*, *white* or *black*.

1. *That we judge our Senses themselves.*

Every one judges the *Affections* of others by his own *Sense*; so that it seems not impossible that in these *Senses* Men might differ as they do in *Temper*. A *Sense* approving *Benivolence* would disapprove *Malice*, which a *Sense* approving *Malice* would disapprove *Benivolence*. The former would judge of the latter by his own *Sense*, so would the latter of the former. Each one would

Answered.

at first view think the *Sense* of the other perverted. But then, is there no difference? Are both *Senses* equally good? No certainly, any *Man* who observed them would think the *Sense* of the former more desirable than of the latter; but this is, because the *moral Sense* of every *Man* is constituted in the former manner. But were there any Nature with no *moral Sense* at all observing these two Persons, would he not think the State of the former preferable to that of the latter? Yes he might: but not from any Perception of *moral Goodness* in the one *Sense* more than in the other. Any rational Nature observing two Men thus constituted, with opposite *Senses*, might by reasoning see, no *moral Goodness* in one *Sense* more than in the contrary, but a *Tendency to the Happiness of the Person himself*, who has the former *Sense* in the one Constitution, and a contrary *Tendency* in the opposite Constitution: nay the Persons themselves might observe this; since the former *Sense* would make these Actions grateful to the Agent which were useful to others; who, if they had a like *Sense*, would love him, and return good Offices; whereas the latter *Sense* would make all such Actions as are useful to others, and to engage their good Offices, ungrateful to the Agent; and would lead him into publicly hurtful Actions, which would not only procure the Hatred of others, if they had a contrary *Sense*, but engage them out of their Self-Love to study his Destruction, tho' their *Senses* agreed. Thus an Observer, or the Agent himself with this latter *Sense*, might perceive that the Pains to be feared, as the Consequence of malicious Actions, did over-balance the Pleasure of this *Sense*; so that it would be to the Agent's Interest to counteract it. Thus one Constitution of the *moral Sense* might appear to be more advantageous to those who have it, than the contrary; as we may call that *Sense* of Taste *healthful*, which made wholesome Meat pleasant; and would call a contrary *Taste* *pernicious*. And yet we should no more call the *moral Sense* *morally good* or *evil*, than we call the *Sense* of Tasting *savoury* or *unsavoury*, *sweet* or *bitter*.

But must we not own, that we judge of all our *Senses* by our *Reason*, and often correct their *Reports* of the *Magnitude, Figure, Colour, Taste* of Objects, and pronounce them *right or wrong*, as they agree or disagree with *Reason*? This is true. But does it then follow, that *Extension, Figure, Colour, Taste*, are not *sensible Ideas*, but only denote *Reasonableness*, or *Agreement with Reason*? Or that these *Qualities* are perceivable antecedently to any *Sense*, by our *Power of finding out Truth*? Just so a *compassionate Temper* may rashly imagine the *Correction of a Child*, or the *Execution of a Criminal*, to be cruel and inhuman: but by *Reasoning* may discover the *superior Good* arising from them in the whole; and then the same *moral Sense* may determine the *Observer* to approve them. But we must not hence conclude, that it is any *reasoning* antecedent to a *moral Sense*, which determines us to approve the *Study of publick Good*, any more than we can in the former Case conclude, that we perceive *Extension, Figure, Colour, Taste*, antecedently to a *Sense*. All these *Sensations* are often corrected by *Reasoning*, as well as our *Approbations* of *Actions* as *Good or Evil**: and yet no *Body* ever placed the *Original Idea* of *Extension, Figure, Colour, or Taste*, in *Conformity to Reason*.

Thus tho' no *Man* can immediately either *approve or disapprove* as *morally good or evil* his own *moral Sense*, by which he approves only *Affections* and *Actions* consequent upon them; yet he may see whether it be *advantageous* to him in other respects, to have it constituted *one way* rather than another. *One Constitution* may make these *Actions* grateful to this *Sense* which tend to procure *other Pleasures* &c. A *contrary Constitution* may be known to the very person himself to be *disadvantageous*, as making these *Actions* immediately grateful, which shall occasion all *other* sorts of *Misery*. His *Self-Love* may excite him, tho' with

* See Sect. 4. of this Treatise.

inward *Dissatisfaction*, to counteract this Sense, in order to avoid a greater Evil. Mr. Hobbes seems to have had no better Notions of the *natural State* of Mankind. An Observer, who was *benevolent*, would desire that all had the former sort of *Sense*; a *malicious Observer*, if he feared no Evil to himself, from the Actions of the Persons observed, would desire the *latter Constitution*. If this Observer had a *moral Sense*, he would think that *Constitution* which was contrary to his own, *strange and surprizing, or unnatural*. If the Observer had no *Affections* towards others, and were disjoined from Mankind, so as to have neither *Hopes* nor *Fears* from their Actions, he would be indifferent about their *Constitutions*, and have no *Desire* or *Preference* of one above another; tho' he might see which were *advantageous* to them, and which *pernicious*.

The 2d Objection, that all Constitutions would have been alike reasonable, answered.

As to the second Argument, - What means [alike reasonable or good to the DEITY?] Does it mean, "that the DEITY could have had no Reason exciting him to make one Constitution rather than another?" 'Tis plain, if the DEITY had nothing essential to his Nature, corresponding to our sweetest and most kind Affections, we can scarce suppose he could have any Reason exciting him to do anything he has done: but grant such a Disposition in the DEITY, and then the manifest Tendency of the present Constitution to the Happiness of his Creatures was an exciting Reason for chusing it before the contrary. Each sort of Constitution might have given Men an equal immediate Pleasure in present Self-Approbation for any sort of Action; but the Actions approved by the present Sense, procure Pleasures of the other Senses; and the Actions which would have been approved by a contrary moral Sense, would have been productive of all Torments of the other Senses.

If it be meant, that "upon this Supposition, that all Approbation presupposes in us a moral Sense, the DEITY could not have approved one Constitution more than another:" where is the Consequence? Why may not

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Deity have something of a superior Kind, analogous to our *moral Sense*, essential to him? How does any Constitution of the *Senses of Men* hinder the DEITY to reflect and judge of his own Actions; How does it affect the divine Apprehension, which way soever *moral Ideas* arise with Men?

If it means "that we cannot approve of one Constitution more than another, or approve the DEITY for making the Present Constitution:" This Consequence is also false. The present Constitution of our *moral Sense* determines us to approve all kind Affections: This Constitution the DEITY must have foreseen as tending to the Happiness of his Creatures; it does therefore evidence kind Affections or Benevolence in the DEITY, this therefore we must approve.

We have got some strange Phrases, "that some things are antecedently reasonable in the Nature of the thing," which some insist upon: "That otherwise, say they, if before Man was created, any Nature without a moral Sense had existed, this Nature would not have approved as morally good in the Deity, his constituting our Sense as it is at present." Very true; and what next? If there had been no *moral Sense* in that Nature, there would have been no Perception of Morality. But "could not such Natures have seen something reasonable in one Constitution more than in another?" They might no doubt have reasoned about the various Constitutions, and foreseen that the present one would tend to the Happiness of Mankind, and would evidence Benevolence in the DEITY: So also they might have reasoned about the contrary Constitution, that it would make Men miserable, and evidence Malice in the Deity. They would have reasoned about both, and found out Truths: are both Constitutions alike reasonable to these Observers? No, say they, the benevolent one is reasonable, and the malicious unreasonable." And yet these Observers reasoned and discovered Truths about both: An Action then is called by us reasonable when 'tis benevolent, and unreasonable when malici-

The meaning of antecedent Reasonableness.

ous. This is plainly making the Word *reasonable* denote whatever is approved by our moral Sense, without Relation to true Propositions. We often use that Word in such a confused Manner: But these antecedent Natures, supposed without a moral Sense, would not have approved one Constitution of the DEITY as morally better than another.

Had it been left to the Choice of these antecedent Minds what manner of Sense they would have desired for Mankind; would they have seen no difference? Yes they would according to their Affections which are presupposed in Elections. If they were benevolent, as we suppose the DEITY, the Tendency of the present Sense to the Happiness of Men would have excited their Choice. Had they been malicious, as we suppose the Devil, the contrary Tendency of the contrary Sense would have excited their Election of it. But is there nothing preferable, or eligible antecedently to all Affections too? No certainly, unless there can be Desire without Affections, or superior Desire, i. e. Election antecedently to all Desire.

Reasons for Election different from those for Approbation.

Some do farther perplex this Subject, asserting, that "the same Reasons determining Approbation, ought also to excite to Election." Here, 1. We often see justifying Reasons where we can have no Election viz. when we observe the Actions of others which were even prior to our Existence.

2. The Quality moving us to Election very often can excite Approbation; viz. private usefulness, not public pernicious. This both does and ought to move Election and yet I believe few will say, "they approve as virtuous the eating a Bunch of Grapes, taking a Glass of Wine, or sitting down when one is tired." Approbation is not what we can voluntarily bring upon our selves. When we are contemplating Actions, we do not choose to approve, because Approbation is pleasant; otherwise we would always approve, and never condemn any Action because this is some way uneasy. Approbation is plain Perception arising without previous Volition, or Choice.

it, because of any *concomitant Pleasure*. The occasion of it is the *Perception of benevolent Affections* in our selves, or the discovering the like in others, even when we are incapable of any *Action or Election*. The *Reasons* determining *Approbation* are such as shew that an *Action* evidenced *kind Affections*, and that in *others*, as often as in *our selves*. Whereas, the *Reasons* moving to *Election* are such as shew the *Tendency of an Action to gratify some Affection* in the Agent.

The *Prospect* of the Pleasure of *Self-Approbation*, is indeed often a Motive to *chuse* one *Action* rather than another; but this supposes the *moral Sense*, or Determination to *approve*, prior to the *Election*. Were *Approbation* voluntarily chosen, from the Prospect of its concomitant Pleasure, then there could be no *Condemnation* of our own *Actions*, for that is unpleasant.

As to that confused Word [ought] 'tis needless to apply to it again all that was said about *Obligation*.



S E C T. II.

*Concerning that Character of Virtue and Vice,
The Fitness or Unfitness of Actions.*

*The Fitness
and Unfit-
ness in
Morals.*

WE come next to examine some other Explications of Morality, which have been much insisted on of late. * We are told, "that there are eternal and immutable Differences of Things, absolutely and antecedently: that there are also eternal and unalterable Relations in the Natures of the Things themselves from which arise Agreements and Disagreements, Conformities and Incongruities, Fitness and Unfitness of the Application of Circumstances, to the Qualifications of Persons; that Actions agreeable to these Relations are morally Good, and that the contrary Actions are morally Evil." These Expressions are sometimes made of the same Import with those more common ones: "acting agreeably to the eternal Reason and Truth of Things." 'Tis asserted that "God who knows all these Relations, &c. does guide his Actions by them, since he has no wrong Affection (the Word [wrong] should have been first explained) And that in like manner these Relations, &c. ought to determine (another unlucky Word in Morals) "to determine the Choice of all Rationals, abstractly from any Views of Interest. If they do not, these Creatures are insolent, counteracting their Creator, and as far as they can, making things to be what they are not, which is the greatest Impiety."

* See Dr. Samuel Clarke's Boyle's Lectures; and many late Authors.

That Things are now *different* is certain. That *Ideas*, to which there is no *Object* yet existing conformable, are also *different*, is certain. That upon comparing two *Ideas* there arises a *relative Idea*, generally when the two *Ideas* compared have in them any *Modes of the same simple Idea*, is also obvious. Thus every *extended Being* may be compared to any other of the same *Kinds of Dimensions*; and *relative Ideas* be formed of *greater, less, equal, double, triple, subduple*, &c. with infinite variety. This may let us see that *Relations* are not *real Qualities* inherent in external Natures, but only *Ideas* necessarily accompanying our *Perception* of two *Objects* at once, and comparing them. *Relative Ideas* do continue, when the external *Objects* do not exist, provided we retain the *two Ideas*. But what the *eternal Relations* in the Natures of Things do mean, is not so easy perhaps to be conceived.

To shew particularly how far *Morality* can be concerned in *Relations*, we may consider them under these three Classes. 1. The *Relations of inanimate Objects*, as to their *Quantity, or active and passive Powers*, as explained by Mr. Locke. 2. The *Relations of inanimate Objects to rational Agents as to their active or passive Powers*. 3. The *Relations of rational Agents among themselves, founded on their Powers or Actions past or continued*. Now let us examine what *Fitnesses or Unfitnesses* arise from any of these *sorts of Relations*, in which the *Morality* of *Actions* may consist; and whether we can place *Morality* in them, without presupposing a *moral Sense*. 'Tis plain, that ingenious Author says nothing against the Supposition of a *moral Sense*: But many do imagine, that his Account of *moral Ideas* is independent upon a *moral Sense*, and therefore are less willing to allow that we have such an immediate *Perception, or Sense of Virtue and Vice*. What follows is not intended to oppose his Scheme, but rather to suggest what seems a necessary Explication of it; by shewing that it is no otherwise intelligible, but upon Supposition of a *moral Sense*.

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1. Relations of *inanimate Objects* being known, puts it in the Power of a rational Agent often to *diversify* them, to *change* their *Forms, Motions, or Qualities* of any kind, at his pleasure: but no body apprehends any *Virtue or Vice* in such Actions, where no *Relation* is apprehended to a *rational Agent's Happiness or Misery*; otherwise we should have got into the Class of *Virtues* all the practical *Mathematicks*, and the Operations of *Chymistry*.

2. As to the *Relations of inanimate Objects to rational Agents*; the Knowledge of them equally puts it in one's Power to *destroy Mankind*, as to preserve them. Without presupposing *Affections*, this Knowledge will not excite to one Action rather than another; nor without a *moral Sense* will it make us approve any Action more than its contrary. The Relation of *Corn* to human Bodies being known to a Person of *kind Affections*, was perhaps the *exciting Reason* of teaching Mankind *Husbandry*: But the Knowledge of the *Relations of Arsenick* would excite a *malicious Nature*, just in the same manner, to the greatest *Mischief*. A *Sword*, an *Halter*, a *Musket*, bears the *same Relation* to the Body of an *Hero*, which they do to a *Robber*. The killing of either is equally agreeable to these *Relations*, but not equally good in a *moral Sense*. The Knowledge of *these Relations* neither excites to Actions, nor justifies them, without presupposing either *Affections* or a *moral Sense*. *Kind Affections* with such Knowledge make *Heroes*; *malicious Affections*, *Villains*.

3. The last sort of *Relations* is that among *rational Agents*, founded on their *Actions* or *Affections*; whence one is called *Creator*, another *Creature*; one *Benefactor*, the other *Beneficiary* (if that Word may be used in this general Sense:) the one *Parent*, the other *Child*; the one *Governor*, the other *Subject*, &c. Now let us see what *Fitness* or *Unfitnesses* arise from these Relations.

Then

There is certainly, independently of *Fancy* or *Custom*, a *natural Tendency* in some Actions to give *Pleasure*, either to the Agent or to others; and a *contrary Tendency* in other Actions to give *Pain*, either to the Agent or others: This sort of *Relation* of Actions to the *Agents* or *Objects* is indisputable. If we call these Relations *Fitnesses*, then the most contrary Actions have *equal Fitnesses* for contrary Ends; and each one is *unfit* for the End of the other. Thus *Compassion* is *fit* to make others happy, and *unfit* to make others miserable. *Violation of Property* is *fit* to make Men miserable, and *unfit* to make them happy. Each of these is both *fit* and *unfit*, with respect to different Ends. The bare *Fitness then to an End*, is not the Idea of moral Goodness.

Perhaps the *virtuous Fitness* is that of *Ends*. The *Fitness* of a *subordinate End* to the ultimate, cannot constitute the Action good, unless the *ultimate End* be good. To keep a *Conspiracy secret* is not a good End, tho' it be fit for obtaining a farther End, the *Success of the Conspiracy*. The *moral Fitness* must be that of the *ultimate End* it self: The *publick Good* alone is a *fit End*, therefore the *Means* fit for this *End* alone are good.

What means the *Fitness of an ultimate End*? For what is it fit? Why, 'tis an *ultimate End*, not fit for any thing farther, but *absolutely fit*. What means that Word *fit*? If it notes a *simple Idea* it must be the *Perception of some Sense*: thus we must recur, upon this Scheme too, to a *moral Sense*.

If *Fitness* be not a *simple Idea*, let it be defined. Some tell us, that it is "an *Agreement of an Affection, Desire, Action, or End, to the Relations of Agents*." But what means *Agreement*? Which of these four Meanings has it? 1. We say one *Quantity* agrees with another of equal *Dimensions* every way. 2. A *Corollary* agrees with a *Theorem*; when our knowing the

Agreement with Relations presupposes also a moral Sense.

Then the

the latter to be Truth, leads us to know that the former is also a true Proposition. 3. Meat agrees with that Body which it tends to preserve. 4. Meat agrees with the Taste of that Being in whom it raises a pleasant Perception. If any one of these are the Meanings of Agreement in the Definition, then one of these is the Idea of *Fitness*. 1. That an Action or Affection is of the same Bulk and Figure with the Relation. Or, 2. When the Relation is a true Proposition, so is the Action or Affection. Or, 3. The Action or Affection tends to preserve the Relation; and contrary Actions would destroy it: So that, for instance, God would be no longer related to us as Creator and Benefactor, when we disobeyed him. Or, 4. The Action raises pleasant Perceptions in the Relation. All these Expressions seem absurd.

These Gentlemen probably have some other Meanings to these Words *Fitness* or *Agreement*. I hope what is said will shew the need for Explication of them, tho' they be so common. There is one Meaning perhaps intended, however it be obscurely expressed, That "certain Affections or Actions of an Agent, standing in a certain Relation to other Agents, is approved by every Observer, or raises in him a grateful Perception, or moves the Observer to love the Agent." This Meaning is the same with the Notion of pleasing a moral Sense.

Whoever explains *Virtue* or *Vice* by *Justice* or *Injustice*, *Right* or *Wrong*, uses only more ambiguous Words, which will equally lead to acknowledge a moral Sense.

S E C T III.

Mr. Woolaston's Significancy of Truth, as
the Idea of Virtue considered.

MR. Woolaston * has introduced a new Explication of
moral Virtue, viz. *Significancy of Truth in Actions*,
supposing that in every Action there is some *Significancy*,
like to that which *Moralists* and *Civilians* speak of in
their *Tacit Conventions*, and *Quasi Contractus*!

The Word *Signification* is very common, *Significati-*
at a little Reflection will shew it to be very on *where-*
ambiguous. In *Signification of Words* these in it *con-*
ings are included: 1. An *Association of an* *sists*.
Idea with a Sound, so that when any Idea is
formed by the Speaker, the *Idea of a Sound* accompanies
2. The *Sound perceived* by the Hearer excites the *Idea*
which it is connected. 3. In like manner a *Judgment* in
the Speaker's Mind is accompanied with the *Idea of a Con-*
nation of Sounds. 4. This *Combination of Sounds* heard
excites the *Apprehension* of that *Judgment* in the Mind of
the Hearer. Nothing farther than these Circumstances
seems to be denoted by *Signification*.

Hearing a Proposition does not of it self *Conclusions*
produce either *Assent* or *Dissent*, or *Opinion* drawn
the Hearer, but only presents to his Appre- from
hension the *Judgment*, or *Thema Complexum*. Speech.
the Hearer himself often forms *Judgments*

In his Religion of Nature delineated.

Q

or

or *Opinions* upon this occasion, either immediately without Reasoning, or by some short *Argument*. These *Opinions* are some one or more of the following *Propositions*. 1. *That a Sound is perceived, and a Judgment apprehended*. 2. *Such a Person caused the Sound heard*. 3. *The Speaker intended to excite in the Hearer the Idea of the Sound, and the Apprehension of the Judgment, or Thema Complexum*. This Judgment is not always formed by the Hearer, nor is it always true, when Men are heard speaking. 4. *The Speaker intended to produce Assent in the Hearer*: This Judgment is not always true. 5. *The Speaker assents to the Proposition spoken*: This Judgment in the Hearer is often false, and is formed upon Opinion of the Speaker's *Veracity*, speaking what expresses his *Opinion* usually. 6. *The Speaker does not assent to the Proposition spoken*: This Judgment of the Hearer is often false, when what is spoken is every way true. 7. *The Speaker intended that the Hearer should believe or judge, "that the Proposition spoken was assented to by the Speaker."* 8. *The Speaker had the contrary Intention, to that supposed in the last Judgment*: Both these last Judgments may be false, when the Proposition spoken every way true. 9. *The Proposition spoken represents the Object as it is, or is logically true*. 10. *The Proposition spoken does not represent the Object as it is, or it is logically false*.

Morality does not consist in Significancy.

As to the first four *Circumstances* which make up the proper *Significancy* of Speech 'tis scarce possible that any one should perceive a *moral Good* or *Evil* in them. Whether the Proposition were logically true or false, having a bare *Apprehension* of it as a *Thema Complexum*, or raising this in another, without intending to produce *Assent* or *Dissent*, can have no more *moral Good* or *Evil* in it, than the *Reception* of any other *Idea* raising it in another. This *Significancy* of *Falseness* is found in the very *Propositions* given in *Schools*, as *Instances* of *Falseness*, *Absurdity*, *Contradiction to Truth*, or *Blasphemy*, pronouncing of which, are *Actions* signifying more properly than most of our other *Actions*; and yet no body condemns them as immoral.

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As to the *Opinions* formed by the Hearer, they are all his own *Action* as much as any other *Conclusion* or *Judgment* formed from *Appearances* of any sort whatsoever. They are true or false, according to the Sagacity of the Observer, or his *Caution*. The Hearer may form perfectly true *Opinions* or *Judgments*, when the Speaker is guilty of the basest *Fraud*; and may form false *Judgments*, when the Speaker is perfectly *innocent*, and spoke nothing false in any Sense.

Nor in
Conclu-
sions form-
ed by Hear-
ers.

The *Evils* which may follow from the false *Judgments* of the Hearer, are no otherwise chargeable on the *Speaker*, than as the evil *Consequences* of another's *Action* of any kind may be chargeable upon any Person who co-operated; by his *Action* or *Omission*, the *Consequence* of which he might have foreseen, did either actually intend this Evil, or wanted that *Degree of kind Affection*, which would have inclined him to have prevented it.

The *Intention* of the *Speaker* is what all *Moralists* have hitherto imagined the *Virtue* or *Vice* of Words did depend upon, and not the bare *Significancy* of Truth or Falshood. This *Intention* is either, 1. To lead the Hearer to a true or false *Opinion* about the *Sentiments* of the *Speaker*. 2. To make the Hearer assent to the *Proposition* spoken. Or, 3. Both to make the Hearer assent to the *Proposition*, and judge that the *Speaker* also assents to it. Or, To accomplish some End, by means of the Hearer's assent to the *Proposition* spoken. This End may be known by the *Speaker* to be either *publicly useful*, or *publicly hurtful*.

The Mo-
rality of
Speech in
the Inten-
tion.

Some *Moralists* * of late have placed all *Virtue* in *Speech* in the *Intention* of the last kind, viz. " Accomplishing

" some publicly useful End, by speaking either *logical Truth* or *Falshood*: and that all *Vice* in speaking, consists in intending to effect something *publicly hurtful* by Speech, whether *logically true or false*, and known to be such; or by using Speech in a manner which we may foresee would be *publicly hurtful*, whether we actually *intend* this evil Consequence or not." Some stricter *Moralists* assert, that " the *publick Evils* which would ensue from destroying mutual Confidence, by allowing to speak *Propositions known to be false* on any occasion, are so great, that no particular *Advantage* to be expected from speaking *known logical Falshoods*, can ever overballance them; that all use of Speech supposes a *tacit Convention of Sincerity*, the *Violation* of which is always evil." Both sides in this Argument agree, that the *moral Evil* in Speech consists either in some *direct malicious Intention*, or a *Tendency to the publick Detriment* of Society; which *Tendency* the Agent might have *foreseen*, as connected with his Action, had he not *wanted* that Degree of *good Affections* which makes Men *attentive* to the Effects of their Actions. Never was bare *Significancy of Falshood* made the Idea of *moral Evil*. Speaking *logical Falshood* was still looked upon as innocent in many cases. Speaking *contrary to Sentiment*, or *moral Falshood*, was always proved evil, from some *publicly hurtful Tendency*, and not supposed as evil *immediately*, or the same Idea with *Vice*. The *Intention to deceive* was the Foundation of the Guilt. This Intention the Speaker studies to *conceal*, and does not *signify* it: It is an *Act of the Will*, neither *signified* by his Words, nor itself *signifying* any thing else.

This Point deserved Consideration, because if any Action be *significant*, 'tis certainly the *Act of Speaking*: And yet even in this the *Virtue* is not the *Significancy of Truth* nor the *Vice* the *signifying Falshood*.

The Significancy of Actions.

The Signification of some Actions depends upon a like Association of Ideas with them made either by Nature, or arbitrarily, and by Custom, as with Sounds. Letters are by Custom

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from the Signs of Sounds. A Shriek or Groan is a natural Sign of Fear or Pain: A Motion of the Hand or Head may signify Assent, Dissent, or Desire. The cutting down tall Poppies was an answer: The sending Spurs, advice to Flight: Kindling many Fires raises the Opinion of an Encampment: Raising a Smoke will raise Opinion of Fire.

The most important Distinction of Signs is this, that *

1. "Some *Appearances* are the Occasion upon which an Observer, by his *own reasoning*, forms a Judgment, without supposing, or having reason to believe, that the Agent, who caused these Appearances, did it with *design* to communicate his Sentiments to others; or when the Actions are such as are usually done by the Agent, without designing to raise Opinions in Observers.
2. Some Actions are never used but with *professed Design* to convey the Opinions of the Agent to the Observer; or such as the Observer infers nothing from, but upon having reason to believe that the Causer of the Appearance intended to convey some Sentiment to the Observer."
3. Other Signs are used, when "the Signifier gives no reason to conclude any other Intention, but only to raise an Apprehension of the Judgment, or the Thema Complexum, without professing any design to communicate his Sentiments, or to produce any Assent in the Observer."

To do Actions from which the Observer will form false Opinions, without having reason to imagine an Intention in the Agent, is never of itself imagined evil, let the Signs be natural or instituted; provided there be no malicious Intention, or neglect of publick Good. 'Tis never called a Crime in a Teacher, to pronounce an absurd Sentence for an instance; in a Nobleman, to travel without Coronets; or a Clergyman in Lay-Habit, for private Conveniency, or to avoid troublesome Ceremony; to leave Lights in a Lodge, to make People conclude there is a Watch kept. This Sig-

* See Grotius de Jure Bell. Lib. 3. c. 1.

nificancy may be in any Action which is observed; but as true Conclusions argue no Virtue in the Agent, so false ones argue no Vice.

Raising false Opinions designedly by the second Sort of Signs, which reasonably lead the Observer to conclude Intention in the Agent to communicate his Sentiments, whether the Signs be customary, instituted, or natural, is generally evil, when the Agent knows the Falshood; since it tends to diminish mutual Confidence. To send Spurs to a Friend, whom the Sender imagines to be in no danger, to deceive by Hieroglyphicks or Painting, is as criminal as a false Letter. This Significancy occurs in very few human Actions: Some of the most important Virtues profess no design of communicating Sentiments, or raising Opinions either true or false: Nor is there any more Intention in some of the most vicious Actions. Again, who can imagine any Virtue in all Actions, where there is this Significancy of Truth with Intention? Is it Virtue to say at *Christmases*, that "the Mor-nings are sharp?" to beckon with the Hand, in sign of Assent to such an Assertion? And in false Propositions thus signified by Actions or Words, there is no Evil apprehended where the Falshood is only logical. When the Falshood is known by the Agent, the Evil is not imagined in the Significancy, but in doing what one may foresee tends to breed Distrust in Society. And did all moral Evil consist in moral Falshood, there could be no Sins of Ignorance. If Mr. Woolaston alledges, that "Ignorance of some things signifies this Falshood, viz. We are not obliged to know the Truth:" This Falshood is not signified with Intention, nor is it moral Falshood, but only logical: since no Man in an Error knows that "he is obliged to know the contrary Truth." Mr. Woolaston's use of the Words [ought] or [obliged] without a distinct Meaning, is not peculiar to this Place.

The third sort of Significancy of Falshood is never apprehended as morally Evil: if it were, then every Dramatic Writer drawing evil Characters, every History Painter, every Writer of Allegories, or Epicks, every Philosopher teach-

ing the Nature of *contradictory Propositions*, would be thought criminal,

But since only the *first sort of Significancy* can be in all Actions, and that too supposing that every Action whatsoever is *observed* by some Being or other: Let us see if this will account for *Morality*. Perhaps either, 1st,

“ Every Action is *good* which leads the Observer into *true Opinions* concerning the *Sentiments of the Agent*, whether the *Agent's Opinions* be *true or false*.” Or, 2dly,
 “ That Action is *good* which leads the Observer into *true Opinions* concerning the *Object, the Tendency of the Action, and the Relation between the Agent and the Object*.”

Did *Virtue* consist in this *first sort of Significancy* of Truth, it would depend not upon the *Agent* but the *Sagacity of the Observer*: The acute Penetration of one would constitute an *Action virtuous*, and the Rashness or Stupidity of another would make it *vicious*: And the most *barbarous Actions* would raise no *false Opinion of the Sentiments of the Agent*, in a judicious Observer.

The *second sort of Significancy* would also make *Virtue* consist in the *Power of Observers*. An exact Reasoner would receive no *false Opinion* from the worst Action concerning the *Object or Relation* of the Agent to it: And a *false Opinion* might be formed by a weak Observer of a *perfectly good Action*.——An Observer who knew an Agent to have the *basest Temper*, would not from his worst Action conclude any thing *false* concerning the *Object*: And all such *false Opinions* would arise only upon Supposition that *the Agent was virtuous*.

But may it not be said, that “ whether Men reason well “ about Actions or not, there are some *Conclusions really deducible from every Action*? It is a *Datum* from which “ something may be inferred by *just Consequence*, whether “ any one actually inters it or not. Then may not this “ *Quality in Actions, whether we call it Significancy or* “ not,

"not, that only true Propositions can be inferred from them
 "by just Reasoning, be moral Goodness? And may it not be
 "the very Idea of moral Evil in Actions, that some false
 "Conclusions can by just Consequence be deduced from them?"
 Or if we will not allow these to be the very Ideas of moral
 Good and Evil, "are they not universal just Characters to
 "distinguish the one from the other?"

One may here observe in general, that since the Existence
 of the Action is supposed to be a true *Premise* or *Datum*,
 no false Conclusion can possibly be inferred from it by just
Reasoning. We could perhaps often justly infer, that the
 Agent had false Opinions; but then this Conclusion of the
 Observer, viz. "that the Agent has false Opinions," is
 really true.

True Conclu-
 sions deducible
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But again, it will not make an universal
 Character of good Actions, that a just Rea-
 soner would infer from them, that "the
 "Opinions of the Agent are true." For it
 is thus Men must reason from Actions;
 viz. *Given the Constitution of Nature, the*
Affections of Agents, and the Action, to
conclude concerning the Opinions: Or more generally given
 any three of these to conclude the fourth. Thus suppose the
 "Constitution of Nature such, that the private Interest of
 "each Individual is connected with the publick Good:" Sup-
 pose an Agent's Affections selfish only, then from a publick-
 ly useful Action we infer, that "the Agent's Opinions are
 "true:" And from a publickly hurtful Action conclude his
 Opinions to be false.

The same Constitution supposed with publick Affections
 as well as selfish. The observing a kind or publickly useful
 Action, will not immediately infer, that the Agent's Op-
 inions are either true or false: With false Opinions he might
 do publickly useful Actions out of his publick Affections, in
 those cases wherein they are not apparently opposite to his
 Interest. A publick Action opposite to some present pri-
 vate Interest, would generally evidence true Opinions; or

if the *Opinions* were false, that his *publick Affections* were in this Case much stronger than his *Self-Love*. A cruel Action would indeed evidence *false Opinions*.

Suppose the *same Constitution* in all other respects, with *malicious Affections* in an Agent. A *cruel or ungrateful Action* would not always prove the *Opinions of the Agent* to be false; but only that his *Malice* in this Instance, was more violent than regard to his *Interest*. A *beneficent Action* would prove only one of these two, either that his *Opinions of the Constitution*, were true; or, that if he was mistaken about the *Constitution*, he had also a *false Opinion* of the natural Tendency of the Action. Thus *false Opinions* may be evidenced by contrary Actions.

Suppose "a *Constitution wherein a private Interest could be advanced in Opposition to the publick*" (this we may call an *evil Constitution*;) Suppose only *Self-Love* in the Agent, then a *publickly useful Action*, any way *toilsome or expensive* to the Agent, would evidence *false Opinions*: And the most *cruel selfish Actions* would evidence *true Opinions*.

In an *evil Constitution*, suppose *kind Affections* in the Agent; a *publickly useful Action* would not certainly argue either *true or false Opinions*. If his *Opinions* were true, but *kind Affections* stronger than *Self-Love*, he might act in the same manner, as if his *Opinions* were false, and *Self-Love* the reigning Affection.

In an *evil Constitution*, suppose *malicious Affections* in an Agent, all *publickly useful Actions* would argue *false Opinions*; and *publickly hurtful Actions* would argue *true ones*.

This may shew us that *Mens Actions* are generally *publickly useful*, when they have *true Opinions*, only on this account; that we neither have *malicious Affections* naturally, nor is there any probability, in our present *Constitution*, of promoting a *private Interest* separately from, or in Opposition to the *Publick*. Were there contrary *Affections* and a con-

contrary *Constitution*, the most cruel Actions might flow from *true Opinions*; and consequently *publickly useful Actions* might flow from false ones.

How far it is a Character of Virtue, that it flows from true Opinions.

In our present *Constitution*, 'tis probable no Person would ever do any thing publickly hurtful, but upon some false Opinion. The *flowing from true Opinions* is indeed a tolerable Character or Property of *Virtue*, and *flowing from some false Opinion* a tolerable Character of *Vice*; tho' neither be strictly universal.

But, 1. This is not proper *Signification*. A judicious Observer never imagines any *Intention to communicate Opinions* in some of the most important Actions, either good or evil. 2. Did an Action *signifie Falshood*, 'tis generally only *logical*. 3. The *false Opinion* in the Agent is not the *Quality* for which the evil Action is *condemned*; nor is the *true Opinion* that for which the good Action is *approved*. True Opinions in Agents often *aggravate Crimes*, as they shew higher Degrees of *evil Affection*, or total *Absence of good*. And *false Opinions* generally *extenuate Crimes*, unless when the very Ignorance or Error has flowed from *evil Affection*, or total *Absence of good*.

'Tis surprizing, for Instance, how any should place the *Evil of Ingratitude* in *denying* the Person injured, to have been a *Benefactor*. The Observer of such an Action, if he supposed the Agent had really that *false Opinion*, would think the Crime the less for it: But if he were convinced that the Agent had a *true Opinion*, he would think his *Ingratitude* the more odious. Where we most abhor Actions, we suppose often *true Opinions*: And sometimes admire Actions flowing even from *false Opinions*, when they have evidenced no want of good Affection.

To write a Censure upon a Book so well designed as Mr. Woolaston's, and so full of very good Reasoning upon the most useful Subjects, would not evidence much good Nature. But allowing him his *just Praise*, to remark any

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Ambiguities or Inadvertencies which may lead Men into Confusion in their Reasoning, I am confident would have been acceptable to a Man of so much Goodness, when he was living.

One may see that he has had some other Idea of *moral Good*, previous to this *Significancy of Truth*, by his introducing, in the very Explication of it, Words presupposing the *Ideas of Morality* previously known: Such as [*Right*,] [*Obligation*,] [*Lye*,] [*his*] denoting [*Property*.]

Mr. Woolaston acknowledges that there may be very little *evil* in some Actions signifying Falshood; such as *throwing away that which is of but little Use or Value*. It is objected to him, that there is equal *Contrariety to Truth* in such Actions, as in the greatest *Villany*: He, in answer to it, really unawares gives up his whole Cause. He must own, that there may be the *strictest Truth and Certainty* about Trifles; so there may be the most *obvious Falshood* signified by *trifling Actions*. If then *Significancy of Falshood* be the very same with *moral Evil*, all Crimes must be equal. He answers, that *Crimes* increase according to the *Importance* of the Truth denied; and so the *Virtue* increases, as the *Importance* of the Truths affirmed. Then

Signifying
of Truth
equal in
unequal
Virtue.

Virtue and Vice increase, as the *Importance* of Propositions affirmed or denied;

But *Signification of Truth and Falshood* does not so increase:

Therefore *Virtue and Vice* are not the same with *Signification of Truth or Falshood*.

But what is this *Importance of Truth*? Nothing else but the *Moment or Quantity* of good or evil, either *private or publick*, which should be produced by Actions, concerning which these *true Judgments* are made. But 'tis plain, the *Signification of Truth or Falshood* is not varied by this Im-

per-

portance; therefore *Virtue* or *Vice* denote something different from this Signification.

But farther, The Importance of Actions toward publick Good or Evil, is not the *Idea of Virtue* or *Vice*: Nor does the one prove *Virtue* in an Action, any farther than it evidences kind Affections; or the other *Vice*, farther than it evidences either *Malice* or *Want* of kind Affections: Otherwise a casual Invention, an Action wholly from views of private Interest, might be as virtuous as the most kind and generous Offices: And Chance-Medley, or kindly intended, but unsuccessful Attempts would be as vicious as Murder or Treason.

Some Ambiguities in Mr. Woolaston.

One of Mr. Woolaston's Illustrations that Significancy of Falshood is the Idea of moral Evil, ends in this, " 'Tis acting a Lye." What then? Should he not first have shewn what was moral Evil, and that every Lye was such?

Another Illustration or Proof is that, " it is acting contrary to that Reason which God has given us as the Guide of our Actions." Does not this place the original Idea of moral Evil in counteracting the DEITY, and not in signifying Falshood? But, he may say, " Counteracting the DEITY denies him to be our Benefactor, and signifies Falshood." Then why is signifying Falshood evil? Why, 'tis counteracting the DEITY, who gave us Reason for our Guide. Why is this evil again? It denies the Truth, that " he is our Benefactor."

Another Illustration is this, " That signifying Falshood is altering the Natures of Things, and making them be what they are not, or desiring at least to make them be what they are not." If by altering the Natures be meant destroying Beings, then moral Evil consists in desiring the Destruction of other Natures, or in Evil Affections. If what is meant be altering the Laws of Nature, or desiring that they were stopped; this is seldom desired by any but Madmen, nor is this Desire evidenced by some of the worst Actions.

Actions, nor is *such Desire* always criminal; otherwise it were as great a Crime as any, to wish, when a *Dam* was broken down, that the Water would not overflow the Country.

If *making Things be what they are not*, means " attempting or desiring that any Subject should have two opposite Qualities at once, or a Quality and its Privation;" 'tis certain then, that according to the Stoicks, all vicious Men are *thorowly mad*. But 'tis to be doubted, that such Madness never hapned to even the *worst of Mankind*. When a Man *murders*, he does not desire his *Fellow-Creature* to be both *dead* and *living*. When he *robs*, he does not desire that both *he* and the *Proprietor* should at the *same time* possess. If any says, that he desires to have a *Right* to that, to which another has a *Right*; 'tis probably false Robbers neither think of *Rights* at all, nor are solicitous about acquiring them: Or, if they retain some *wild Notions of Rights*, they think their *Indigence, Conquest or Courage* gives them a *Right*, and makes the other's *Right* to *cease*. If *attempting to make old Qualities or Rights give place to new*, be the Idea of *moral Evil*, then every *Artificer, Purchaser, or Magistrate invested with an Office* is criminal.

Many of Mr. Woolaston's Propositions contradicted by Actions, are about *Rights, Duties, Obligation, Justice, Reasonableness*. These are long Words, principal Names, or *Attributes* in Sentences. The little Word [*his*,] or the Particles [*as, according*] are much better: they may escape Observation, and yet may include all the Ambiguities of *Right, Property, Agreement, Reasonableness*: Treating Things as they are, and not as they are not: Or, According to what they are, " or are not," are Expressions: he probably had learned from another truly great Name, who has not explained them sufficiently.

It may perhaps not seem improper on this occasion to observe, that in the *Quasi Contractus*, the *Civilians* do not imagine any Act of the Mind of the *Person obliged* In *Quasi Contracts or Tacit, no Signification of Truth.*

to be really signified, but by a sort of *Fictio juris* supposing it, order him to act as if he had contracted, even when they know that he had *contrary Intentions*.

In the *Tacit Conventions*, 'tis not a *Judgment* which is signified, but an *Act of the Will transferring Right*, in which there is no Relation to *Truth or Falshood* of it self. The *Non-performance of Covenants* is made *penal*, not because of their *signifying Falshoods*, as if this were the Crime in them: But it is necessary, in order to preserve *Commerce* in any Society, to *make effectual all Declarations of Consent to transfer Rights* by any usual *Signs*, otherwise there could be no *Certainty* in *Mens Transactions*.

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S E C T. IV.

Shewing the Use of Reason concerning Virtue and Vice, upon Supposition that we receive these Ideas by a Moral Sense.

HAD these who insist so much upon the *Truths antecedent Reasonableness of Virtue*, told us distinctly what is reasonable or probable concerning it, many of our Debates had been prevented. Let us consider what *Truths concerning Actions Men could desire to know, or prove by Reason*. I fancy they may be reduced to these Heads. 1. "To know whether there are not *some Actions or Affections* which obtain the *Approbation* of any Spectator or Observer, and others move his *Dislike* and *Condemnation*?" This Question, as every Man can answer for himself, so *universal Experience and History* shew, that in all Nations it is so; and consequently the *moral Sense is universal*. 2. "Whether there be any particular *Quality*, which, wherever it is apprehended, gains *Approbation*, and the contrary rises *Disapprobation*?" We shall find this *Quality* to be *kind Affection*, or Study of the Good of others; and thus the *moral Senses* of Men are generally *uniform*. About these two Questions there is little reasoning; we know how to answer them from reflecting on our own *Sentiments*, or by consulting others. 3. "What Actions do really evidence *kind Affections*, or do really tend to the greatest publick Good?" About this Question is all the special Reasoning of those who treat of the particular *Laws of Nature*, or even of *Civil Laws*: This is the largest Field and the most useful Subject of Reasoning, which remains upon every Scheme of *Morals*. 4.

"What are the Motives which, even from Self-Love, would excite each Individual to do those Actions which are publickly useful?" 'Tis probable indeed, no Man would approve as virtuous an Action *publickly useful*, to which the Agent was excited only by *Self-Love*, without any kind Affection: 'Tis also probable that no view of *Interest* can raise that kind affection, which we approve as virtuous; nor can any Reasoning do it, except that which shews some *moral Goodness*, or kind Affections in the Object; for this never fails where it is observed or supposed in any Person to raise the *Love* of the Observer; so that *Virtue* is not properly taught.

Yet since all Men have naturally *Self-Love* as well as *kind Affections*, the former may often counteract the latter, or the latter the former; in each case the Agent is *uneasy*, and in some degree *unhappy*. The first *rash Views* of human Affairs often represent *private Interest* as opposite to the *Publick*: When this is apprehended, *Self-Love* may often engage Men in *publickly hurtful Actions*, which their *moral Sense* will condemn; and this is the ordinary Cause of Vice. To represent these Motives of *Self-Interest*, to engage Men to publickly useful Actions, is certainly the most necessary Point in Morals. This has been so well done by the *antient Moralists*, by Dr. *Cumberland*, *Puffendorf*, *Grotius*, *Shaftesbury*; 'tis made so certain from the *divine Government* of the World, the *State of Mankind*, who cannot subsist without Society, from universal *Experience* and *Consent*, from *inward Consciousness* of the Pleasure of kind Affections, and *Self-Approbation*, and of the *Torments of Malice*, or *Hatred*, or *Envy*, or *Anger*; that no Man who considers these things, can ever imagine he can have any possible *Interest* in opposing the publick Good; or in checking or restraining his kind Affections; nay if he had no *kind Affections*, his very *Self-Love* and Regard to his private Good might excite him to publickly useful Actions, and dissuade from the contrary.

What farther should be provable concerning *Virtue*, whence it should be called *reasonable antecedently to all Affection*,

fection, or Interest, or Sense, or what it should be fit for, one cannot easily imagine.

Perhaps what has brought the Epithet *Reasonable*, or *flowing from Reason*, in opposition to what flows from *Instinct, Affection, or Passion*, so much into use, is this, "That it is often observed, that the very Best of our particular *Affections* or *Desires*, when they are grown violent and *passionate*, thro' the *confused Sensations* and *Propensities* which attend them, do make us incapable of considering calmly the whole *Tendency* of our *Actions*, and lead us often into what is *absolutely pernicious*, under some Appearance of *relative* or *particular Good*." This indeed may give some ground for distinguishing between *passionate Actions*, and those from *Calm Desire* or *Affection* which employs our *Reason* freely: But can never set *rational Actions* in Opposition to those from *Instinct, Desire* or *Affection*. And it must be owned, that the most perfect *Virtue* consists in the *calm, unpassionate Benevolence*, rather than in particular *Affections*.

If one asks "how do we know that our *Affections* are right when they are kind?" *How we judge of our Moral Sense.* What does the Word [right] mean? Does it mean *what we approve*? This we know by *Consciousness* of our *Sense*. Again, how do we know that our *Sense* is right, or that we *approve our Approbation*? This can only be answered by another Question, viz. "How do we know we are pleased when we are pleased?" — Or does it mean, "how do we know that we shall always approve what we now approve?" To answer this, we must first know that the *same Constitution* of our *Sense* shall always remain: And again, that we have applied our selves carefully to consider the *natural Tendency* of our *Actions*. Of the *Continuance* of the same Constitution of our *Sense*, we are as sure as of the Continuance of *Gravitation*, or any other *Law of Nature*: The *Tendency* of our own *Actions* we cannot always know; but we may know certainly that we *heartily and sincerely* studied to act according to what, by all the Evidence now in our Power

to obtain, appeared as most probably tending to publick Good. When we are conscious of this *sincere Endeavour*, the evil Consequences which we would not have foreseen, never will make us condemn our Conduct. But without this *sincere Endeavour*, we may often approve at *present* what we shall afterwards condemn.

How our Moral Sense is corrected by Reason. If the Question means, "How are we sure that we approve, all others shall also approve?" Of this we can be sure upon no Scheme; but 'tis highly probable that the *Senses* of all Men are pretty uniform: That the DEITY also approves *kind Affections*, otherwise he would not have implanted them in us, nor determined us by a *moral Sense* to approve them. Now since the *Probability* that Men shall judge truly, abstracting from any presupposed *Prejudice* is greater than that they shall judge *falsely*; 'tis more probable, when our Actions are really kind and publickly useful, that all *Observers* shall judge truly of our *Intentions*, and of the *Tendency* of our Actions and consequently approve what we approve our selves than that they shall judge *falsely* and condemn them.

If the Meaning of the Question be, "Will the doing what our *moral Sense* approves tend to our *Happiness* and to the avoiding *Misery*?" 'Tis thus we call a *Taste* wrong, when it makes that Food at present grateful, which shall occasion *future Pains*, or *Death*. This Question concerning our *Self-Interest* must be answered by such Reasoning as was mentioned above to be well managed by our *Moralists* both antient and modern.

Thus there seems no part of that Reasoning which we ever used by *Moralists*, to be superseded by supposing *moral Sense*. And yet without a *moral Sense* there is no *Explanation* can be given of our *Ideas* of *Morality*; nor of the *Reasonableness* supposed antecedent to all *Instincts*, *Affections*, or *Sense*.

"But may there not be a *right* or *wrong* State of our *moral Sense*, as there is in our other *Senses*, according as they represent their Objects to be *as they really are*, or represent them otherwise?" So may not our *moral Sense* approve that which is *vicious*, and *disapprove* *Virtue*, as a *sickly* *Palate* may dislike *grateful* *Food*, or a *vitiating* *Sight* misrepresent *Colours*, or *Dimensions*? Must we not know therefore *antecedently* what is *morally* *Good* or *Evil* by our *Reason*, before we can know that our *moral Sense* is *right*?

To answer this, we must remember that of the *sensible* *Ideas*, some are allowed to be only *Perceptions* in our *Minds*, and not *Images* of any like *external* *Quality*, as *Colours*, *Sounds*, *Tastes*, *Smells*, *Pleasure*, *Pain*. Other *Ideas* are of something *external*, as *Duration*, *Number*, *Extension*, *Motion*, *Rest*: These latter, for distinction, we may call *concomitant* *Ideas* of *Sensation*, and the former *purely* *sensible*. As to the *purely* *sensible* *Ideas*, we know they are alter'd by any *Disorder* in our *Organs*, and made *different* from what arise in us from the same *Objects* at other times. We do not denominate *Objects* from our *Perceptions* during the *Disorder*, but according to our *ordinary* *Perceptions*, or those of others in *good* *Health*: Yet nobody imagines that therefore *Colours*, *Sounds*, *Tastes*, are not *sensible* *Ideas*. In like manner many *Circumstances* diversify the *concomitant* *Ideas*: But we denominate *Objects* from the *Appearances* they make to us in an *uniform* *Medium*, when our *Organs* are in *no* *disorder*, and the *Object* not very *distant* from them. But none therefore imagines that it is *Reason* and not *Sense* which discovers these *concomitant* *Ideas*, or *primary* *Qualities*.

Just so in our *Ideas* of *Actions*. These three Things are to be distinguished, 1. The *Idea* of the *external* *Motion*, known first by *Sense*, and its *Tendency* to the *Happiness* or *Misery* of some *sensitive* *Nature*, often infer'd by *Argument*:

ment or Reason. 2. *Apprehension* or *Opinion* of the *Affections* in the Agent, concluded by our *Reason*: So far the Idea of an *Action* represents something *external* to the Observer. 3. The *Perception* of *Approbation* or *Disapprobation* arising in the Observer, according as the *Affections* of the Agent are apprehended *kind* in their *just Degree*, or *deficient*, or *malicious*. This *Approbation* cannot be supposed an *Image* of anything *external*, more than the *Pleasure* of *Harmony*, of *Taste*, of *Smell*. But let none imagine, that calling the *Ideas* of *Virtue* and *Vice* *Perceptions* of a *Sense*, upon apprehending the *Actions* and *Affections* of another does diminish their *Reality*, more than the like *Assertions* concerning all *Pleasure* and *Pain*, *Happiness* or *Misery*. Our *Reason* does often correct the *Report* of our *Senses*, about the *natural Tendency* of the external *Action*, and corrects *rash Conclusions* about the *Affections* of the Agent. But whether our *moral Sense* be subject to such a *Disorder*, as to have *different Perceptions*, from the same apprehended *Affections* in an Agent, at *different times*, as the *Eye* may have of the *Colours* of an unaltered Object, 'tis not easy to determine: Perhaps it will be hard to find any *Instances* of such a *Change*. What *Reason* could correct, if it fell into such a *Disorder*, I know not; except suggesting to its *Remembrance* its former *Approbations*, and representing the *general Sense* of Mankind. But this does not prove *Ideas* of *Virtue* and *Vice* to be previous to a *Sense*, more than a like *Correction* of the *Ideas* of *Colour* in a Person under the *Faundice*, proves that *Colours* are perceived by *Reason*, previously to *Sense*.

If any say, "this *moral Sense* is not a *Rule*:" What means that Word? It is not a *strait rigid Body*: It is not a *general Proposition*, shewing what *Means* are fit to obtain an end: It is not a *Proposition*, asserting, that a *Superior* will make those happy who act one way and miserable who act the contrary way. If these be the *Meanings* of *Rule*, it is no *Rule*; yet by reflecting upon it our *Understanding* may may find out a *Rule*. But what *Rule* of *Actions* can be
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formed without Relation to some *End* proposed? Or what *End* can be proposed, without presupposing *Instincts*, *Desires*, *Affections*, or a *moral Sense*, it will not be easy to explain.



S E C T V.

Shewing that Virtue may have whatever is meant by Merit; and be rewardable upon the Supposition, that it is perceived by a Sense, and elected from Affection or Instinct.

SOME will not allow any Merit in Actions flowing from kind Instincts: "Merit, say they, attends Actions to which we are excited by Reason alone, or to which we freely determine our selves. The Operation of Instincts or Affections is necessary, and not voluntary; nor is there more Merit in them than in the Shining of the Sun, the Fruitfulness of a Tree, or the Over-flowing of a Stream, which are all publickly useful."

*Merit,
what.*

But what does Merit mean? or Praise-worthy things? Do these Words denote the "Quality in Actions, which gains Approbation from the Observer? Or, 2dly, Are these Actions called meritorious, "which, when any Observer does approve all other Observers approve him for his Approbation of it, and would condemn any Observer who did not approve these Actions?" These are the only Meanings of meritorious, which I can conceive as distinct from rewardable, which is considered hereafter separately.

Now we endeavoured already to shew, that "no Reason can excite to Action previously to some End, and that no End can be proposed without some Instinct or Affection." What then can be meant by being excited by Reason, as distinct from all Motion of Instincts or Affections?

Then *determining our selves freely*, does it mean *acting without any Motive or exciting Reason*? If it did not mean this, it cannot be opposed to *acting from Instinct or Affections*, since all *Motives or Reasons* presuppose them. If it do mean this, that "Merit is found only in Actions done without *Motive or Affection*, by mere *Election*, without prepollent *Desire* of one *Action or End* rather than its opposite, or without *Desire of that Pleasure* which * some do suppose follows upon any *Election*, by a natural *Connexion*:" Then let any Man consider whether he ever acts in this manner by mere *Election*, without any previous *Desire*? And again, let him consult his own Breast, whether such kind of Action gains his *Approbation*? Upon seeing a Person not more disposed by *Affection, Compassion, or Love or Desire*, to make his Country happy than miserable, yet choosing the one rather than the other, from no *Desire of publick Happiness*, nor *Aversion to the Torments of others*, but by such an *unaffectionate Determination*, as that by which one moves his *first Finger* rather than the *second*, in giving an Instance of a *trifling Action*; let any one ask if this Action should be *meritorious*: and yet that there should be no *Merit* in a *tender compassionate Heart*, which shrinks at every *Pain* of its *Fellow-Creatures*, and

* This is the Notion of *Liberty* given by the Archbishop of Dublin, in his most ingenious Book, *De Origine Mali*. This Opinion does not represent *Freedom of Election*, as opposite to all *Instinct or Desire*; but rather as arising from the *Desire of that Pleasure supposed to be connected with every Election*. Upon his Scheme there is a *Motive and End* proposed in every *Election*, and a natural *Instinct* toward *Happiness* presupposed: Tho' 'tis such a *Motive and End* as leaves us in perfect *Liberty*. Since it is a *Pleasure or Happiness*, not connected with one thing more than another, but following upon the *Determination* it self,

triumphs in their *Happiness*; with kind *Affections* and strong *Desire* labouring for the publick Good. If this be the Nature of *meritorious Actions*; I fancy every honest Heart would disclaim all *Merit in Morals*, as violently as the old *Protestants* rejected it in *Justification*.

But let us see which of the two Senses of *Merit* or *Praiseworthiness* is founded on this (I won't call it *unreasonable* or *casual*) but *unaffectionate Choice*. If *Merit* denotes the *Quality moving the Spectator to approve*, then there may be *unaffectionate Election* of the greatest Villany, as well as of the most useful Actions; but who will say that they are *equally approved*?—But perhaps 'tis not the *mere Freedom of Choice* which is approved, but the *free Choice of publick Good*, without any *Affection*. Then Actions are approved for *publick Usefulness*, and not for *Freedom*. Upon this Supposition the *Heat of the Sun*, the *Fruitfulness of a Tree*, would be *meritorious*: or if one says, “these are not *Actions*,” they are at least *meritorious Qualities, Motions, Attractions*, &c. And a *casual Invention* may be *meritorious*. — Perhaps *Free Election* is a *Conditio sine qua non*, and *publick Usefulness* the immediate Cause of Approbation; neither separately, but both jointly are *meritorious*: *Free Election* alone is not *Merit*; *Publick Usefulness* alone is not *Merit*; but both concurring. Then should any Person by *mere Election*, without any *Desire* to serve the publick, set about *Mines*, or any *useful Manufacture*; or should a Person by *mere Election* stab a Man, without knowing him to be a *publick Robber*; here both *free Election* and *publick Usefulness* may concur: Yet will any one say there is *Merit* or *Virtue* in such Actions? Where then shall we find *Merit*, unless in kind *Affections*, or *Desire* and *Intention* of the publick Good? This moves our *Approbation* wherever we observe it: and the want of this is the true Reason why a *Searcher for Mines*, a *free Killer* of an unknown Robber, the *warming Sun*, or the *fruitful Tree*, are not counted *meritorious*.

But it may be said, that to make an Action *meritorious* it is necessary not only that the Action be *publickly useful* but that it be *known* or *imagined* to be *such*, before the

gent freely chuses it. But what does this add to the former Scheme? Only a *Judgment* or *Opinion* in the *Understanding*, concerning the *natural Tendency* of an *Action* to the publick Good: Few, it may be presumed, will place *Virtue* in *Assent* or *Dissent*, or *Perceptions*. And yet this is all that is superadded to the former Case. The Agent must not *desire* the publick Good, or have any *kind Affections*. This would spoil the *Freedom of Choice*, according to their Scheme, who insist on a *Freedom opposite to Affections* or *Instincts*: But he must *barely know* the Tendency to publick Good, and without any *Propensity* to, or *Desire* of, the Happiness of others, by an *arbitrary Election*, acquire his Merit. Let every Man judge for himself, whether these are the Qualities which he *approves*,

What has probably engaged many into this way of speaking, "that *Virtue* is the Effect of *rational Choice*," and not of *Instincts* or *Affections*," is this; they find, that "some *Actions* flowing from particular kind *Affections*, are sometimes condemned as *evil*," because of their *bad Influence* upon the State of larger Societies; and that the *Hurry* and *confused Sensations* of any of our Passions, may divert the Mind from considering the *whole Effect* of its *Actions*: They require therefore to *Virtue* a *calm and undisturbed Temper*.

There is indeed some ground to recommend this Temper as very necessary in many Cases; and yet some of the most *passionate Actions* may be perfectly good. But in the calmest Temper there must remain *Affection* or *Desire*, some implanted *Instinct* for which we can give no *reason*; otherwise there could be no *Action* of any kind. As it was shewn above in the first Section.

If *meritorious Actions* are these which whosoever does not approve, is himself condemned by others; the Quality by which they are constituted *meritorious* in this Sense, is the same which moves our *approbation*. We condemn any person who does not approve that which we our selves approve: We presume the *Sense* of others to be constituted like

like our own; and that any other Person, would he attend to the Actions which we approve, would also approve them, and love the Agent; when we find that another does not approve what we approve, we are apt to conclude, that he has not had kind Affections toward the Agent, or that some evil Affection makes him overlook his Virtues, and on this account condemn him.

Perhaps by meritorious is meant the same thing with another Word used in like manner, viz. rewardable. Then indeed the Quality in which Merit or Rewardableness is founded, is different from that which is denoted by Merit in the former Meanings.

Rewardable, or deserving Reward, denotes either that Quality which would incline a superior Nature to make an Agent happy: Or, 2dly, That Quality of Actions which would make a Spectator approve a superior Nature, when he conferred Happiness on the Agent, and disapprove that Superior, who inflicted Misery on the Agent, or punished him. Let any one try to give a Meaning to the Word rewardable distinct from these, and not satisfy himself with the Words worthy of, or deserving, which are of very complex and ambiguous Signification.

Now the Qualities of an Action determining a powerful Nature to reward it, must be various, according to the Constitution and Affections of that Superior. If he has a moral Sense, or something analagous of a more excellent sort, by which he is determined to love those who evidence kind Affections, and to desire their Happiness, then kind Affection is a Quality moving to Reward.

But farther, if this Superior be benevolent, and observe that inferior Natures can by their mutual Actions promote their mutual Happiness; then he must incline to excite them to publicly useful Actions, by Prospects of private Interest to the Agent, if it be needful: Therefore he will engage them to publicly useful Actions by Prospects of Rewards, whatever be the internal Principle of their Actions.

ons, or whatever their *Affections* be. These two *Qualities* in *Actions*, viz. *flowing from kind Affections*, and *publick Usefulness* concurring, undoubtedly incline the *benevolent Superior* to confer *Haapiness*: The *former alone*, where, thro' want of *Power*, the *Agent* is disappointed of his kind *Intentions*, will incline a *benevolent Superior* to reward; and the *want of Power* in the *Agent* will never incline him to punish. But the *want of kind Affections*, altho there be *publickly useful Actions*, may be so offensive to the *moral Sense* of the *superior Nature*, as to prevent *Reward*, or excite to *punish*; unless this *Conduct* would occasion greater *publick Evil*, by withdrawing from many *Agents* a *necessary Motive* to *publick Usefulness*, viz. the *Hope of Reward*.

But if the *Superior* were *malicious* with a *moral Sense* *contrary to ours*, the *contrary Affections* and *Tendency of Actions* would excite to reward, if any such thing could be expected from such a *Temper*.

If *Actions* be called *rewardable*, when "a *Spectator* would approve the *superior Mind* for conferring Rewards on such *Actions*:" Then various *Actions* must be *rewardable*, according to the *moral Sense* of the *Spectator*. Men approve rewarding all *kind Affections*: And if it will promote *publick Good* to promise Rewards to *publickly useful Actions* from whatsoever *Affections* they proceed, it will evidence *Benevolence* in the *Superior* to do so. And this is the Case with *human Governors*, who cannot dive into the *Affections* of Men.

Some strongly assert (which is often the only Proof) that "to make an *Action* *rewardable*, the *Agent* should have had Inclinations to evil as well as to good." What does this mean, That a good governing *MIND* is only inclined to make an *Agent* happy. or to confer a *Reward* on him when he has some *evil Affections*, which yet are surmounted by the *benevolent Affections*? But would not a

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benevolent Superior incline to make any *benevolent Agent* happy, whether he had any weaker evil Inclinations or not? Evil Inclinations in an Agent would certainly rather have some Tendency to *diminish* the Love of the Superior Mind. Cannot a good Mind *love* an Agent, and *desire* his Happiness, unless he observes some Qualities, which, were they alone, would excite *Hatred* or *Aversion*? Must there be a Mixture of *Hatred* to make *Love* strong and effectual, as there must be a Mixture of Shade to set off the Lights in a Picture? Is there any Love, where there is no Inclination to make happy? Or is strong Love made up of Love and *Hatred*?

'Tis true indeed, that *Men* judge of the *Strength* of kind Affections generally by the contrary Motives of *Self-Love*, which they surmount: But must the DEITY do so too? Is any Nature the less lovely, for its having no Motive to make itself odious? If a Being which has no Motive to evil can be *beloved* by a Superior, shall he not *desire the Happiness* of that Agent whom he loves? 'Tis true, such a Nature will do good Actions without Prospect of any *Self-Interest*; but would any benevolent Superior study the less to make it happy on that account? — But if they apply the Word *rewardable* to those Actions alone, *which an Agent would not do without Prospect of Reward*: then indeed to make an Action in this Sense *rewardable*, 'tis necessary that the Agent should either have *no kind Affections*, or that he should live in such Circumstances, wherein *Self-Love* should lead to Actions *contrary* to the publick Good, and over-power any kind Affections; or that he should have *evil Affections*, which even in a good Constitution of the World, his *Self-Love* could not over-balance without *Reward*.

This poor Idea of *Rewardableness* is taken from the *Poverty* and *Impotence* of human Governors: Their Funds are soon exhausted; they cannot make happy all those who Happiness they desire: Their *little Stores* must be frugally managed; none must be rewarded for what good they will do without Reward, or for abstaining from Evils to which

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they are not inclined. Rewards must be kept for the *insolent Minister*, who without reward would fly in the Face of his Prince; for the *turbulent Demagogue*, who will raise Factions if he is not bribed; for the *covetous, mean-spirited, but artful Citizen*, who will serve his Country no farther than it is for his private Interest. But let any kind honest Heart declare what *sort of Characters* it loves? *Whose* Happiness it most desires? *Whom* it would reward if it could? Or what these *Dispositions* are, which if it saw rewarded by a superior Nature, it would be most pleased, and most approve the Conduct of the Superior? When these Questions are answer'd, we shall know what makes *Actions* rewardable.

★ we call all Actions *rewardable*, the rewarding of which we *approve*; then indeed we shall approve the rewarding of all *Actions* *which we approve*, whether the Agent has had any *Inclinations* or *Motives* to Evil or not: We shall also approve the *promising of Rewards* to all *publickly useful Actions*, whatever were the Affections of the Agents. If by this *Prospect of Reward* either *malicious* Natures are restrained from Mischief, or *selfish* Natures induced to serve the Publick, or *benevolent* Natures not able without reward to surmount real or apparent *selfish Motives*: In all these Cases, the *proposing Rewards* does really advance the Happiness of the *Whole*, or diminish its *Misery*; and evidences *Benevolence* in the superior Mind, and is consequently approved by our *moral Sense*.

In this last Meaning of the Word *rewardable*, these Dispositions are rewardable. 1. *Pure unmix'd Benevolence*. 2. *Prepollent good Affections*. 3. *Such weak Benevolence, as will not without Reward overcome apparently contrary Motives of Self-Love*. 4. *Unmix'd Self-Love, which by Prospect of Reward may serve the publick*. 5. *Self-Love, which by Assistance of Rewards, may overballance some malicious Affections*. If in these Cases *proposing Rewards* will increase the Happiness of the System, or diminish its Misery, it evidences *Goodness* in the Governor, when he cannot so well otherwise accomplish so much good for the whole.

If we suppose a Necessity of making all virtuous Agents equally happy, then indeed a Mixture of evil Dispositions, tho' surmounted by the good, or of strong contrary Motives overbailanced by Motives to Good, would be a Circumstance of some Importance in the Distribution of Rewards: Since such a Nature, during the Struggle of contrary Affections or Motives, must have had less Pleasure than that virtuous Nature which met with no Opposition: But as this very Opposition did give this Nature full Evidence of the Strength of its Virtue, this Consciousness may be a peculiar Recompence to which the unmixed Tempers are Strangers: And there seems no such necessity of an equal Happiness of all Natures. It is no way inconsistent with perfect Goodness, to make different Orders of Beings; and, provided all the Virtuous be at last fully content, and as happy as they desire, there is nothing absurd in supposing different Capacities and different Degrees; and during the Time of Probation, there is no necessity, nor the least shew of it, that all be equal.

Those who think "no Person punishable for any Quality, or Action, if he had it not in his Power to have had the opposite Quality, or to have abstained from the Action if he had willed it;" perhaps are not mistaken: but then let them not assert on the other Hand, that it is unjust to reward or make happy those, who neither had any Dispositions to Evil, nor could possibly desire any such Dispositions. Now if Mens Affections are naturally good, and if there be in their Fellows no Quality which would necessarily raise Malice in the Observer; but, on the contrary, all Qualities requisite to excite at least Benevolence or Compassion: It may be justly said to be in the Power of every one, by due Attention, to prevent any malicious Affections, and to excite in himself kind Affections toward all. So that the intricate Debates about human Liberty do not affect what is here alledged, concerning our moral Sense of Affections and Actions, any more than any other Schemes.

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Some alledge, that MERIT supposes, beside *kind Affection*, that the Agent has a *moral Sense*, reflects upon his own Virtue, *delights* in it, and *chuses* to adhere to it for the *Pleasure* which attends it*. We need not debate the Use of this Word *Merit*: 'tis plain, we approve a generous kind Action, tho the Agent had not made this *Reflection*. This Reflection shews to him a Motive of Self Love, the joint View to which does not increase our *Approbation*: But then it must again be owned, that we cannot form a just Conclusion of a *Character* from one or two kind, generous Actions, especially where there has been no very strong *Motives to the contrary*. Some apparent Motives of *Interest* may afterwards overballance the *kind Affections*, and lead the Agent into vicious Actions. But the *Reflection* on Virtue, the being once *charmed* with the lovely Form, will discover an *Interest* on its side, which, if well attended to, no other Motive will overballance. This Reflection is a great *Security* to the *Character*; this must be supposed in such Creatures as *Men* are, before we can well depend upon a *Constancy in Virtue*. The same may be said of many other Motives to Virtue from *Interest*; which, tho they do not immediately influence the *kind Affections* of the Agent, yet do remove these *Obstacles* to them, from *false Appearances of Interest*. Such are these from the Sanctions of *divine Laws* by future Rewards and Punishments, and even the manifest *Advantages of Virtue in this Life*: without *Reflection* on which, a *steady Course of Virtue* is scarce to be expected amidst the present Confusion of human Affairs.

* See Lord Shaftesbury's *Inquiry concerning Virtue*. Part I.

S E C T. VI.

How far a Regard to the Deity is necessary to make an Action virtuous.

SOME do imagine, that “to make an Action virtuous, it is necessary that the Agent should have previously known his Action to be *acceptable to the Deity* and have undertaken it chiefly with design to please or obey him. We have not, say they, reason to imagine a *malicious Intention* in many of the worst Actions: The *very want of good Affections in their just Degree*, must constitute *moral Evil*. If so, then the *moral Evil* in the *want of Love or Gratitude*, must increase in proportion to the *Causes of Love or Gratitude* in the Object: by the *Causes of Love*, they mean *those Qualities in the Object* upon Observation of which Love or Gratitude do arise in every good Temper. Now the *Causes of Love* toward the DEITY are infinite; therefore the want of the highest possible Degree of Love to him, must be infinitely evil——To be excited more by *smaller Motives* or *Causes* than by greater, to love those who are less lovely, while we neglect him in whom are *infinite Causes of Love*, must argue great *Perverseness* of Affections. But the *Causes of Love* in the DEITY, his infinite *Goodness* toward all, and even toward our selves, from whence springs all the Happiness of our Lives, are infinitely above any *Causes of Love* to be found in *Creatures*, therefore to act from Love to them without *Intention* to please GOD, must be infinitely evil.”

If this Reasoning be just, the best of Men are infinitely evil. The Distinction between *habitual* and *actual Intention* will not remove the Difficulty, since these Arguments

ments require *actual Intention*. An *habitual Intention* is not a present act of Love to DEITY, influencing our Actions more than actual Love to *Creatures*, which this Argument requires; but a prior general *Resolution* not at present repeated.

To find what is just on this Subject, we may premise some Propositions of which Men must convince themselves by *Reflection*.

II. There is in Mankind such a *Disposition* naturally, that they desire the Happiness of any known *sensitive Nature*, when it is not inconsistent with something more strongly desired; so that were there no *Oppositions of Interest* either private or publick, and *sufficient Power*, we would confer upon every Being the highest Happiness which it could receive. *How we compute the Goodness of Temper.*

But our *Understanding* and *Power* are limited, so that we cannot know many other Natures, nor is our utmost *Power* capable of promoting the Happiness of many: our Actions are therefore influenced by some *stronger Affections* than this general *Benevolence*. There are certain *Qualities* found in some Beings more than in others, which excite *stronger Degrees of Good-will*, and determine our *Attention* to their Interests, while that of others is neglected. The *Ties of Blood*, *Benefits conferred upon us*, and the *Observation of Virtue* in others, raise much more vigorous *Affections*, than that general *Benevolence* which we may have toward all. These *Qualities* or *Relations* we may call the *Causes of Love*.

However these *Affections* are very different from the general *Benevolence* toward all, yet it is very probable, that there is a *Regularity* or *Proportion* observed in the Constitution of our Nature; so that, abstracting from some acquired *Habits*, or *Associations of Ideas*, and from the more sudden *Emotions* of some particular Passions, that Temper which has the most lively *Gratitude*, or is the most suscep-

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tive of *Friendship* with virtuous Characters, would also have the strongest *general Benevolence* toward indifferent Persons: And on the contrary, where there is the weakest *general Benevolence*, there we would expect the least *Gratitude*, and the least *Friendship* or *Love* toward the *Virtuous*. If this *Proportion* be observed, then, if we express all these Desires of the good of others by the Name of *Benevolence*, we may denote the several *Degrees* in which Men possess these several kind Dispositions by the *Goodness of the Temper*: And the Degrees of Desire toward the Happiness of any Person, we may call the *Quantity of Love* toward him. Then,

The *Quantity of Love* toward any Person is in a compound Proportion of the apprehended *Causes of Love* in him, and of the *Goodness of Temper* in the Observer. Or $L = C \times G$.

When the *Causes of Love* in two Objects are apprehended equal, the *Love* toward either in different Persons is as the *Goodness of Temper*; or $L = G \times 1$.

When the *Goodness of Temper* is the same or equal, the *Love* toward any Objects will be as the *Causes*; or $L = C \times 1$.

The *Goodness of any Temper* is therefore as the *Quantity of Love*, divided by the apprehended *Causes*, or $G = \frac{L}{C}$. And since we cannot apprehend any Goodness in having the *Degree of Love* above the *Proportion* of its Causes, the most virtuous Temper is that in which the *Love* equals its *Causes*, which may therefore be expressed by Unity *

* See *Treat. 2. Sect. 3. Art. 11.* last Paragraph.

Hence it follows, that if there were any Nature incomparably more excellent than any of our *Fellow-Creatures*, from whom also we ourselves, and all others had received the greatest *Benefits*; there would be less Virtue in any small Degree of *Desire of his Happiness*, than in a like Degree of *Love* toward our *Fellow-Creature*. But *not loving* such a Being, or having a *smaller Degree of Love*, must evidence a much greater *Defect* in Virtue, than a like want of *Love* toward our *Fellow-Creatures*. For the *Causes of Love* being very great, unless the *Love* be also very great, the *Quotient* which expresses the *Goodness of Temper* will be very much below Unity.

III. To apply this to the DEITY is very obvious. Our *Affections* toward him arise in the same manner as toward our *Fellows*, in proportion to our *Attention to the Causes of Love in him*, and the *Goodness of our Temper*. The Reflection on his *Goodness* raises *Approbation* and *Complacence*, his *Benefits* raise *Gratitude*, and both occasion *Good-will* or *Benevolence*. Some imagine, that "his *Happiness* is wholly detached from all Events in this World, absolute, and unvaried in himself." And yet the same *Inclination of Mind* might remain in us, tho' we had this Opinion. When the *Happiness of a Friend* is in *Suspense*, we desire it; when he has obtained all that which we desired, the same *Inclination of Mind* seems to remain toward him, only without that *Uneasiness* accompanying Desire of an *uncertain Object*: Thus *Gravity* may be said to be the same when a Body is resting on a fixed Base, as when it caused descent.

Upon this Scheme of the divine Happiness, it is not easy to account how our Love to him could excite us to promote the *Happiness of our Fellows*. Our frequent *Contemplation* of such an amiable excellent Nature, might indeed tend to *reform or improve our Temper*.

If we imagine that the DEITY has such *Perceptions of Approbation* or *Dislike* toward Actions as we have our *selves*, then indeed our *Love* to him would directly excite us

us to do whatever he approves, and shun what he condemns. We can scarce avoid imagining, that the frequent recurring of Events *disapproved*, must be uneasy to any Nature, and that the observing *approved Actions* must be delightful.

If we imagine that the *divine Happiness*, or any part of it is connected with the Happiness of his Creatures, so that their Happiness is constituted the Occasion of his; then indeed our *Love to the DEITY* will directly excite us to all manner of *beneficent Actions*. 'Tis true, many good Men deny these two last Opinions, yet it is probable, when their Minds are diverted from *Speculations*, by Opportunities of Action, there recurs some Imagination of *Offence*, *Uneasiness* and *Resentment* in the DEITY, upon observing *evil Actions*; of *Delight* and *Joy* in beholding good Actions; of *Sorrow* upon observing the *Misery* of his Creatures, and *Joy* upon seeing them happy: So that by their *Love to the DEITY* they are influenced to beneficent Actions, notwithstanding their *speculative Opinions*. In our Conceptions of the DEITY, we are continually led to imagine a Resemblance to what we feel in our selves.

Whoever maintains these Opinions of the DEITY to be true, must also suppose "a particular *Determination* of all Events in the Universe;" otherwise this part of the divine Happiness is made *precarious* and *uncertain*, depending upon the *undetermined will* of Creatures.

The Diversity of Opinions concerning the *divine Happiness*, may lead Men into different ways of accounting for the *Influence* which the *Love of God* may have upon our Actions toward our Fellows: But the Affections toward the DEITY would be much the same upon both Schemes. Where there were the same just *Apprehensions* of the *divine Goodness* in two Persons, the *Love to the DEITY* in both would be proportioned to the *Goodness of Temper*. Tho' the highest possible *Degree* of Love to a perfect good DEITY, would evidence no more *Virtue of Temper*, than

proportioned Love to Creatures; yet the having only smaller Degrees of Love to the DEITY, would evidence a greater Defect of Goodness in the Temper, than any want of Affection toward Creatures.

Here it must be remembred, that in arguing concerning the Goodness of Temper from the Degree of Love directly, and the Causes of Love inversly, actual Attention to the Causes of Love is supposed in the Person. For 'tis plain, that in the best Temper no one Affection or Idea can always continue present, and there can be no Affection present to the Mind, toward any Object, while the Idea of it is not present. The bare Absence therefore of Affection, while the Mind is employed upon a different Object, can argue no evil in the Temper, farther than want of Attention, may argue want of Affection. In like manner, in the best Temper, there can be no Love toward an Object unknown: The want therefore of Love to an Object unknown, can argue no evil in the Temper, farther than Ignorance may argue want of Affection. It is certain indeed, that he who knows that there is a good DEITY, and actually thinks of him, and of all his Benefits, yet has not the strongest Love and Gratitude toward him, must have a Temper void of all Goodness; but it will not follow, that that Mind is void of Goodness which is not always thinking of the DEITY, or actually loving him, or even does not know him. How the want of Attention to the DEITY, and Ignorance of him, may argue an evil Temper, must be shown from different Topicks, to be considered hereafter.

IV. But previously to these Inquiries we must consider "what Degrees or Kinds of Affection are necessary to obtain the simple Approbation of Innocence." 'Tis plain, the bare Absence of all Malice is not enough. We may have the general Benevolence toward a mere sensitive Nature, which had no other desire but Self-Love; but we can apprehend no moral Goodness in such a Being: Nay, 'tis not every small

What Degrees of Affection necessary to Innocence.

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Degree of kind Affections which we approve. There must be some proportion of kind Affections to the other Faculties in any Nature, particularly to its Understanding and active Powers to obtain Approbation. Some Brutes evidence small Degrees of Good-Will, which make them be approved in their Kind; but the same Degrees would not be approved in a Man. There is an higher Degree expected in Mankind, to which, if they do not come up, we do not account them innocent. It is not easy to fix precisely that Degree which we approve as innocent by our moral Sense. Every kind Affection, if it be considered only with relation to its own Object, is indeed approved, such as natural Affection, Gratitude, Pity, Friendship: And yet when we take a more extensive View of the Tendency of some Actions proceeding even from these Affections, we may often condemn these Actions when they are apprehended as pernicious to larger Systems of Mankind. In the same manner we often condemn Actions done from Love to a particular Country, when they appear to be pernicious to Mankind in general. In like manner, Self-Preference and pursuing private Advantage abstractly considered, is innocent: But when it is apprehended as very pernicious in any case to the Safety of others, it is condemned.

Mankind are capable of large extensive Ideas of great Societies. And it is expected of them, that their general Benevolence should continually direct and limit, not only their selfish Affections, but even their nearer Attachments to others: that their Desire of publick Good, and Aversion to publick Misery, should overcome at least their Desire of positive private Advantages, either to themselves or their particular Favourites; so as to make them abstain from any Action which would be positively pernicious or hurtful to Mankind, however beneficial it might be to themselves, or their Favourites. To undergo positive Evil for the sake of positive Good to others, seems some Degree of Virtue above Innocence, which we do not universally expect: But to reject positive attainable good, either for

elves or our particular Favourites, rather than occasion any considerable *Misery* to others, is requisite to obtain the Approbation of *Innocence*. The want of this Degree we positively condemn as evil; and an Agent must rise above it by *positive Services* to Mankind, with some *Trouble* and *Expence* to himself, before we approve him as virtuous. We seem indeed universally to expect from all Men those good Offices which give the Agent no trouble or expence: Whoever refuses them is below *Innocence*. But we do not *positively condemn* those as evil, who will not sacrifice their private Interest to the Advancement of the *positive Good* of others, unless the private Interest be *very small*, and the publick Good *very great*.

But as the Desire of *positive private Good* is weaker than Aversion to *private Evil*, or Pain; so our *Desire* of the positive Good of others, is weaker than our *Aversion* to their Misery: It seems at least requisite to *Innocence*, that the stronger *publick Affection*, viz. our Aversion to the Misery of others, should surmount the weaker *private Affection*, the Desire of positive private Good; so that no prospect of Good to our selves, should engage us to that which would occasion *Misery* to others. It is in like manner requisite to *Innocence*, that our Aversion to the Misery of greater or equal Systems, should surmount our Desire of the *positive Good* of these to which we are more particularly attached.

How far it may be necessary to *Innocence* to submit to smaller *private Pains* to prevent the greater *Sufferings* of others, or to promote some great *positive Advantages*; or how far the Happiness of *private Systems* should be neglected for the Happiness of the *greater*, in order to obtain the Approbation of *Innocence*, it is perhaps impossible precisely to determine, or to fix any general *Rules*; nor indeed is it necessary. Our Business is not to find out "at how cheap" a Rate we can purchase *Innocence*, but to know what is "most noble, generous and virtuous in Life." This we know consists in sacrificing all *positive Interests*, and bearing all *private Evils* for the publick Good: And in submitting

ting also the Interests of all *smaller Systems* to the Interests of the whole: Without any other *Exception* or *Reserve* than this, that every Man may look upon himself as a *Part* of this System, and consequently not sacrifice an *important private Interest* to a *less important Interest* of others. We may find the same sort of Difficulty about all our other Senses, in determining precisely what Objects are *indifferent*, or where Pleasure ends, and Disgust begins, tho' the positive Degrees of the *grateful* and *ungrateful* are easily distinguished.

It is also very difficult to fix any precise Degree of Affection toward the DEITY, which should be barely requisite to Innocence. Only in general we must disapprove that Temper, which, upon Apprehension of the perfect Goodness of the DEITY, and of his innumerable Benefits to Mankind, has not *stronger Affections* of Love and Gratitude toward him, than those toward any other Being. Such Affections would necessarily raise frequent Attention and Consideration of our Actions; and would engage us if we apprehended any of them to be offensive to him, contrary to that *Scheme of Events* in which we apprehended the DEITY to *delight*, to avoid them with a more firm Resolution than what we had in any other Affairs. *Positive Virtue* toward the DEITY must go farther than a *restraint* abstaining from Offence, by engaging us with the greatest Vigor, to do whatever we apprehend as *positively pleasing*, or conducive to those Ends in which we apprehend the DEITY delights. It is scarce conceivable that any good Temper can want such Affections toward the DEITY, who once he is known, as were above supposed necessary to Innocence. Nor can we imagine *positive Degrees* of Goodness of Temper above Innocence, where Affections toward the DEITY do not arise proportionably.

What is here said relates only to the *Apprehensions* of a *moral Sense*, and not to those Degrees of Virtue which the DEITY may require by *Revelation*: And every one's Heart may inform him, whether or no he does not approve,

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least as *innocent*, those who omit many good Offices which they might possibly have done, provided they do a great deal of good; those who carefully abstain from every apprehended Offence toward the DEITY, tho' they might possibly be more frequent in Acts of Devotion. 'T's true indeed, the Omission of what we know to be required is positively evil: so that by a Revelation we may be obliged to farther Services than were requisite previously to it, which we could not innocently omit, after this Revelation is known: But we are here only considering our moral Sense.

V. Now let us inquire how far *Simple Ignorance* of a DEITY, or *unaffected Atheism* does evidence an evil Disposition, or Defect of good Affections below Innocence.

How far Ignorance of DEITY is Evil.

1. Affections arising upon *apparent Causes*, or present Opinions, tho' false, if they be such as would arise in the best Temper, were these Opinions true, cannot argue any present want of Goodness in any Temper, of themselves: The Opinions indeed may often argue a want of Goodness at the time they were formed: But to a benevolent Temper there is no Cause of Malice, or Desire of the Misery or Non-existence of any Being for itself. There may be Causes of ill-like, and Desire of Misery or Non existence, as the means of greater Good, or of lessening Evil.

2. No Object which is entirely *unknown*, or of which we have no Idea, can raise Affection in the best Temper; consequently want of Affection to an unknown Object evidences no evil. This would be the Case of those who never heard even the Report of a DEITY, if ever there were any such: Or who never heard of any Fellow-Creatures, one may make a supposition like to that made by Cicero. And this is perhaps the Case, as to the DEITY, of

any unfortunate Children, who may have some little Use of Reason, before they are instructed in any Religion.

If there really were an *Innate Idea* of a DEITY so imprinted, that no Person could be without it; or if we are so disposed, as necessarily to receive this *Idea*, as soon as we can be called moral Agents: Then no Ignorance of a DEITY can be innocent; all *Atheism* must be affected, or an Opinion formed, either thro' evil Affection, or want of good Affection below Innocence. But if the *Idea* of a DEITY be neither imprinted, nor offer itself even previously to any Reflection, nor be universally excited by Tradition, the bare Want of it, where there has been no Tradition or Reflection cannot be called criminal upon any Scheme. Those who make *Virtue* and *Vice* relative to a Law, may say, "Men are required to reflect, and thence to know DEITY." But they must allow *Promulgation* necessarily, before Disobedience to a Law can be criminal. Now previously to Reflection it is supposed impossible for the Agent to know the *Legislator*, or to know the Law requiring him to reflect, therefore this Law requiring him to reflect was not antecedently to his Reflection published to him.

The Case of *human Laws*, the Ignorance of which does not excuse, is not parallel to this. No Person under a Civil Government can be supposed ignorant that there are Laws made for the whole State. But in the present Supposition, Men antecedently to Reflection may be ignorant of the DEITY, or that there are Laws of Nature. If a Subject could thus be unapprized, that he lived under Civil Government, he should not be accounted *Compos Mentis*. The Supposition indeed in both Cases is perhaps wholly imaginary; at least as to Persons above Childhood. Children scarce imagine that ever any Person was wholly unapprized of a governing Mind, and of a Right and Wrong in Morals. Whether this is to be ascribed to innate Ideas, or to some necessary Determination of our Nature, to imagine a designing Cause of the beautiful Objects which occur to us, with a moral Sense, let the curious inquire.

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3. Suppose an Idea formed in a *benevolent Mind*, of other *sensitive Natures*, *Desire* of their existence and Happiness would arise.

4. A good *Temper* would incline any one to wish, that other Natures were *benevolent*, or morally Good, since this is the chief *Happiness*.

5. A good *Temper* would desire that the Administration of Nature were by a *benevolent* or good *Mind*.

6. All *Desire* of any Event or Circumstance inclines any Mind to search into the *Truth* of that Event or Circumstance, by all the *Evidence* within its power to obtain.

7. Where there is such *Desire*, and sufficiently obvious *Evidence* given in proportion to the *Sagacity* of the desiring Mind, it will come to the *Knowledge* of the *Truth*, if its *Desire* be strong.

Now from these Propositions we may deduce the following Corollaries.

1. Supposing the Idea of a good DEITY once apprehended, or excited either by *Report*, or the slightest *Reflection*; if there be *objective Evidence* in Nature proportioned to the *Capacity* of the Inquirer, for the Existence of a good DEITY, *Atheism* directly argues want of good Affection below Innocence.

2. If there be only the simple *Tradition* or *Presumption* of a governing Mind once raised; and if there be Evidence as before for his *Goodness*, to conclude the DEITY evil or malicious, must argue want of good Affection as before.

3. Suppose the Idea of an evil DEITY once excited, and some Presumptions for his *Malice* from *Tradition*, or slight *Reflection* upon particular Evils in Nature; to rest in this Opinion without Inquiry would argue want of good Affection;

Affection; to desire to reject this Opinion, or confute it by contrary Evidence, would argue *good Affection*: Suppose such contrary *Evidences* obvious enough in Nature to one who inquired as diligently about it as about his own *Interest*; to continue in the *false Opinion* cannot be innocent.

How Ignorance in human Affairs evidences a bad Temper.

VI. In like manner concerning our Fellow-Creatures, who are actually known to us.

4. To imagine Fellow-Creatures *morally Good*, either according to *Evidence* upon Inquiry, or even by a rash *Opinion*, evidences *good Affection*.

5. Imagining them Evil contrary to obvious *Evidence* argues *want of good Affection* below Innocence.

6. Retaining and inculcating an Opinion either of the *Causes of Love* in others, or of the *Causes of Aversion*, induces an *Habit*; and makes the Temper prone to the *Affection* often raised. Opinion of *Goodness* in the *DEITY* and our Fellows, increases *good Affection*, and improves the Temper: *Contrary Opinion* of either, by raising frequent *Aversions*, weakens *good Affection*, and impairs the Temper.

This may shew how cautious Men ought to be in passing Sentence upon the *Impiety* of their Fellows, or representing them as *wicked and profane*, or *hateful* to the *DEITY* and justly given over to eternal Misery: We may see what a wise *Mark* it is to know the *true Church* by, that "it pronounces *Damnation* on all others." Which is one of the Characters of the *Romish Church*, by which it is often recommended as the safest for Christians to live in.

The same *Propositions* may be applied to our Opinion concerning the *natural Tendencies* of Actions. Where *Evidence* is obvious as before, *good Affection* will pro-

duce true Opinions, and false Opinions often argue want of good Affection below Innocence. Thus, tho' in Assent or Dissent of themselves, there can neither be Virtue nor Vice, yet they may be Evidences of either in the Agent, as well as his external Motions. 'Tis not possible indeed for Men to determine precisely in many cases the Quantity of Evidence, and its proportion to the Sagacity of the Observer, which will argue Guilt in him, who contrary to it, forms a false Opinion. But Men are no better judges of the Degrees of Virtue and Vice in external Actions. This therefore will not prove that all false Opinions or Errors are innocent, more than external Actions: The Searcher of Hearts can judge exactly of both. Human Punishments are only Methods of Self-Defence in which the Degrees of Guilt are not the proper Measure, but the Necessity of restraining Actions for the Safety of the Publick.

VII. It is next to be considered, how *How want of Attention* to the DEITY can *tention evidences* argue want of good Affections, in any Agent, to whom he is known. *a bad Temper.*

Every good Temper will have strong Affections to a good DEITY, and where there is strong Affection there will be frequent Reflection upon the Object beloved, Desire of pleasing, and Caution of offence. In like manner every person of good Temper, who has had the Knowledge of *Country, a System, a Species*, will consider how far these great Societies may be affected by his Actions, with such attention as he uses in his own Affairs; and will abstain from what is injurious to them.

Attention to a DEITY apprehended as good, and governing the Universe, will increase the *Moment of Beneficence* in any good Agent, various ways, such as by Prospects of Reward, either present or future, by improving Temper thro' Observation of so amiable a Pattern, or raising Sentiments of Gratitude toward the DEITY, a part of whose Happiness the Agent may imagine depends upon

upon the Happiness of the Universe. In like manner, th
considering a *Species* or *System* may increase our good Offices,
since *their* Interests are advanced by good Offices to In-
dividuals.

But then from a like Reasoning to that in *Art. II.* 'tis
plain, that in *equal Moments* of good produced by two
Agents, the *Goodness of the Temper* is inversely as the several
additional Helps, or Motives to it. So that *more Virtue* is
evidenced by any given *Moment* of Beneficence from good
Affections only toward our *Fellows*, or particular Persons
than by the *same Moment* produced from the joint Consi-
derations of the DEITY, or of a general *System* or *Spe-
cies*.

But an injurious Action which appeared to the Agent
not only *pernicious to his Fellows*, or to particular Persons
but *offensive to the DEITY*, and pernicious to a *System*, is
much more vicious than when the Agent did not reflect
upon the DEITY, or a *Community*.

Nothing in
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VIII. We must not hence imagine, th
in order to produce greater Virtue in o
selves, we should regard the DEITY no f
ther, than merely to *abstain from Offense*.
Were it our sole Intention in beneficent A
tions, only to obtain the *private Pleasure*
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Virtue, this might seem the proper Mea
of having great Virtue with the lea
Expense. But if the real Intention, whi

constitutes an Action virtuous be the *promoting publi
Good*; then *voluntarily* to reject the Consideration of a
Motive which would increase the *Moment* of publi
Good, or would make us more vigorous and steadfast
Virtue, must argue *want of good Affection*. In any giv
Moment of Beneficence, the unaffected *Want* of Reg
to the DEITY, or to *private Interest*, does really arg
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tions, if they really do so, argues Virtue equal to, or greater than that in the former Case: And he *affected Neglect* of these Motives, that so we may acquit our selves, virtuously with the *least Expence* to our selves, or with the least Moment of publick Good, must evidence *want of good Affections*, and base *Trick and Artifice* to impose upon Observers, or our own Hearts. Therefore,

Since Gratitude to the Deity, and even Consideration of *private Interest*, tend to increase the Moment of our Beneficence, and to strengthen good Affections, the voluntary *Retaining* them with this View evidences Virtue, and *affecting* to neglect them evidences Vice*. And yet,

If the Moment produced by the Conjunction of these Motives, be not greater than that produced with unaffected Neglect of these Motives, from particular good Af-

* This may sufficiently justify the *Writers of Morality* in their proving, that "Virtue is the surest Means of Happiness to the Agent." 'Tis also plain from universal Experience, that a *Regard to the Deity*, frequent *Reflection* on his Goodness, and consequent *Acts of Love*, are the strongest and most universally prevailing *Means* of obtaining a good Temper. Whatever *Institution* therefore does most effectually tend to raise Mens *Attention*, to recal their Minds from the Hurry of their common Affairs, to instruct them in the Ways of promoting publick Good rather than the busy Part of the World without assistance would probably apprehend, must be so *wise and good*, that every honest Mind should rejoice in it, even tho' it had no other *Authority* than *human* to recommend it. Every one will understand that by this is meant a *publick Worship* on certain Days, in which a stop is put to Commerce, and the busy part of Mankind instructed in the Duties of *Piety* and *humanity*.

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fection, there is less Virtue in the former than in the latter.

Men may use Names as they please, and may chuse to call nothing *Virtue* but " what is intended chiefly to evidence *Affection* of one kind or other toward the DEITY." Writers on this Scheme are not well agreed about what this *virtuous Intention* is; whether only to evidence *Submission*, or *Submission* and *Love*, or to obtain the divine *Benevolence*, and private *Happiness* to the Agent, or to give *Pleasure* to the DEITY. But let them not assert, against universal Experience, that we approve no Actions which are not thus intended toward the DEITY. 'Tis plain, a generous compassionate Heart, which, at first view of the Distress of another, flies impatiently to his Relief, or spares no Expence to accomplish it, meets with strong *Approbation* from every Observer who has not perverted his *Sense of Life* by *School-Divinity*, or *Philosophy*. 'Tis to be suspected, that some *Vanity* must be at the Bottom of these Notions, which place *Virtue* in some *Nicety*, which active Tempers, have not leisure to apprehend, and only the *Recluse Students* can attain to.

To be led by a weaker Motive; where a stronger is alike present to the Mind, to love a Creature more than God, or to have stronger Desires of doing what is grateful to Creatures than to God, when we equally attend to both, would certainly argue some *Perversion of our Affections*; or to study the particular Good of one, more than that of a System, when we reflected on both: But as no finite Mind can retain at once a *Multiplicity of Objects*, so it cannot always retain any one Object. When a Person therefore not thinking present of the DEITY, or of a Community or System, does a beneficent Action from particular Love, he evidences *Goodness of Temper*. The bare Absence of the Idea of DEITY, or of Affections to him, can evidence no evil; otherways it would be a Crime to fall asleep, or to think any thing else: If the bare Absence of this Idea be no evil, the Presence of kind Affections to Fellow-Creatures cannot be evil. If indeed our Love to the DEITY excited to an

Action

Action, and at the *same time* Love to a *Creature* excited to the Omission of it, or to a contrary Action, we must be very criminal if the *former* do not prevail; yet this will not argue all Actions to be evil in which *pleasing the DEITY*, is not directly and chiefly intended. Nay, that Temper must really be *very deficient* in Goodness, which needs to excite it to any good Office, to recal the Thoughts of a *DUTY*, or a *Community*, or a *System*. The frequent recalling these Thoughts, indeed, does strengthen all good Affections, and increases the *Moment* of Beneficence to be expected from any Temper; and with this *View* frequently to recal such Thoughts, must be one of the best Helps to Virtue, and evidence high Degrees of it. Nay, we cannot call that Temper *entire* and *complete*, which has not the *strongest Affection* toward the greatest Benefactor, and the most worthy Object.

Beings of such Degrees of *Knowledge*, and such *Extent* of Thought, as Mankind are not only capable of, but generally obtain, when nothing interrupts their Inquiries, must naturally arise to the Knowledge of the *DEITY*, if their Temper be good. They must form *general Conceptions* of the whole, and see the *Order*, *Wisdom*, and *Goodness* in the *Administration of Nature* in some Degree. The Knowledge and Love of the *DEITY*, the *universal MIND*, is *natural* a Perfection to such a Being as Man, as any accomplishment to which we arrive by cultivating our natural Dispositions; nor is that Mind come to the *proper state* and *Vigor* of its kind, where *Religion* is not the main *Exercise* and *Delight*.

IX. There is one very subtle Argument on this Subject. Some alledge, "That since the *DEITY* is really the *Cause* of all the Good in the Universe, even of all the *Virtue*, or good *Affection* in Creatures, which are the seeming *Causes of Love* toward them, it must argue strange *Perversion* of Temper to love those in whom there is no *Cause of Love*, or who are (as they affect to speak) *nothing*, or *Emptiness* of all Goodness."

Whether
the *DEITY*
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“*ness*. The DEITY alone is amiable, in whom there is in-
 “finite *Fulness* of every amiable *Quality*. The DEITY, fa-
 “they, not without some Reason, is the *Cause* of every
 “pleasant *Sensation*, which he immediately excites accom-
 “ding to a general *Law*, upon the Occasion of *Motions* ar-
 “sing in our Bodies; that likewise he gave us that gener-
 “*Inclination*, which we modify into all our different *A-*
 “*fections*; God therefore, say they, is alone lovely. Other
 “Things are not to be beloved, but only the *Goodness*
 “God appearing in them; nay some do make the loving of
 “them, without considering God as displaying his *Good-*
 “ness in them, to be infinitely evil.”

In answer to this it must be owned, that “God’s being
 “the Cause of all the Good in the Universe, will no doubt
 “raise the highest Love to him in a good Temper, where
 “it reflects upon it.

But 1st, had all Men this Apprehension that “there was
 “no good in any Creature,” they really would not love
 them at all. But Men generally imagine with very good
 ground, that there are good Beings distinct from God, and
 produced by him: And whether this Opinion be true or
 false, it evidences no evil.

2. As upon this Scheme God is the Cause of all pleasant
Sensation, so is he the Cause of all Pain: He is, according
 to them, the Cause of that *Inclination* which we modify
 into evil *Affection*, as well as into good. If then we are
 to love God only, for what we call good *Affection* in Creatures,
 and not the Creatures themselves, we must also only love
 God upon observing evil *Affections* in Creatures, and have
 no *Aversion* to the basest Temper, since God gave the gen-
 eral *INCLINATION* alike in both Cases.

3. If we may suppose real Beings distinct from God,
 that their Affections are not God’s Affections, if God is
 not the only Lover and Hater, if our moral Sense is de-
 termined to approve kind Affections, and our Love or Benevo-

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hence must arise toward what we approve; or if we find an *Instinct* to desire the Happiness of every sensitive Nature, we cannot avoid loving Creatures, and we must approve any kind *Affections* observed in others toward their Fellows. 'Tis true, we must approve the *highest Affections* toward the DEITY, and condemn, as a *Deficiency* of just Affections toward GOD any Degree which is not superior to our other Affections. But still, *Affections* toward Creatures, if they be *distinct Natures* from GOD, must be approved.

4. If to make a Mind virtuous, or even innocent, it be necessary that it should have such sublime Speculations of GOD, as the τὸ πᾶν in the *Intellectual active System* (if we may call one *Agent* in many *Passive Organs* and *active System*) then God has placed the Bulk of Mankind in an absolute *Incapacity* of Virtue, and inclined them perpetually to infinite Evil, by their very *Instincts* and *natural Affections*. Does the *parental Affection* direct a Man to love the DEITY, or his Children? Is it the DIVINITY, to which our *Pity* or *Compassion* is directed? Is GOD the Object of *Humanity*? Is it a *Design* to support the DIVINITY, which we call *Generosity* or *Liberality*? Upon *Receipt of a Benefit*, does our Nature suggest only *Gratitude* toward GOD? Affections toward the DEITY may indeed often accompany Affections toward Creatures, and do so in a virtuous Temper: But these are distinct Affections. This Notion of making all virtuous Affections to be only directed toward GOD, is not suggested to Men by any thing in their *Nature*, but arises from the long subtle *Reasonings* of Men at leisure, and unemployed in the natural Affairs of Life.

5. If there be no Virtue or Cause of Love in Creatures, it is vain for them to debate wherein their Virtue consists, whether in regard toward the DEITY, or in any thing else since they are supposed to have none at all.

To conclude this Subject. It seems probable, that however we must look upon that Temper as exceedingly imperfect

perfect, inconstant, and partial, in which *Gratitude* to the universal Benefactor, *Admiration* and *Love* of the prime original Beauty, *Perfection* and *Goodness*, are not strongest and most prevalent Affections; yet particular *zions* may be innocent, nay virtuous, where there is actual *Intention* of pleasing the D E I T Y, influencing Agent.

F I N I S.

